Winter Interlude - Drawing on the Past - Explosions and Notes


[NB 22.11.2019 - the UK election looms, and the populist focus centres on political twists and turns; with the virtue signalling of respecting the marginally successful  British people's desires For 'Brexit'.

Yet whilst debate becomes deliberately emotionally charged by topics of Immigration and the NHS, there has been scant focus on what might be called  'The New British Business Model', that melds into the global and European economic realities.

The public has been swayed by long existing media-fuelled narratives, and yet the reality of most people's lives is that they know little or nothing about the economic realities and scenarios that lay ahead For Britain, whether a ST I Brexit, Canadian Credit or renegotiated terms outside of inside the EU.

Time perhaps to forget the emotive choices of the mass populace, and place Britain's future in the hands of those who actually know the commercial, sectors and trade terrain, on a country by country basis.

Once the fiscal and monetary massaging ends, it's all about the macro and micro fundamentals.

For the moment, I hope you enjoy the journey back in time].



Further to the previous 'Explosions and Ghosts' weblog per the contextual corporate backdrop to a notional 'Mini 3'; this article simply wishes to better convey the idea and use of exploded views with accompanying notes.

Such diagrams seek to better visually describe either the dissected operational elements of an item: as per the absorbing diagrams of machinary, or to - in design and engineering circles - better explain the concepts and operational systems being suggested or considered in New Product Development.

The accompanying graphic illustrates the coupling of 2 very basic concept sketches regards user configurability and re-configurability for the two variants of next generation Freelander, soon after the launch of Freelander 1 (CB40 / L20).

These showing exploded views of potential 'lifestyle' orientated possibilities for not the nearer-term expectant face-lift, but the replacement vehicle 7-9 years down the line, so 2004/5.

It was an effort to 'relegitimise' what was often but wrongly perceived by the 'old guard' as Land Rover as having sold its soul, so as to enter the high volume 'Soft-Roader' sector.

[NB the same argument raging today about New Defender, but with far more vigour given Defender's legendary status].

Hence this was part of an effort to re-strengthen the Green Oval badge in its new somewhat mainstream territory.

Freelander 1 had been developed as a merged effort between the Land Rover and Rover Cars divisions, with Rover conceptually exploring the market space long before the awful 200 Streetwise emerged.

From Odin and Pathfinder projects it had started to create somewhat compelling product propositions merging the notion of 4WD cars (previously seen with: AMC Eagle, Subaru, Audi) and with 'Active Lifestyle' vehicles (previously: Matra Rancho, Nissan Prarie, Honda Shuttle etc).

The concepts were decent enough and with familiar styling to late 1980s/early 1990s Cars products were a natural extension, in theory.

Aside from the 'Big Car', there was even a prototype Metro 'SUV' created which sounds hideous but was quite well resolved using the Honda Shuttle type of tall rear window. (Far better than Streetwise).

Except the product type(s) and usage did not fit-in with Rover's immediate brand values centred around driving comfort, ease and upmarket interiors; and so would have sent mixed messages to the market-place.

And could not be badged 'Road Rover' (even though echoing the 1950s and 1960s prototypes) because they would have undermined the Land Rover brands and its Range Rover sub-brand.

Obviously the natural home was with Land Rover and so Project CB40 / L20 was initiated to create a brand extension vehicle suited to mainstream vehicle drivers and users who themselves had become more demanding in the 1980s and 1990s with more lifestyle pursuits and the status derived from higher echelon automotive marques.

All this is well recognised 'history', as is the story of Freelander. Ultimately Freelander 1 was a vehicle that provided pseudo-adventurism for the singleton, couple and family with its 3-door removable hard-top and 'soft-back' and the 5 door in notional estate car station-wagon guise.

Freelander 1 was an immediate and long lasting hit with people, and was regards its mechanical architecture very innovative (car-based adapted FWD floor pan, low-cost 4x4 mechanics, first application of 'HDC' (Hill Descent Control) and made available in two model guises to maximise atraction and so sales potential and so revenues.

And giving the swelling market sector and so massive sales potential, the CB40 project had been given impetus and funding by BMW AG, and had created Land Rover products that were indeed 'Best in Class' off-road, compared to the Japanese competitor crop from Toyota (RAV4), Suzuki (Vitara), Honda (CR-V).

Yet besides its generally softened LR appearance (ie raised suspension, rounded 'shoulders', rear-door hung spare wheel, black composite bumpers - soon altered to be colour-matched) the look of the car did not invite buyer-users to be as adventuristic as the vehicle itself was certainly capable of both on grass and even up to semi-serious off-roading.

In short the first generation vehicle had already by mid 1998 become periodically lambasted as 'Car Park to Safari Park' because of the conventional suburban behaviour of its client-base.

It should be remembered that the mid 1990s was a returned short-lived economic boom period, so suburbanite holidays typically consisted of 'the Med' and 'the USA', so not involving the car. Instead increasing weekend and weeklong country-side getaways for city dwellers, for which Freelander appeared just right; able to bring back a bit of country-life glamour when returning home to the suburbs.

Freelander then was in very real terms the everyday representation of escapism, during the weekday grind, where the fantasies of country manor houses could be overlaid upon the suburban 'good life'.

[NB The vehicle was itself then to the urbane intelligencia merely a simularcrum object, representing an idea (Defender and Discovery and so true Off-Road escape) yet in detail far from the original; ie "all style and no substance"].

But that was not the case at all, since though it had its undeniable faults - engines, gearboxes, build quality, it was mechanically exactly the right solution for its rota of tasks.

It could do far more than it was generally called upon to do, but being more 'feminine' compared to its bigger siblings to match the mainstream, it did not automatically invite the buyer-user to become as adventuristic as he or she could have been.

Hence the main drawback to Freelander 1 was that it appeared 'weaker' than it actually was, and so any second generation model and its variants should do a better job of enticing the buyer-user and to become more adventuristic....to stack-up at the Supermarket Car Park, drive past the Safari Park and head to the lakes and hills for properly physically interactive 'escapes', from mountain biking in woodlands to camping to nature-watching.

Freelander needed to entice the driver and passengers into the free lands of the countryside, whether that be Cumbria in the UK, the Dolomites in Italy, near reach Bush or isolated beach in Australia or Savanna-lands of Southern Africa.

In short Freelander needed to better entice its owners to become greater participants of the Land Rover 'club' orientated around 'the land', from Farmers to Adventurer-Overlanders to Off-Roaders.
As of mid 1998, even with massively successful previous launch, it was seen that the 2nd generation vehicle would need to better self-advertise its true nature and intent.


[NB the concern was that If it did not evolved in the right direction, it could ultimately succumb to being criticised as a "hairdressers car", just as Suzuki's very capable SJ410 had done - itself later bought and adapted by true off-road enthusiasts; as has now partly happened to Freelander].

The accompanying pictorials illustrate very basic considerations as to how the DNA of the two Freelander variants could be evolved.

In real terms the mechanical package would be an evolution, so more had to be made of the BIW to yet further improve the User Experience. One aspect of CB40's Project Mission was regards 'Extra-Ordinary Customer Delight', fulfilled by the 3-door. So its successor would have to evolved the original USP, and so very basic thoughts were drafted to differentiate Freeland from its bigger stablemates, and provide yet more 'Surprise and Delight' in use.

And although the sketches were purely about 'Re-Configurability', Accesories and possible Technical Issues and not specifically Style (which was wholly the Studio's remit under Geoff Upex and George Thompson), it was inevitable that basic LR design schema and personal thoughts of the period influenced the basic bodystyle of the sketches.

So keeping to the increasingly geometric LR concepts that were 'flavour of the day' that had been drafted for the Disco 2 Update (L25 , seen a year later), Discovery 3 (L50) and Range Rover 3; but with reduced waistline height, reduced 'DLO' / greenhouse height and increased wheelbase, and possibly decreased ride height ( both W/B and H much exaggerated here for effect) so as to aid the 5 door's rear legroom and luggage space, even if it affected the 3-door's break/ramp-over angle, since it was never a 'rock-crawler'.

Freelander 2 was no where near yet becoming officially recognised as a formal NDP programme, since Freelander 1 had yet to be launched and Business and Technical Strategy was still in the motions of considering what best architectures/packages to use for all future LR products; and was thus in the midst of a major 4x4 and 4WD competitor, technical and market audit.

Specifically, the L50 programme (Discovery 3 initially called 'Heartland') and L40 (Defender 2, were being radically reconsidered, regards Advanced Suspension of the Disco, and Composite Skin Panels on the Defender), and were under major technical reconsideration.


This because the 4x4/SUV/X-Over market had advanced and so broadened so much even by late 1997. And because of the enforced possibilities of having to possibly share System Sets with BMW's upcoming X5. So much so that with concerns that X5 might compromise LR suspension capabilities (especially regards articulation and 'compliance'), thus the Concept Suspension Engineers on Heartland were initiatlly tasked with exploring various advanced systems beyond Airbags, known as 'Kinematic', into Rheo-Statically Controlled Electro-Hydraulic Systems, for very Variable Ride Height and extreme axle articulation. This was a exploratory engineering exercise in CAD modelling,when awaiting the full compliment of L50 Concept Engineers to form the team. Needless to say, it did not evolve into production].

As per Freelander 2, the shown sketch layouts show a Series/Defender influenced bodyside, which had been rightly previously dismissed on upmarket Range Rover since 1970, and so inevitably on the same platform the 'Rangie' based Discovery 1 and 2. That new Freelander bodyside, inspired by Defender, to add greater perceived shared DNA to its ancestor, with likewise implied visual strength (even if in reality Defender's body was torsionally poor).

That meant far greater visual prominence of the 'B' post, demonstrated by seperated shutlines of front and rear doors. The roll-bar of the 3dr would be seen in the shutlines of the 5-door. With the specific use of the diagonal shut-line on the 'adventuristic' 3-door, echoed in the rear closure of the 'family' 5 door (as per Defender). That gave a specific visual cue between both variants, so emphasising each variants' connectedness to the other. It made the 3 door appear more rugged, and with the rear of the 5 door inevitably be accessed by children and young teens, provided them with a direct psychological connection to the more trendy 3 door.

'Entry and Egress' had also been a bugbear of taller vehicles, especially for children and females, themselves obviously typically shorter than males. 'd always thought the visual clumsiness of typical after-market and later similar factory-fit items detracted from well considered vehicle lines and disrupted the aerodynamic boundary layer at sill level. Unless also used as 'rock sliders' (in very very rare instances) the standard types were very functional but cosmetically cumbersome.

Instead better to try to integrate a step within a structural cover to the structural inner-sill, that could obviously carry an adult's weight. This item - if possible - deformable enough to help protect the sill if lightly impacted, but also removable by after-market specialists, so as to be replaced with 'Rock Sliders' if needed.

The face of the vehicle shows the typical applied 'family' template of the period (longlasting until 2014 on Freelander). The wheels here obviously unrealistic - typically sketchy - used to echo the increasing prominance of the wheel arches, another LR 'family' trait to distinguish from less feature-line defined Range Rover. The wheel designs simply to constrast as 4-spoke 'rugged/sporty' and 8-spoke 'conventional' to enhance the personality of the variant.

Critically, onto the crux of the sketches, the variants' features:

Firstly, mention of the two bonnet types, providing choice between conventional (as shown on 3-door) and 'Castleated' version (as shown on 5-door). the latter echoing and literally expanding the 'Castleations' of original 1970 Range Rover.

The 'Castleations' mimicked the concept idea shown on the stylised version of previously illustrated 'AID' mechanical mule, with under-hinged storage pods upon either side of the bonnet top. On 'AID' used for farmer's tools etc, but here as a functional design cue to both original Range Rover and critically here what might have been Freelander's wholly off-road designed underling 'AID'. The Turrets act as access hatches for small basic storage space between the wing/fender and the inner-wing/ flitch. This for wet apparel, dried-out by the mesh inducted heat from the engine bay, that channelled airflow ducted-out at the rear. Critically, it also provided much improved aero-housing for the wing mirrors, which in cold temperatures would be de-frosted by the passing warm air. Thus in concept form at least a dual functional solution, though unfortunately unlikely as productionised.

The 3-door vehicle (simplistically then labelled 'Adventure') shows evolution of Freelander 1's BIW, with removable hardtop and so accompanying soft-back. The hardtop though with Alpine windows and no side windows, to assist rigidity. (Rear passengers look through 1/4 light windows)

However, Freelander 1 provided no open-air experience for the driver and front passenger, the sun roof a mediocre affair. So here the standard roof is replaced by what might be described as an 'intermediate fabric hood' - something between a fully insulated fabric all-weather convertible hood and a skimpy 'bikini-top' as seen on beach vehicles. Thus part insulated, but quickly removable and replacable, attached to windscreen top and new structurally significant Roll-Bar (for torsional rigidity, given no steel roof).

The idea obviously stemmed from the solution from the Lotus Type 111 (Elise Mk1), which sought a basic but durable solution to weatherproofing the car. Consisting of quick-release cant-rail bars, cross-braces and fabric hood cover. The cant-rail bars ensure tight fitment of the window into enclosed rubbers and channels water from the hood onto the windscreen. Given its inspiration from the admired sportscar, this notionally comprimised solution actually provides technical gravitas and greater useability and so enjoyment than a typical T-bar roof which requires removal and storage of 2 roof panels.

The removable hardback is similar to the 1997 car, as would be the soft-back installation. However, far greater feature made of the rear 1/4 light window. Initially seen is that its shape is reflected by that of a Side Storage 'Locker' located before the rear wheel.

[NB the term 'Locker' is also obviously synonymous with the slang for an LSD (Limited Slip Differential). Freelander's drivetrain system was effectively car derived and adapted, so not akin to the old norms of transfer-box and locking differentials. Yet the word itself provided association to the world of extreme off-road, and so was specifically used in its alternative meaning for storage].

Instead of being a fixed aspect of the BIW, the 1/4 light is a removable unit in itself, as per a Sports-Car, with eyelets for tie-down straps when securing a mountain bike or other equipment in the rear (when rear seats folded down or removed). It is locked-down with cam-levers into the roll bar and lower body. The Roll Bars and Sports Bars similarly finished in the same brushed aluminium or stainless steel to contrast with paint.

[NB there was also the idea that these 'Sports-Bars' with thick plexiglass window, would include 3 small fold-out legs in the frame, so that when removed from the vehicle able to function as either 2 low stools, or 1 stool and 1 low table. Thus in the old Land Rover spirit of dual use items; to sit and drink when camping overnight a literal Sports Bar (so providing a modern take on the Series 1 front grille, when used as a BBQ rack for outdoor cooking, and akin to Citroen 2CV's removable seats for external use].

That 'Side Storage Locker' (obviously lockable) provides greater security for items when the 2 soft-tops are removed. Deliberately mimicking the side lockers of Military Defenders and those of Motorhome and Caravan RVs. So as to be both wholly practical and cross-fertilise imagery of those arenas.
Inside the locker is an optional carry-bag or carry-case.

The carry bag itself in two versions:
a) in canvas to echo yesteryear canvas tops, and beach connotations.
b) rigid plastic and lockable itself, to echo idea of security and even possibly a stylised version of the iconic Jerry Can.

[NB This somewhat of an insider joke given Gerry McGovern's styling of Freelander 1; to be set-down in the vehicle's formal Engineering Specifications List, to which Styling would have to adhere].

These bags deliberately illustrating the diagonal of the bodyside aperture, to demonstrate its anticedance and obviously to fit snugly into the body panel recess. And as importantly, be ergonomic, since a heavier forward-biased weight in the hand assists the walking gait when carrying a load, since it assists the swing of the arm(s) in its pendulum effect.

The 5-door variant (then notionally labelled 'Interactive') echoes the diagonal of the original Series/Defender layout in its rear door, and thus critically also (as stated) evokes the 3-door vehicle. Just as the 3-door has become more open, so has this variant.

The most important elements being :
a) the Removable Rear 1/4 Light Windows.
b) the Transparant Top or Fabric Top.

Both these solutions create as far as is possible, the much sought for Open Air Effect within a closed vehicle.
The Removable 1/4 Light windows then opens the whole vehicle up when all other windows are wound down (including tailgate window that was so beloved of Freelander owners), even with a conventional roof structure. Whilst the installation of a transparent roof or retractable fabric roof further opens the car to what feels a near convertible status.

Given the pace of competition, such or similar 'Experience Features' would be needed to evolve the basic impetus of the Freelander sub-brand, create major differentiation, and so assisted the continued popularity of Freelander 2 amongst both previous owners possibly migrating elsewhere, and new buyers who could not obtain such aspects in competitor vehicles.

Besides the possibly considered extremity of the 'Turret Bonnet' and and possibly non-use of the 'Integrated Deformable Sill Step', many of these features are obviously not innovative in themselves, simply the merging of the previously very niche arena of Leisure 4x4s (typically American Jeep CJ-5 and Wrangler, with also LR NAS90) themselves obviously created from previous privateer adapted of their Utility 4x4s (Series1 and 2, and CJ-3 and 4), best exemplified in Beach and Mountain Trail America.

These vehicle feature considerations made - as either standard, part standard or options - necessary given the recognition of the new brand impetus that Jeep was via Wrangler derived/inspired Concepts: JEEPSTER, ICON and ECCO, aswell as efforts such as the DAKAR showcar upon standard 5-door Wrangler.

And so whilst Land Rover / Rover Group Powertrain Engineering had been the main proponents in creating Freelander 1's off-road credibility, Freelander 2 was envisaged by myself in Technical Stratagy as requiring as much BIW innovation (if not outright re-invention) as possible, to maintain the progress made on CB40 and grow the popularity through product uniqueness not only the UK and Europe, but critically further afield in both the obvious USA, Japan, Australia and South Africa, aswell as the then increasingly economically stable and newer EM BRIC economies.

[NB Freelander to especially shine in Brazil as the responsible 'tread lightly' off-roader, given the what was then the beginnings of the climatic spotlight upon the Amazon Rain Forest. As illustrated by the family friendly 'Rain Forest' Restaurant that had opened in Shaftesbury Avenue, Central London in that period].
Ultimately, with BMW divestment, and then under Ford's overtly tight financial regime, Freelander arguably suffered by not being given the breathing space and product planning impetus to evolve as originally intended given its two original first generation variants.

The 3 door was discontinued and the 5 door was replicated as a notionally better version of itself regards product quality and performance parameters. Critically under Ford the use of corporate common systems and components.

Moreover, Ford had its own decent margin Cross-Overs and SUVs in the USA, with Escape and Mazda Tribune, set against Freelander aswell as obviously its bigger SUVs. So Detroit sought even better margins from an 'upmarket' Freelander, especially given the costs of shipment from Halewood to North America, and that meant as much 'cost-down' on the 2nd generation programme as feasible.

Freelander's raison d'etre as a youthful 'young at heart' product for all ages - essentially offering lifestyle escapism and so freedom, effectively ceased when Ford's overtly conservative reinterpretation arrived in 2006 as a single model. Without the 3-door anymore, and without special design effort upon the 5-door to create a Land Rover spirit, the car became more soulness. This was sad given the visually perfect rendition of Discovery 3 / LR3 that reflected its own raison d'etre. Although softer in appearance, Freelander effectively became a smaller Disco.

[NB Disco 3 effectively reset the brand imagery of Land Rover. Its blocky, clean and detail punctuated look had been honed in the Studio since 1996, appearing in full resolution after Disco 2's facelift a full 8 years later. It's proud arrival was the very opposite of a near sorrowful eventual Freelander 2, and it rightly took the mantle of the archetype Land Rover].

The second generation vehicle was to the public little more than what appeared a better quality but uninspiring 're-skin' of the old car.

This was obviously not so, since it was based on a Ford-Europe derived EUCD platform (for Ford, Jaguar, Volvo, Land Rover) which merged the general architecture and technical demands of mainstream Ford and PAG (Premier Auto Group) brands.

And that meant priority of common denominator Engineering and Manufacturings scale and capacity plans across both Gaydon tech centre and Halewood production plant. Maximisation of platform business model targets, supplier pricing negotiations and plant utilisation.

It would be good to believe that that central corporate ambition of reduced NPD costs, meant monies could be redirected toward Discovery 3.

Ultimately, it meant that very unfortunately Freelander 2 did not get to evolve as initially envisaged (as herein) in 1997 - before formalised investigation - continued as a distinctly two variant model range line-up.
And as such, the original ambition of the sub-brand, was also highly diluted.

Freelander 2 became effectively re-orientated by the earnings promise from the American market. And that meant aspirant suburbanites simply seeking an affordable - though far less differentiated - of Land Rover ownership and associated prestige.

The expected American demand was such that the product could be philosophically diluted to reduce development costs, yet still provide substantive revenues.

Land Rover had undoubtedly been financially fortified by its American owner of the time, yet also was simultaneously seemingly stunted when 'Ford-ified' in its C/D segment entry, and segment expansion ambitions.

For attuned Business Strategists, Product Planners, Designers and Engineers, the corporate circumstantial realities of bringing and sustaining meaningfully differentiated vehicles to market determine everything.

The global boom of the late 1980s and 1990s, corporate profitability and the need to stay one step ahead, provided the strategic backdrop by which many manufacturers explored and developed attractive, segment distinct and characterful vehicles; the examples are too many to list here.

However, when a company is effectively fragile (as Land Rover was even in the late 1990s given its subsidisation of the entire Rover Group), or regional and global economies stagnate or contract (as seen immediately after 2001 and 2008), the creation of something altogether iconic becomes extremely hard, if not impossible, given the very necessary 'baton-down the hatches' corporate mentality.

Both events so in 1998 for Solihull and Gaydon.

BMW AG looking likely to divest Land Rover to ultimately Ford (and so my departure from Rover Group onto Lotus in late 1999), and Ford thereafter required to double-down on cost-saving measures to endure the bursting of the 'dot com bubble' and shock of 9/11 attacks.

Itself an era that had a massively negative toll on innovative NPD perspectives, philosophies and ambitions for Western VMs. Once again hit in 2008-9 by the Great Financial Crisis. In essence, western auto-manufacturing was 'under the kosh' for a decade and a half, the GFC again forcing the typical reaction of consolidation and cost-down.

[NB the macro and micro effects of which were and are still with us, as exemplified with Renault-Nissan-Mitsubishi and the more recent FIAT-Chrysler and PSA merger agreement].

In different circumstances, Freelander could have grown - as envisaged here - into much more than the much constrained second generation 5-door vehicle, which arguably led to its final demise in 2014. It offered little more than its mainstream badged competitors.

However, two decades earlier it had been envisaged as a new and substantive sub-brand in its own right, that actually added great value to the 'escapist absorption' that everyday people obviously desire whether on daily commute or into the countryside.

Whilst the fast developing EM nations could have become far more enchanted by the Green Oval, with Freelander, beyond the obvious aspirational trope of premium badge consumerism. Freelander 1 and 2 could have provided the true added-value of opening the eyes of the burgeoning EM middle classes regards their own country's natural beauty.

All of that early era 1997 hope for the vibrant expansion of Freelander is now well and truly "water under the bridge"; and consigned to a very small corner of the history books.

That recognised, the basic sketches shown here seek another goal.

The fact that matters here is regards the use of drawing as a powerful communication tool.
Where even basic drawings can utilise methods such as 'exploded' diagrams to relay central intent.

Yet to provide further insight regards the basis of the ideas, sketches all invariably require accompanying legibly written descriptions to assist; even if the old adage states that a picture paints a thousand words. Pictures do best when set in context.

Even the original Mini designer Alec Issigonis' sketches were rough and accompanying notations often illegible; simply done in his standard hand-writing. So even as conceptually good as he was, colleagues like Jack Daniels and others would have undoubtedly appreciated far cleaner block lettering in their explanations.

So when drawing to communicate a base idea or product to others - especially if involving alternative and specific features - do try to keep it visually 'clean and simple'.

Since instantaneous, unhindered immediate understanding and appreciation in others often helps to convince of an idea's plausibility.....if the timing is right.

Autumn Interlude - Statistics, Issigonis and Mini - Objective Empirical Research >>> Holistic Industrial Innovation >>> Consumer Education >>> UK Self-Development.

An Interlude within an Interlude -

Before the few eventual final examples of 'Drawing from the Past', to highlight the importance of drawing skills - investment-auto-motives takes the opportunity to return to its central remit of Micro and Macro automotive issues, by delving in almost 'real-time' into perhaps  the most economically successful and socially progressive era Britain ever saw in the 2Oth century - the 1950s.

Doing so by contextualising the rather astounding new product development story of the automotive icon that was Issigonis's Mini, against the corporate environment it was conceived within, and criticall the socio-economic backdrop of the time.

A time of economic boom, social mobility and a popularised attunement to what would be later quoted as "the white heat of technology".

A time that appears oh so very different to where Britain unfortunately sits today.


Macro and Micro Entwined 'Real Time' Historical Books -

This delve into Britain's past prompted by the current parallel reading of:
1. the 1960 : The Social (and Economic) Framework - JR Hicks
2. the 1964: The Mini Story - L. Pomeroy / A. Issigonis (re-reading).


The Social Framework - HR Hicks:

This 1960 third edition treatise sought  to educate the new generation about the socio-economic basis of the UK. Though written previously, it was only by 1957 that exhaustive economic data and so facts were able to be collated and deployed via the government's 'Blue Book'. This unsurprisingly showed a very different and increasingly prosperous picture compared to the previous immediate pre and post war editions of 1938 and 1949.

Consisting of 5 main chapters it spans the Macro and the Micro of Economics, and critically seeks to create through good descriptive illustrateion a picture of Britains economic flows within and beyond its shores.
Telling, is its title, and the bias toward the word 'Social' over and above 'Economic', when seeking to explain (in a very balanced, yet socially sensitive manner) the very construction of the national economy and varying perspectives regards it.

This because the previous 1929 Crash had tainted the previous almighty idea of Capitalism per se, and by the 1930s a definite Socialistic atmosphere prevailed, whilst the Churchillian war years had promised better days beyond, and Attlee's post-war win harboured a continuation of that Socialistic atmosphere. That atmosphere merged with renewed economic strength during Churchill's return as PM (exporting to the USA and Commonwealth) and present but declining through the 1951-1964 Conservative era, and re-instated - though as technically progressive - under Wilson's 1964-67 term. Thus the book reflects the general zeitgeist over its 3 editions.


The Mini Story - Laurence Pomeroy / Alec Issigonis:

The Mini Story, recounts Issigonis' professional background over a similar timeframe, the mid 1930s to late 1950s. From concept for lever operated auto-gear change clutch for a Mr Gillett, through to the Mini's full development story; with his professional landmarks. starting with Humber Motors in 1934 (appreciating the importance of independent suspension on  road cars), applying that knowledge at Morris Motors and its sub-division Morris Garages (MG) in that decade.

En route, to Mini, mention of Issigonis's hillclimb cars, his readybought Austin 7 'Ulster' and his self-designed 'Lightweight Special' (aluminium bodied and rubber sprung), and the critical influence of his early FWD concept for what became the conventional RWD Morris Minor.


1959, Stark Contrast to 2019 -

The present machinations concerning Brexit only serves to illustrate the major sociological and economic rifts inside the UK, that have philosophically grown over the last 2 decades. And although it is overtly simplistic to generalise, the core narrative that abounds is that there has never been a more marked divide between a supposedly multicultural, pro-European Left and a (if at all possible) a supposedly mono-cultural, anti-European Right.

This problematic enough. Yet when also set within a background of the UK's historically slow-growth and periodic stagnation of its economic engine (across most Service and Manufacturing sectors), the vagueness surrounding Brexit's ultimate impact understandably worries corporate executives, managers and staff, and so the public at large.

Those geo-political shifting sands creating enormous operational challenges to business undergoing  that affect the very structure - and sometimes very mission - of many enterprises.

Add in the backdrop of slowed and more fragile global economic conditions driven by geo-politics, trade concerns / wars (now re-emerging in US corporations' Q4 earnings projections), China's self-centred economic growth expansion policies (actually assisting local production JV agreements such as that with Jaguar Land Rover), and EM regions own stuttering growth problems, so prompting re-use of past 'Import Substitution' policies to follow China, aswell as a still very fragile Europe - and the UK's comparative position - with its own small internal market and no meaningful new trade agreements, is obviously at a new low point; and could be viewed as desperate.

Prime Minister Johnson offers Adam Smith's (OxBridge promoted) 'lassez-faire' rhetoric, aligned to the WTO, and promise of high potential new horizons. Whilst Labour undoubtedly views that outcome as simply "jam tomorrow" regards the ultimate levels of inward investment from global foreign companies considering various global locations for their expansion plans. Hence its focus on Re-Nationalisation and Employee Share-Holder policies. Both party's obviously have respective pros and cons, depending upon the perspective of specific issues.

For all the nationalistic and near jingoistic ferver behind Brexit, and the concommitant growing new focus on the UK's own regional sub-identities as distinct production units (from Eco-Farming to Eco-Food to Eco-Fashion), presently the national psyche amongst the average person is that of befuddlement; and as such prone to believe their specific 'political saviours'.


1945, A Time for Re-Birth

Britain has been here before, immediately after WW2.

Yet very pertinently, that was arguably a time of far less population fragmentation, and so greater genetic and cultural unity.

(This the imagined 'utopia' those furthest Right wish to regain with their 'England for the English' campaigns.

At its best, about re-installing more virtuous values in society and being rid of the worst aspects of today's society (eg immorality, organised crime, petty crime, illegal immigration, the absence of well paid average employment, etc), but also all too sadly and ironically echoes the similar calls made from the very Left leaning National Socialist German Workers Party (ie the 'Nazi' Party) of the 1930s.

It may be distasteful to many, but any form of social cohesion typically derives from ethnic unity, of whatever background. When that cohesive identity is fragmented through racial or religious mixing, so more social fracture lines appear upon which 'blame-game' frictions will inevitably be created. And that as seen today reverberates between the ethnic multi-mixes of large cities (that have enough of their own inter-group problems) and provincial towns that until recently were typically ethnically mono-cultural.

But given the UK's status quo, and its ambitions to grow its economic activities with many other Non-White, Non-Christian countries, Britain needs to somehow create an atmosphere of national virtue that all colours and creeds should attest to - perhaps a personal pledge or similar, as seen in the Scouts etc].

Like it or not, given the shared experiences of War, there appeared to be far greater social cohesion of the time, between the English, Scots and Welsh; as depicted in films such as Noel Coward's play and David Lean's film interpretation of 'This Happy Breed'.

Even with its inevitable small social fractures, centred around fairness in time of need, the War provided for unified social consciousness, and VE and VJ Days, the new social impetus toward a better tomorrow..

A decade later and Britain's renewed vigour had been much assisted by continuation of that spirit and critically its Commonwealth connections for material imports and finished exports, from 'black', 'brown' and 'white' countries (Carribean, East Africa, India and Australia).

And that inter-connected trade cohesiveness had begun to show good strong economic results.

By the mid 1950s, the NHS had become the darling of not just individuals and families, but also industry as it grew and maintained a healthier labour force. Private and public housing investments had delivered the previous War's promise of "Houses for Heros" and the country was abuzz with fundamental change within the UK's new Golden Era.


Exemplar of that New Age -

The 1959 Mini - in guises of 'Austin 7-Mini' and 'Morris Mini-Mnor' - was just one of a plethora of new products in consumer and industrial realms that exemplified just how far the UK had come in the past decade.

[NB And all too ironically, designed by an immigrant whose ancestry was maternally Bavarian-German, paternally Greek, and born in a province of Turkey. So what would have been in the eyes of the typical xenophobic Brit of the time less than revered given his background].

The car itself was notionally inspired by the advent of the September 1956 Suez Crisis, when Egypt's President Nasser nationalised the narrow channel between the Mediterranean basin and Arabian Sea / Indian Ocean, and the Syrian oil pipeline was cut by Pan-Arab nationalists. But in reality there was a far greater raison d'etre at home.

Although The Suez Crisis was front page news, the fact is that given the economic and military firepower of Britain and the USA (ie the various air bases and ports) and the need for Arab states to export oil, in real terms the fracas would inevitably be relatively minimal. Furthermore, what has rarely been stated is that the true impact was only upon 20% of the UK's fuel supply - so not wholly disasterous.

Instead, in the everyday Britain a far bigger macro-economic effect was underway. One that urged the design of new affordable, small and energy efficient car.

As shown before, the country was the still under-going Reconstruction and simultaneously grasping Re-growth. And increased private travel was a key element of the ambition.

[NB Obviously, just as it was in Europe, where 1930s designed FIAT 'Topolino', the VW Beetle, Citroen 2CV actually came of age in the 1950s, after the inevitably much delayed ideas of mobilisation of the masses for national growth].

The difference being that by the mid 1950s, given its substantive but still lesser wartime devastation, Britain was able to effectively able to redeploy its labour and infrastructure assests more efficiently that its ex European counterparts and foes. So able to obtain quicker productivity enhancing social-mobility thanks to its inventory of relatively unscathed trains, cars, vans, trucks, motorcycles and bicycles.

[NB Obviously given the War, mainland Europe had seen far greater diminishment of its private vehicle parc, from what was a relatively large vehicle parc by 1939.

Very interestingly a programme was shown on Channel 4 on the evening of Sunday 13.10.2019 depicting personal film footage of France in 'the last summer' before war (France: the last Summer). Yet even here, unfortunately, propoganda is all too obvious to the automotive enthusiast.

Herein, with regards the later commandering of private and public vehicles, with a supposed 1939 diary extract read by the narrator.

He says "trucks next to Porsches" ("Camions a cote de Porsches") when taking about street views in mid-late 1939.

The only Porsches dated 1939 were 3 hand fabricated Type 64 race cars (based on the spare parts from the prototype set of KdF Wagen) for race-track use only.

The first Porsche available for general sale to the public was the 356, starting in very low numbers in 1948, then more as of 1950. Very few if any bought in France, even 5 years after the war.

Hence in 1939 there were no "trucks parked next to Porsches" on French streets, and the apparent personal diary was thus fabricated to provide believable emotional effect, through building false imagined imagery for the viewer. Prompt a person to imagine something and their more likely to believe it, and so the whole tale told.

Moreover, the supposed 1939 personal film footage of also shows a family playing next to a post-war type of low budget car with faired-in fenders, pointing the 1950s. More content inconsistency. The colour film grainy, when even then actually quite clear given the expense and quality of colour film footage.  

As regards the use of deliberately false information on publicly formed internet space, to support specific agendas, please see later mention of  the Wikipedia content regards Mini, later in this weblog].

So unlike a devastated and progress hindered Europe, by the mid 1950s Britain sought to much improve yet further, so as to make more and more people economic protagonists, by engaging newer sets of untapped consumers to create 'new car' drivers. These new entrants into reliable and aspirational motoring from lower category demographic groups, the young and with greater attention to previously non-driving females.

The policy-makers of Whitehall wanted its people to be able to travel further by consuming more capable and affordable transport, to step-away from the discomfort of motorcycles when commuting to work and higher education, to buy new rather than used, and prompt the middle-classes to purchase a 2nd car for greater suburban interactivity (ie shopping, and leisure activities) to further muster local economies.

All of this set within broader, meaningful and very visible socio-economic change and improvements, as showcased by the 1953 Festival of Britain and its central influence of Modernism and Futurism, the two merged with primary colours and motifs. As seen across all realms of new ideas, from architecture to kitchen equipment

The lower and lower-middle masses were directed into new lives with Inner-City slum clearances set against the new prospects of various highly planned nationwide New Towns. And - aside from Green-Belt'd London - most cities and towns with and without old slums were transformed by newly expanding outer suburbs.
Beyond such prime domestic concerns was the national need to export. To both earn foreign currency and critically maintain strong trading connections and so soft-power connections to countries dotted around the globe, from Australia to the Caribbean.

The UK's industrial re-birth had reflected by the previous 'Britain can Make It' campaign, which was accompanied by that infrastructure building, a new wave of 'modern' homes with greater functional and pleasurable amenities both at home and near-by (though not as bemoaned by some, so in all cases).

Critically, increasingly with that industrial transformation from 1945 to late 1956 - the time of 'Suez' - the country had seen the ending of rationing for most items and a return to re-expansion of B2B (plant, machinery, office equipment etc) and B2C goods (foods, clothes, white and brown goods, vehicles etc); and it would continue to do so  for another 14 years or so.

This was the everyday and so substantively real backdrop to UK manufacturing, from furniture to motor vehicles. The 'Suez Crisis' a mere blip that no doubt boosted the profits of Anglo and American oil companies given the high demand, reduced supply, and likewise boosted national belief about international importance across the Arab World.

Nevertheless the UK's domestic backdrop told an high-fueled economic expansion story, as the country began to transform its workforce toward advanced manufacturing of the time and toward an expanding technical services capability, for use at home and abroad.

Improved education through Apprenticeships, Technical Colleges and 'Redbrick' Universities meant a new better skilled generation of youngsters sought their own life opportunities, close to and far from their origins. The normative ideals of a wife/husband, a car, a home, children, pets and ever more interesting annual holidays.

That higher education and stable homelife the spring-board for further educational advancement  by the follow-on generation - in theory at least.

Thus as regards the idea of 'The Suez Crisis' and threat from 'Bubble Cars' (from German BMW Isettas to 'Kabin' Heinkels, Messerscmitts to British Peels) being Leondard Lord's strategic prompt for Austin-Morris, it was infact the broader Macro trends to satusfy commuter and weekend travel needs for the millions of people with higher disposable incomes, greater life aspirations and to ensire higher rates of personal mobility - so promoting expenditure - amongst the hithertoo over-shadowed masses.

With furthermore, the need to create a cheaper smaller utility vehicles (van and pickup) for likewise growing numbers of small to medium sized firms, nationally-owned industries (Post Office, Electricity and Gas Boards, the Armed Forces and the new era of multi-conglomerate corporates.  

The short period of returned petrol rationing of the Suez Crisis, did alter the minds of many, but that wake-up call regards national energy security was itself a useful ignition spark for a new era, itself for a new generation, who sought new products to befit newly expanding  personal horizons.
Mini in Austin, Morris, and later Riley and Wolseley guises would befit and itself propel that era

And critically, as very well described by JR Hicks in 'The Social Framework', it was not until the mid 1950s that Britain managed to compile detailed and meaningful economic data (by modern standards). Since prior to WW2, even with large scale international trade and domestic consumption, it had been a far more haphazard affair relying upon industry bodies of varying capabilities, and during the War efforts had been necessarily centralised upon War Planning.

It was only the Wartime experience of becoming far more objectively critical about Micro and Macro economic flows within the UK, into the UK and out of the UK, to reduce inefficiencies and maximise outcomes, that such detailed practices began to take greater hold in the public economists' mindset.

[NB The learning curve that both the US and Britain went through, likewise put to good use by Ford HQ in Detroit, under Robert MacNamara's 'Whiz Kids' and new calculating technologies, to better mate broad economic and market data to production and logistics planning and methods].

Hence ironically, for Britain and BMC alike, their own respective metamorphoses were a blend of old 1920s style (Henry) 'Fordism' mixed with a 'Neo-Fordism' applied immediately after WW2.

It was both common-sense of scale efficiencies and beyond that Ford's and GM's cross company rationalisation policies that prompted the formation of BMC, and led Leonard Lord's central mode of thinking between 1952 and 1956.


The Birth of an Icon -

By 1956 BMC had largely rationalised the operational synergies between its prime Austin and Morris and secondary MG, Riley and Wolseley divisions.

[NB A dacade later it would exploit the vertical aspect of the overall value-chain by acquiring Pressed Steel, before merging with Leyland Motor Corp in 1968].

The author Laurence Pomeroy tells a compelling story about the Mini's development process, imparting very good appreciation of the matter, from Issigonis himself.

[NB in the Foreword Issigonis simply relays his path of learning from small and lightwieght cars: the Austin 7 (per his 'Ulster') and the George Dowson assisted 'Lightweight Special', and about his preferance for a nose-heavy, FWD vehicle to induce safe understeer at its limits, (which took a further 16 years to realise after his initial 1941 FWD 'Mosquito' concept became the RWD Morris Minor.

Moreover, the short Foreword conveys his dislike of writing..."a disagreable occupation", hence leaving the task to Pomeroy].

Thus where as Minor had been the birthchild of immediate post-war austerity and so highly conventional engineering that rebuffed Issigonis's initial ideas stemming from his admiration of the Citroen Avant, the Mini would allow him to flourish in creativity.

That recognised, the Minor still provided for the protyped beginnings of his FWD. enlarged cabin-space dream, since it utilised smaller than standard wheels (14 inches) and one initial prototype demonstrator was built with a 'Flat 4' engine / FWD layout.

[NB Pomeroy makes no mention of what in enthusiasts circles becam the legend about the 2 inch 'cut and shut', to widen the car, a decision made only when on the verge of production. This being of such significance to British industrial folklore, that this legend - as with so many in the auto-industry - appears ultimately mere myth, no doubt stated or invented at the time to add product interest, by highlighting the width of the cabin over pre-war segment design.

To me, this 'legend' had always seemed utterly implausible, given the financial and time realities and constraints of a vehicle programme with pre-set budgets and deadlines. So I was glad to not read of it in Pomeroy's retelling].

[NB At time of writing this weblog the comprehensive Wikipedia article about Mini refers to ADO 15 as having been widened by 2 inches. This is utter nonsence. As seen, that myth only relates to the 1948 Minor and its 2 inch bonnet-band.

This also unfortunately illustrates how an online publicly accessed information facility can be easily manipulated to furnish false information (or even - as may be here seek to confuse 'gaslight' or undermine investment-auto-motives - not for the first time!

No doubt by time of this web-post, it will have disappeared again! Such is the neferious activity of neferious groups and individuals in today's Britain, very much part of the 'social fragmentation' issue mentioned previously]

[NB Also critically in the book, no mention whatsoever of Issigonis' war-time and post-war designs for the military. Such as the amphibious motorised 'Guppy' 'wheel-barrow', or suspension design of the 1950s Austin Champ 4x4, which in its prototype form (like 'Mosquito') did use that boxer-4 watercooled engine. Possibly because it was still confidential at the time (1964).

And Though a later prototype - so after the book was written - Issigonis also created the 4x4 Austin 'Ant' deploying a transverse engined 4WD system.

30 years later Rover Group's Chief Programme Engineer for the CB40 programme, Dick Elsy, would opt for a similar system for the drivetrain of the Land Rover Freelander.

BTW...The next weblog illustrates my own 1998 thoughts regards the ideal Body-In-White Features Development for CB40's successor, Freelander 2].

After initial mention of 'Mosquito',  The Mini Story, begins proper, utiling the style code XC9003 before official project name ADO 15, between 1957 - 1959.

Having regained Issigonis from his previous departure from Morris to Alvis in 1952, Leonard Lord provides an almost free-reign to the Design-Engineer. All but the engine type, since he needed to maintain the central business threads that had been central to BMC's profitability over the previous 5 years regards BMC group.

Namely synergies (eg simplified development and production, reduced dealer parts inventory and so reduce overall costs throught the corporation's value-chain. None negotiable was Issigonis's to use of a current production engine - the 'A' series from Austin in Longbridge.

Very pertinantly given his importance to small car design, the basic investigative research of FIAT's Chief Engineer Dante Giacosa is mentioned. As to the engineering and performance reasons for why European makers inevitably preferred rear engined layouts for small cars, such as VW / NSU- Prinz / Renault, as did Japan's Mazda with its first R360.

[NB This somewhat echoed again over the last 20 years on specific models such as the 2 Daimler Smart variants, the 5 door sharing a platform with Renault's latest Twingo, and TATA's use on its Nano.  (as well as in a manner, Rover Group's Spiritual and Spiritual Too concepts of 1997 by Oliver Ie Grice - beautifully resolved, but likewise limited by  mid-rear engine position, even if laid flat). Though primarily for reasons of crash management over production cost, the latter the prime consideration in the 1950s).

Giacosa showed that on the global export level in 1955, the small rear engined cars from Germany, France and Italy took 80% of the market, simply because they were not necessarily the best practically - given imposition of the rear engine per luggage space and configurability, but because they were available, cheap and reliable.

[NB Because of the over-inflated, panic -inducing, news stories about the 'Suez Crisis', the even smaller 'Bubble Cars' were gaining some popularity in the UK, with iobvious previous popularity in Germany, Belgium and Holland. But the UK's news stories of the time depicted far greater apparent popularity than was actually so in terms of true demand and sales figures. Which highlights the likely connection between the vested interests of Bubble Car importers and the Cinematic News Organisations such as Pathe].

Giacosa also pays tribute to the 1922 Austin Seven (itself much influenced by Peugeot's Bebe), for its comparitively greater practicality as a small car; itself prompting the 1936 FIAT 'Topolino' Cinquecento. But he also critically notes that these cars (Peugeot, Austin and FIAT) were ostensibly 2-seaters posing as 4 seaters; and that vitally it was impossible to build what was really a 2 seater for half the price of a proper 4-seater.

So it made sense to build proper or near full-sized 4 seater even as a lower cost basic Small car. And that the business rational made even more sense when vehicle weight is reduced as much as possible; so as to reduce direct input costs, whilst of course high unit volumes are achieved. To in turn spread and reduce the company's overhead costs.

And because overheads were often static - especially when operating 'lean' - and so not easily altered to operate at base efficiency, it made sense to take the cost out of the production costs of the car itself, since little could be done with the firm if it were not to operationally 'wax and wain', so creating inefficiencies in itself.

All of this why European cars were largely as they were - rear engined. (Without also stating to his British audience, that the Europeans typically were behind the British in terms of overall car parc and product expections, and obviously then far further behind the Americans as of 1955.

The Italian critically highlighted the importance to the firm of "mass to price", comparing the much heavier  typical American car that weighed 3,000 lbs and so sold for 5 - 6 Shillings per lb of mass, to the typical European cars that weighed 1000 lbs and so of 7 - 9 Shillings per lb of mass.

[NB of course what Giacosa does not state, is that the socio-economic and cultural differences between 1955 America and Europe, and so vehicle demand levels were enormous, as illustrated by comparitive and even available consumer goods of the time.

The successful Americans firms (GM, Ford, Chrysler) had undoubtedly accounted for this examination of material inputs costs in their 1950s platform planningn. Able to gain back profits from their higher specification low level Chevrolet, Ford, Dodge/Plymouth cars, whilst gaining greater still profits on their Buick-LaSalle-Cadillac, Mercury-Lincoln, and Chrysler-Imperial models].  

Nevertheless, some of what Giacosa said from a starkly commercial perspective undoubtedly seeped into Issigonis regards small UK and European cars, especially regards the importance of production costs per vehicle weight (ie the basic measurement  aspects of the Bill of Materials). This so even though he'd well learned the weight-saving lesson in race cars two decades earlier regards performance, the re-emphasis here per production costs.. (No doubt Leonard Lord, as a former Production Engineer - had echoed this factor time and again at BMC, but as Pomeroy elucidates, it struck home to Issigonis coming from his renowned contemporary. (In 1956, Giacosa was 51, whilst Issigonis was 50).

The book goes into detail -with useful Issigonis sketches - regards the initail 10x4x4 ft Box Concept, his material (steel) cost calculations, and numerous simple and complex Product Engineering and Design for Manufacture solutions and sketches.

Thereafter, the importance of the in-sump gearbox solution to minimise engine bay mechanical packaging, and the early Development Mules fabricated and run with the engine in its initial orientation, then re-orientated 180 degrees to protect the carburettor from  icing-up. And frustratingly for Issigonis, that necessity requiring a transfer-set of 3 more gears within the gearbox to re-orientate the direction of forward drive; so adding complexity, weight and cost (very galling to the 'Simplitician').

And critically why -given Giacosa's valid points about the advantages of rear engine, why a front engine was unquestioningly preferred in its novel layou to free-up the rear of the platform, to maximise load space and provide for varied body-type permutations., aswell as ability to extend the wheelbase for such variants.And

The European small cars had been designed by their manufacturers as fundamental low cost and low sales priced runabouts, with far less attention drawn to the platform's reconfigurability.

[NB I suspect this done in Italy and France - less so Germany - after the War, so that different vehicle segments (private vs commercial, small vs medium / large) within the market could be effectively monopolised by specific manufacturers, and so better accord to partially centrally planned Reconstruction efforts. This seems the only plausible explanation as to why FIAT's Cinquecento went from front engined for the earlier 1936 'Topolino' in various body-styles, to rear-engined and essentially one body-style of 1957 Nouvo Conquecento(excluding the space inefficient, poor selling, estate variant called 'Giardinera')].

Like the Austin 7, ADO 15 had been designed to encompass as wide a client-base as possible. And yet more so over the earlier 7 (which itself was obviously body on frame and essentially designed as two distinct units using standard production considerations), with necessarily far greater consideration for Manufacturing and Assembly cost and ease.

Thus Issigonis was not simply thinking 2 Dimensionally per the opposites of (van) Utility and (car) Leisure-Functionality for his car, but 4 Dimensionally, including considerable concentration regards Manufacturing and Assembly.

This was his true 'genius', his breadth of holistic appreciation.

[NB By the 1990s, the Auto-Industry had already absorbed very effective Japanese production philosophies, and then began leaning toward reducing NPD times by deploying 'Simultaneous Engineering' techniques. (Such as cross-functional matrix teams, more use of 'real-time' CAD and Admin IT etc).

But Issigonis demonstrated the ability to 'Simultaneously Engineer' from concurrent alternative perspectives inside a single mind - the true mark of a good Designer.

As for the 1990s, for those in the Auto-Industry who'd devoted themselves to years of homework and were passionate about their subject from many angles, and so innately 'knew' - in the Issigonis manner -  by the 1980s and 1990s the industry had become frustrating.

Under 'corporatisation', 'management theory' and 'management speak' , the raft of theorums emenating from the theoritician's pens in Business Schools started to arguably disadvantage quick and proficient New Product Development.

'Simultaneous Engineering' was supposedly in the Japanese manner - yet theories were often based upon limited research and so little true appreciation, driven by the astounding capabilities of IT to provide 'real-time' information on Design Update changes between Concept Engineers, Development Engineers and Manufacturing Engineers.

There were arguably "too many chefs in the kitchen" simultaneously, with the minutia of Manufacturing issues that would not be enacted for 20-30 months becoming discussion points in late Concept and early Development stages. Thus a virtual Merry-Go-Round of conflicting perspectives and voices, which had to be settled by the Chief Programme Engineer.

Furthermore, such theorums were increasingly becoming pushed and adopted by senior company-(wo)men who themselves had limited real interest in the broad subject nor the overall design process. Hence the likes of promoted early CAD Engineers who'd seen the true benefits of early CAD and so transposed the same thought process regards 'Simultaneous Engineering' and IT managers who had never been privy to the holistic process or had even personally built or re-built a car; so had virtually no practical understanding, besides the view through a computer screen.

Yet for the sake of their careers (and to include in their own MSc or PhD work) wanted to be seen to be following the latest IT driven Management Theory practices to gain internal and external recognition and so notional credibility.

It was itself painful to watch as teams of costly Engineers would be sat around doing virtually nothing as decisions had to be constantly made about minutia problems that were being over-played in a partly politicised atmosphere, by either the Concept, Development or Manufacturing quarters. Especially so since inevitably little more was actually learned, less so applied given real-world operational pressures of the firm, and importantly cost the company's time, resources and money and so inevitably affected the bottom-line.

Undoubtedly the likes of Simultaneous Engineering has its place when practicably applied , but so much better to have very capable Senior Engineers and Board Members (employee and independent) who understand the whole process from Market Research, Concept Packaging, Design/Styling, Development Engineering, Manufacturing Engineering, Production,  Distribution, Sales and After-Sales, and so back into Market Research, etc. Aswell as having afar bigger appreciation for the bigger picture in which the firm is operating, from Competitors to Global Economics].

In this regard, as a singular conceptual creative hub, with strong practical understanding, Issigonis appeared to have been imbued with that big picture perspective, even if likely unable to know about accounting 'Depreciation' rates or the different types of Funding Options available to his company.

Hence, from the product perspective, although Issigonis had been interested in race cars before WW2, unlike so many engineers, he had no personal bias in predetermining the end point. He simply went by the requirement of the brief and the recognised and emergent facts.

Which in ADO15's case was far greater appreciation for ultimate Use: Design Practicality, Ride and Handling Driveability, Manufacturing Ease and Overall Cost.

[NB Likewise to the myth about the Minor, it also appears unlikely that the story about Ford engineers reckoning that each Mini produced cost more than it sold for, was true. Leonard Lord and George Harriman would have seen to that. And if so perhaps only upon Ford's then altered accounting basis of heavy early depreciation of fixed assets (prior to its Public Listing to boost mid 1960s profits), and Time and Motion studies, all under the supervisory wisdom of its Henry Ford II appointed 'Wiz Kids'.

Or perhaps Ford's 'Tear Down' specialists misinterpreted perception of overall expected unit volumes, against set-up costs. That story also helped to 'tear down' BMC's repuation in the industry at the time, whilst ironically Ford was running two separate European companies in the UK and Germany.

It is guestimated by investment-auto-motives that the ammortisation costs of the new BIW and part-paid

Supplier tooling would have 'broken even' by the 80-100,000th car, off-setting the development costs of suspension and tyres, with its carry-ver engine, body-shell simplicity, reduced labour build time.

Mini, in all its simply designed utility and upmarket rebadged variants ultimately sold nearly 5.4 million units].        
The number of conceptualised and ultimately produced model variants and variations illustrate the very rational yet Humanistic approach Issigonis had.

He could understand the needs of the specific end user, partly because he was in himself an 'everyman'. From the stereo-typical gin-swilling member of the high-culture loving upper middle-classes, to the methodical and detail-orientated hands-on capabilities of an 'under the arches' mechanic of the period.

The man undoubtedly radiated an everyday societal interest, to be translated to his vehicle solutions, and no doubt never 'blew hot air'.

He was able to see through the lives and uses of many others and see through the eyes of those many others; from a Squaddie using a Moke as an Army Base drone vehicle or Signals Corps messenger buggy in the field, to leader of the local Women's Institute driving a well appointed Riley or Wolseley variant.
He obviously observed and obviously absorbed.

As for the idea of 'genius solutions', even Issigonis was fallible, since his initial complete monocoque structure proved torsionally weak and warped during initial development testing. Thereafter design and use of front and rear sub-frames to carry engine, suspension, steering, brakes and wheels, which as separate entities added a modularity to the build process and so sped-up factory build times, aswell as allowing for more body variants later as wheelbase could be easily altered without redesigning the sub-frames.

The Moulton originated suspension needs no more than mere mention here given its stature in British engineering history on Mini, other models and of course his own fold-away bicycle.

Pomeroy highlights the importance of the 10 inch wheels; highlighting that this was at least as important as the transverse engine, since they were so critical to maintaining the cub-like cabin and small length and width, and so ultimately outstanding manouvreability. This achieved through new tyre development from Dunlop.

[NB the author also refers to the Body and 'the Hull', which illustrates the manner in which the Brits utilised the marine analogy for a pressed steel shell, given its proximity to a boat's hull, before the US term Body-in-White became commonplace].

[NB History recalls ADO 15's small team of Alec Issigonis, Jack Daniels, Christopher Kingham and the few additional draughtsmen and 2 students. But typically ommits the Buck's and specifically the 2 Prototypes fabrication technicians who had to have worked hard and may have provided critical feedback regards likely stress points, as came to be seen in testing at Chalgrove, and so substituted use of sub-frames. And also for years, omitted the initial experimentation with a Twin-cylinder set up that proved very problematic and comparatively costly, and so early elimination].

Of interest is Pomeroy's mention of the cars launch and the initial inertia shown by the middle and lower-middle classes, who sought a car that their neighbours would admire, status being a prime motivator in vehicle purchase. Issigonis remonstrated that he designed a car for its size, economy, manouvreability, ease of parking and safety, not for its status; reckoning that anything mass-produced has no true 'status'.

The irony was that, unlike the 'petit borgeois', the upper-middle / upper class, young and working class, immediately took Mini to their hearts, realising what a brilliant motoring solution it was; the former able to immediately purchase - and so create an aspirational effect on the car - whilst the latter (and more needy and demanding) had to typically wait as they saved.

Pomeroy goes into detail about the Cooper, Downton and Cooper S variants, and highlights the importance of the Van (and less so Pick-Up) variants from launch, since the Commercial models would be very attractive to small and large businesses.

The van variant launched in May 1960 was of particular note since - as with the car - it was functionally much better than the A35 version it replaced. Furthermore, it provided a yet cheaper access to new vehicle motoring for the middle-class young. This because the van did not incur Purchase Tax, so could be had for £360, when the car at £350 incurred £146, so determining a price of £496.

[NB This boosted by its 'artistic' connotations as band-members (hauling drums, new electric guitars, amps, etc) or sculptors or painters, and was seen by them as a multi-functional, all purpose vehicle, a kind of rudimentary all-purpose utility cross-over its time.

The fact is that whilst the Middle and Upper Middle were buying the car, it was the van variant that provided motoring access to the other less well off demographic groups. Take a look on you tube at old film footage of 1960s everyday British traffic and the mini van often appears alongside the older and bigger Austins and Morris's].

The author provides limited comment on those variants initially built by the Experimental Department: the Military Moke, double-engined Moke, Moke Beach Car and the  (front and mid engined) 4WD Twini for possible race competition purposes.

He also highlights the wonderment of modern production methods, stating that the majority of Minis to be sold would be in 'De Lux' trim akin to the most popular A35 predecessor, sold as seen for £496, whilst the A35 was  £537. Thus a better car in all measures for nigh on £40 less than its predecessor.

And the production of the Van then allowed for the launch of the wood-framed Estate variant, four moths later in September 1960, using the same one-piece floor-pressing. This ironically expanding the attraction of the car to initially the Upper Middle, since it mimicked a smaller version of the 'Shooting Break', and so the aspirant Middle who liked the 'town and country' overtones.

And in October 1961 the Riley and Wolseley versions appeared with different face and small 'fin-tail' rear with boot, and plush interiors to mirror the larger stablemates. Issigonis was somewhat displeased by these versions since they were then heavier than his orginal concept and so less spritely in use. Additionally, these upscale versions attract a 50% Purchase Tax on RRP, which was already £127 above the base car. So sales were poor and the additional effort and cost to BMC was actually wasted.

[NB Likely that with BMC's nationalistic remit to 'keep the flag flying' for Britain, especially abroad, the Riley and Wolseley versions were viewed as inalienable to ensure a complete bottom to top model range, even if business sense recognised that sales would be low. The mass variants to subsidise the niche variants].

Though designed as a cheap small city car by Issiginosis, the BMC Marketing Department actually sought to 'Premiumise' the car from the very start (much as BMW did 40 years later). No doubt that required from above to ensure earlier financial breakeven of the programme and thereafter good profitability.
The previously ammortised A35 was used as the business template had provided good profits. But since A35's introduction inflation had affected the Mini programme's Input Costs and Leonard Lord was adamant that BMC would recoup costs asap and then maximise profitability.

This is why although Issogonis simply saw the car as the architype cheap spritely runabout, yet certainly not a 'racer', BMC 's seniors were happy to develop relations with John Cooper and then Downton Engineering. Recognising that rally and race-track success would add a performance dimension to the vehicle range and so attract additional sporting and sporty clientel; and likewise use the Sportier Minis as connection and  to MG and (and later Triumph) racing prowess. The first Cooper, as of late 1961, started at £679, so £25 more than the Riley version.

Pomeroy states that Issigonis warmed-up to John Cooper's involvement because Cooper Engineering's Grand Prix efforts had been mighty, yet from small resources in Surbiton, South London. Infact initially Cooper had been disinterested aswell, focused upon GP. But he had become familiar with the 'A-Series' engine in Formula Junior and had bought a Mini for his own use, and gradually became more and more impressed by it. So he prompted Issigonis to forge relations between Cooper and BMC.

[NB The Mini Cooper obviously became legendary. So much so that BMW years later orientated its R50 programme around Cooper as the centre of gravity of the brand, between One and Cooper S].

However, initially the Cooper was designated as a road-orientated, more 'peppy', 'driver's car' distinctly for the public road, not rally and race, though it was having increasing successed by the Factory Team and Privateers. To up the anti in proper Competition, the Cooper S was created, prompted by Downton Engineering's ability to tune the engine to propel different gear ratios to have the car reach 100 mph.

And BMC was able to offer the new 'S' model at the same price as the previous Cooper, because The Treasury had reduced Purchase Tax from 50% to 25%, so to qoute Pomeroy, "by such simple means did Chancellor Maudling motivate major mechanical modifications without monetary penelty".

[NB It had been recognised by Whitehall that to better serve the broad economy by better assisting the population's consumer aspirations, and so better serve domestic Industry, a sizable change in Purchase Tax was needed if Britain was to expand its effort in wealth creating value-added goods; seeking to create a more virtuous circle of specialist industries which could then provide for broadened wealth distribution across the demographic spectrum. Consumers would gain the aspirational products they sought, companies would enhance revenues and profits, and more technically specialised staff would be worth more to the economy, and so paid more by employers. Hence the Tax change sought to prompt a spiraling upward wealth effect].

[NB Not described here, between 1960 - 1964 BMC also investigated the idea of a Mini based MG with very different bodystyle, under AD034 and ADO70 project names, and so two versions created, the first simple with typical European convertible 'barchetta' style, the second more stylised with greater horizontal emphasis as a Targa-top. This explored because initially niche producers like Marcos were fitting more streamlined sporting fibreglass bodies for far better aerodynamics onto the Mini's platform and markedly increasing performance. These unofficial coupe versions of Mini then opened the way for possible sportier version from the factory itself].

The book continues by describing the early prototype and early production car problems that were overcome spanning: repositiong of gear lever from fascia to floor, water ingress into the footwells, oil forced onto the clutch surface, engine movement stresses upon exhaust system, ventilation problems caused by high air pressure area upon front quarter-light windows, change to radiator fan blades, the stiffening of the rear suspension structure.


'The' Industrial Case Study Lesson for a Self-Developing Nation -

In business academia case studies abound, with in referance to the auto-sector, the seemingly ever-lasting tale of the Ford Model T and its production efficiencies, set against the Ford Edsel for badly timed overt business ambition and its mis-reading of the marketplace and massive financial losses to Ford as the 1950s turned into the 1960s.

With what was in essence a WW2 boom period for American industry in war-manufacture, that profit(eering) went to largely to good use when set toward post-war consumerism with cars the very vehicles to transport the average American's mind and efforts toward a glamorous (seemingly) Hi-Tech future.

Detroit's Big 3 had found its own course and based largely on the style and marketing re-skinning of older body-on-frame and then later monocoque vehicles to excite the masses with looks, brands and feature content, (having seen its initially more technically advanced competitors seeking expensive technical advantage fall by the way-side as CapEx costs overtook profits).

Yet, in Britain BMC's notional product planners recognised that by 1956, prompted more by Big Picture socio-economic reality and the desire to grow the nation's consumer-base, as  the actual backdrop to the 'Suez Crisis' - something very pragmatic yet innovative, small, efficient and yet 'maximal' for its size, could bring very real mobility advantages to many people, old and young and across the social spectrum.

The Mini joined many other very progressive efforts of the period, as stated earlier in public road transport, public aeronautical transport, public marine transport, pollution-free energy generation, etc....all as part of a greater socially driven 'democratisation' toward better lifestyles for all.

The UK was on an economic and infrastructure basis far behind the USA, but far ahead of a devastated Europe, and still developing 2nd world across the globe. As such - with American ambition, yet European constraints - it was able to muster the creative energies to create its own innovative future, and plan through public and private enterprise spheres, its own future.

Alec Issigonis was one of the very few who molded the everyday experiences of Britain and far beyond. In the mold of others such as: Whittle in jet propulsion, Durrant-Curtis-Scott in Routemaster bus design, Cockerell per hovercrafts etc. People who broke with convention to create something better to make life in Britain itself better, both economically and socially.


An Objective and Balanced Mindset -

Issigonis's early background of of mixed Greco-German parentage, British influenced early education environment and Turkish birthplace, undoubtedly shaped him from an early age.

The need to flee Turkey in 1922 to Malta and then onto Britain and the ealry loss of his father infused an understanding of the impact of geo-political turmoil and so the importance of a secure homeland in Britain.
That together with his highly conflicting ancestry and heritage meant that from birth he was socially and so philosophically multi-dimensional. Blended from much and yet also seperated from the all too typical shortcomings of blinkered overt national identty and so 'nationalism'.

His experiences shaped him as broad-minded in scope (of society) and yet also highly pragmatic and very objective (per design solutions). That ability to view through that multi-perspective lens much matured from the overtly idealistic initial engineering approach to Mosquito/Minor, but matured and brought to bare unde the right macro-economic conditions for Mini.

More than anything, he was a particularly insightful and incisive 'everyman', who could simultaneously see 'all' in the outside world, and see 'small' in technological response to that outside world.

In a country who's recent past of increasing specific business and technical specialisation as part of its domestic and export Services orientated economy, there has arguably occurred an unfortunate separation from the Big Picture 'whole' and Small Picture 'detail', as other countries - with Britain's help - create their own futures. And often doing so without Britain's help, just as Ratan Tata did with the 'Nano', seeking to replicate the Issigonis thought process for India]

And that role as international 'knowledge  brokers' has to a degree served well across various sectors, from the Eco-Engineering of all transport types, to the burgeoning realms of ever more sophisticated Fin-Tech.

But beyond previous and current domestic research efforts in Aluminium Structures (previously 'conquered for mass manufacturing at JLR) and presently exploration of Electric Propulsion solutions, able to self-power guiding Artificial Intelligence systems...it  may be that the boundaries of directed Innovation have been over-defined along these wholly Eco-directed avenues, which often when tied to ever growing 'carbon foot-print guilt' actually often seem overtly prohibitive and restrictive, even if lightweight EVs eventually become the norm.

Britain should seek to develop its own expanded new model of automotive innovation which surpasses simply satiating the eco-guilt of drivers by deploying 'virtue-signalling' solutions as new status symbols.
It should think afresh as Issigonis did, to provide expanded horizons for people's who day by day feel themselves ever more hemmed-in by their (media-brainwashed) obligations to the planet.

Issigonis called himself the 'Reluctant Revolutionary' with Mini.

And now that James Dyson has rightfully belatedly ceased his efforts regards a Dyson Premium EV (sat directly against Aston Martin's Lagonda concept), perhaps the likes of the revolutionary 'Rebel Extinction' crowds might wish to proactively lead the way, with their own financially feasible and highly meaningful value-adding personal transport solutions,  that like the 1957 ADO 15 concept, proliferated one base idea into a myriad of solutions for a myriad of peoples.


To End -

That said, the central message of this weblog is the idea of reading different and yet comparitive material from a specific era to in gain insights into the Macro (JR Hicks) and the Micro (L. Pomeroy).
And regards that end, with those two books read in parallel, it became more than appatent that there exists a strong feed-back loop between ever enhanced macro data and the ability to when necessary create something highly innovative based on sound principles.

It was statistical feedback from Whitehall publications regards Britain and the Commonwealth, that allowed for confidence by BMC in a very quick New Product Development Process for Mini.
And it was similar meaningful and transparent Macro information that likewise had underpinned Britain's high innovative ambitions of that 1950s/1960s New Age, from Mini, to Routemaster Bus, to Hovercrafts, to Commercial Jet travel, through to first phase (and initially very well safeguarded) Nuclear Reactors for Clean Energy, so together ending 'Pea Souper' Smogs whilst expanding travel possibilities.

The products and infrastructure solutions - often combined - themselves created the new culture and so the broader progressive socio-economic context, from which a new more optimistic generation thrived.

Hicks states that Britain had not really overcome the previous socio-economic inflictions of WW2, until the mid 1950s, when things appeared somewhat (to paraphrase) 'normal again; and the country became again highy productive on its renewed peacetime footing.

Infact 'normal' was an under-statement given the pace of progress shown.

ADO 15 went from verbal and written brief from Leonard Lord to 'blue-prints' and a wooden 'Buck' dimensional and style mock-up (XC9003) in 120 days, and then to initial 2 Prototypes build and testing - the first known as 'the Orange Box' - after only another 100 days. And onto full production in less than 2 years.

Let us hope that paradoxically, there are more 'Reluctant Revolutionaries' amongst the vociferous Green Set who can do aswell as Issigonis.



 

Summer Interlude - Drawing from the Past - "Explosions and Ghosts"

A comment before beginning this web-log proper....

............................................................

Given the previous Land-Rover Strategy and Concept related articles (Defender 2, 'Titan' and 'AID') - themselves envisaged to access additional and expanding income streams and simultaneously buoy the brand's original utilitarian persona - the natural instinct is to provide opinion regards the recently unveiled New Defender (in '90'and '110' level and pack guises), now that the immediate reaction from press and public has passed.

Obviously, previously I'd had my own thoughts regards Defender's overall design  - not simply 'styling'...not simply 'engineering' but truly holistic answer; that followed the dictum of 'Engineering Artform' as per an extended design-guidelines template I'd prescribed when in the Studio in 1996.

Given the the launch of New Defender it would be wholly insensitive to divulge the detail of those ideas, even if it be over 20 years later.

Simply to state that the concept was far more 'Lego-Like' in philosophy, and made a virtue of reconstructing its initial simple and very clean basic exterior which could be 'deconstructed' panel by panel for accessories fitment and re-configurability for the spectrum of different user groups from Utility to Adventure to Leisure.

That mutual functionality in turn nurturing a cognitive connection between what were becoming the 'old' and 'new' sets of buyers, from very different socio-demographic and psychographic perspectives. So unifying the increasingly diverse buyer and user base.

With the various 'Pack' Options demonstrated at launch, allowing drivers and passengers to become  more active and interactive, I sincerely hope Land Rover will consider a yet more interactive 'Lego Like' approach regards future innovation which then underpins the very rationale of Defender, as known for over 70 years.

And so given personal background, and the possible weight of my words, in the instance of New Defender - without the Commercial variants seen and still far too early to gauge real world product mix, take up and so revenues  - any form of comment from an investor's viewpoint would be mere conjecture.

The vehicle will be considered upon its own merits and income provision to JLR over the quarters and years to come; and if able to straddle the 3 target sectors convincingly should provide for a rare auto model line that can off-set the wavering revenue norms of a cyclical industry.

Critically, I sincerely hope that a pick-up version of the '110' - in single and double cab variants - will have been developed alongside the notional "Station Wagon" or "County" 'hard-tops', given the global size of the double-cab market, and also opportunity for basic single cab to offer a longer bed to in part fulfil the '130's previous role.

(NB The '130' is reported as an expected addition in 2020/21, but because of the truly specific nature of the original 130 on ladder frame, its often custom engineered platform base, and previous very small volume, we shall have to wait and see if the '130' business case makes sense and it actually arrives. Positively, the Slovakian location actually assists the business case given labour rates compared to Solihull, so such SVO variants could in fact become an enlarged part of the global business model if well managed).

Yet without seeing such variants as existent, it is far too early to provide a meaningful comment on the vehicle in its entirety. So although a basic '90' - sign-written with 'Wilks Bros 1948' - was seen at the Frankfurt unveiling, other commercially orientated variants will be rolled-out, and will undergo near forensic analysis by its prospective users.

And so the exactitude of the overall product pipeline, breadth of variants, pricing, expected volumes, product mix etc, and hence entire New Defender business model is not yet wholly clear.

Well recognised by the TATA Motor's Board (given its own heavily plunged share price due to India's own contracted economy, within the global autos slowdown)  is that Defender must at long last be of such high volume and overall profitability so as to provide a substantive long-term income streams.

That income from vehicle sales, finance provision, options and accessories, after-sales service and Land Rover 'experiences'. So whilst people have highlighted the new Slovakian plant (at incentivised yet still obviously high cost), that which has not been aired is the task of re-orienting the global Land Rover dealer-base to provide the very necessary support Defender will require at the customer interface, aside from the immediate internet interface, so as to retain customer loyalty given the inevitable first run  product quality problems that occur, over and above its less than perfect product quality rankings.  

Thus, for the present, no expansive comment, since in this matter discretion is required at such an early phase.

.........................................................



The intention of this weblog is the continued message regards the importance of drawing when seeking to communicate an idea.

Perhaps more than ever, with the decline in the broad vocabulary and so exactitude of the English language, reduced to overtly simple English, Americanised English, slang words, abbreviation or metaphore, drawing itself seemingly grows even more important  so as allow an idea to be conveyed almost automatically.
And ironically unlike language which conveys best with pedantic exactitude, the more simple and clean the drawing, the easier to communicate the central idea or concept

Having previously shown : loose sketches, side elevation, orthographic projection and the expansion of base construction lines, for vehicle concepts from 2 decades ago; displayed  here is the use of  'Exploded' diagrams and 'Ghost' images, in very simple form, to illustrate:

1.  How items / components are individually distinct
2. How items / components are assembled, or operated
3. The invisible items / components within.

And on the 60th Anniversary of Mini, what more fitting than the accompanying graphic window. whic illustrates the very basic design thoughts for a 'Mini 3'.

Initially sketched-out during the latter design phases of then New Mini (ie Mini 2) as of  mid 1999; and later compiled into single A4  summary a couple of years later in 2001.

The initial thinking and original sketches done whilst at Rover Group as wholly unofficial exploratory thoughts over a couple of weekends, with recognition that the Rover Group as was, looked increasingly likely to be broken-up by BMW AG to secure its own long-term future, and the remnant that was to be Rover Cars would have to think afresh about its place in the market-place and automotive sector.

[NB at that point it was suspected that BMW would also 'naturally' retain MG aswell, as a midway 'British-Sports' and natural connection between both MINI and its own sporting Z-series, the success of the Z3  providing the cost amortised platform, and MG targeting the lower price range, so ability to chase the volumes of Mazda's MX-5/Miata. The business case was compelling at the time].

Hence the future scenario for the Rover Cars division was by then bleak, as it looked likely that it would have to eventually struggle-on by itself. The Rover 75 was in 1999 effectively brand new, but without BMW (or Land-Rover) sourced cash injections, all future model programmes spanning widely across A-B/B-C/D-E segments, would need to be primarily funded by 75's profitability, and that was nigh on impossible given the enormous CapEx demands of conventional car manufacturing.

Even so, with R75 launched, R55 still in clay form (but rejected by BMW as likely to cannabalise 3 and 5 series sales) and R30 (25/45 successor) being evaluated at concept stage via design sketches, initial engineering packaging and systems and trim levels specifications, the only vehicle in the theorectical pipeline not being considered was that of a dedicated A-segment car; as part of the ideolology of leaving small cars (eg Metro/100) behind in the bid to move the Rover brand upmarket.

[NB However in the 1990s the A-B segment had become a hotbed of creativity, and even premium manufacturers had been exploring the small 'mass' arena by which to grow their volumes and profits, so legitimising the rightly conceptualised small cars as being seen as city-chic and so prestigious, as seen with New Mini and New Fiat 500].

Hence my thoughts spawned firstly the 'City-Car' thumbnail (see top right) for Rover Cars, given the agedness of the Metro-based 100.

But critically the high cost of any such conventionally engineered replacement looked increasingly unrealistic, since as a likely eventual single brand company itself still in 'Turnaround' mode, it would be unable to access amenable re-financing. The City would require what was effectively a high-yield 'junk-bond' level dividend/coupon upon its financing 'Notes' for taking the risk of backing Rover Cars.

Moreover, any new small car had to vie against an increasingly highly competitive crop of exciting and somewhat radical A segment cars (eg Renault Twingo, Ford Ka, and Suzuki  Wagon R (rebadged by others) aswell as conventionals such as Peugeot's 106) and impressive arrat of B-segment cars (eg Ford Fiesta, GM Corsa, Renault 5, Peugeot 205/6, VW Polo etc .

Globally, A-segment cars had grown into their own in the 1990s, as both affordable trendy runabouts in Europe (led by Twingo and Ka), and in Asia and increasingly Europe as newly affordable yet practical monoboxes across Asia (after doing so in Japan).

[NB Later as MG-Rover, the company with no development funding, resorted to the rebadging of the TATA Indica as CityRover; itself a sign of the foreseen perilous state of the firm].

But even in 1999, it had become obvious that poor state of Rover Cars' divisional finances and high likelyhood of dissolution of the 4 brands by BMW, meant that for Rover Cars any new car that sought to set itself was a breed apart in the broadening A or A-B segment, would require a wholly unconventional business model to become feasibly born.

A wholly new 'low cost' development approach was necessary if an independent Cars remnant of Rover Group was to survive and possibly even eventually re-flourish.

Convincingly recasting the engineering attributes and brand values of the R75 into a small newly engineered package would be nigh on impossible, given the worn base-structure tooling on 100 (poor tolerances) and 25/45, aswell as the innate width of the 25/45 car, unsuited to an A-segment car.

[NB Toyota was able to achieve that unconventional wide-short package on its iQ, simply because it was Toyota and had the brand strength to convince the public]

Yet there was an alternative - and necessary radical - path for any such remnant firm, if it was to think outside the box, in the same way Issigonis did for Austin-Morris in 1957 for the ADO 15 project that became the 1959 Austin Mini 7 and Morris Mini-Minor.

To my mind, something could be done with the two A-segment virtues of 'Character' (Twingo / Ka) and ' Practicality' (Wagon R) when convincingly combined.

This had not really happened thus far with different vehicle types, and although Twingo had undoubtedly moved into that space with its egg-like monospace, it had not been made available in the UK, and itself was seen as overtly feminine and cute, and tended to attract a majority of female buyers.

[NB that was Renault's commercial intent as central to the design brief of the Twingo programme.

So obviously any new small car solution would have to offer character and space and to provide a compellingly attractive proposition for customers of both sexes, so creating as wide a captive net over various socio-demographics as possible.

And critically could only be commercially realised using the very lowest development and manufacturing cost formulas to suit the inevitably much slimmed enterprise that Rover Cars would inevitably become, if it was to survive at all.

Thus, any such any new car would have to follow the path of the original Issigonis Mini, yet also become even more radical.

[NB Remember that ADO15 itself relied upon the conventions of an already cost amortised (A-series) engine (tho' innovatively turned transversely) and the use of conventional high cost press tooling. Austin-Morris then in 1957/8 putting its development faith and money into the in-sump gearbox, rubber-cone suspension and neccessity of sub-frames to reduce stresses on the BIW shell and reduce NVH].

Thus, as a 30 year old Business Strategist from a Design-Engineering and Corporate Design Management background (ie per the reality of designing within the strictures of commerce and economics), it was my own love of the Issigonis Mini and the manner in which it was born by good design to meet the needs of its then new segment, aswell as being affordable to BMC.

This meant that very quickly it became apparent to extinguish any such ideas about a small Rover badged car - whose conventional engineering and so development costs were prohibitive to grow Rover's very neccessary build quality credentials - and instead, with rightful 'Purist' intent, re-imagine something much more along the lines of the original Mini

[NB even though the MINI (Austin and Morris) nameplates were owned by BMW, a new brand could be feasibly created alongside Rover Cars that had similar overtones of original Mini ADO15 in its very spirit and innovative solutions].

Infact would need to 'advanced' be so as to necessarily separate any such interesting new car from obvious associations to BMW's MINI. But it could still have a subliminality per the best case examples from the past (ie Mini and Austin 7, and likely other People's Cars)

As stated, in mid 1999, the BMW NewMini (ie 'Mini 2') project was, from a Design and Product Engineering perspective, very near completion. With only minor fettling arising from Production Engineering considerations as the myriad of tasks under Manufacturing Engineering were being completed.

[NB As is well known by now, the Designer Frank Stephenson had been seconded to Rover Group from BMW (Munich and Designworks) since his Modern-Retro approach had been much preferred by the BMW Board; given MINI brands re-invention centred around the dynamic Cooper actings as the prime inspiration and able to obtain premium pricing.

By mid 1999 it was well into the Production Engineering phase for Production Set-Up, with the innate process of Quality Snagging much reduced at the Cowley plant thanks to the very systematic BMW Engineering and Production 'Gateways' approach deployed from the very start, and Cowley's own previous learning from Honda].

It must be emphasised then that BMW was in no way thinking of any kind of a 'Mini 3', recognising New MIni and its generational successors created on the premis of the conventional development of the New Mini aesthetic and driving and quality principles.

Hence, there was no formal 'live' NPD process, but I could read between the lines of unfolding events and likelihood of outcomes, and sought to map out a possible new chapter for a remant part of a once powwrful and proud portion of UK industry; aswell as seeing  a contemporary parallel of the relevance of that Leonard Lord - Alec Issigonis foresightedness. in 1956.

[NB Like others I had been a life-long fan of Issogonis's effort on ADO15. So much so that when I read some of his letters on show from the Gaydon Heritage Museum Archive, I noted a serendipitous specific similarity between the name of the road he lived with in Edgbaston, Birmingham, where he died, and the road name of my first home in London when born. So there - at least appeared - seemed a spiritual connection of sorts - which in 1998 led me to - a decade after his death - visit his old house as an homage to the man].

Thus personal thoughts about ideal re-interpretation of a small car as a kind of 'Mini 3' would inevitably follow in the progressive footsteps of ADO15 in terms of its package volumetric efficiency and even greater onus upon fuel efficiency, with through the advantages of lightweight structures, ability to gain performance advantage on a bhp/tonne basis.

But first and foremost it was to be a urban runabout and so everyday 'shopping car' that could by virtue of its engineering DNA also be easily developed enjoy performance variants in standard box (but low C of G) body-shell or altered sporting / aero body-styles

Hence, the tiny City-Car thumbnail doodle (with backdrop silhouette) of a Rover Cars consideration, was soon redrawn in similar proportionate size, but with far more aforethought, regards original Mini principles and aesthetic.

This then in fact the very antithesis of the BMW car, which rightly for its intended client base, put style and performance over simplicity and functionality.

As seen from its multi-generational success since 2001, the BMW New Mini was from a corporate persepective waswholly perfect as a zeitgeist relavant durable consumer good.

Frank and his team of Modellers and Concept Engineers gave the consumer exactly what was required at the time (after New Beetle) and before his similar efforts on New Fiat 500.  R50 / R53 ticked all the boxes for NPD success given its formulaic mixture of 'visual memes' of the original (especially in its face), whilst adding handling and product quality attributes. It was what a global marketplace had been primed for and was subconsciously waiting for, and hence its enormous success.

Thus New Mini was commercially 'right' because it had obvious derivative character and so 'soul' - even if 'manufactured' - itself the invocation of the post-modern, hyper-real object.

And - although it was overtly formulaic to me - from a business and corporate standpoint, it was something that I was wholeheartedly behind given the fragile state of Rover Group and the need for MINI income to substantially buoy the company's top and bottom lines. That only possible if itself left with some commercial autonomy over MINI, which became increasingly unlikely between 1995 and 1999.

[NB even then with New Mini revenues, Rover Group would have had to very well balance research, development and amortisation costs to provide a strong strong ROI (needing to string-out the absorption of costs as much as possible to restrengthen its financial position. And given its past track record and 'need' to operate 4 brands that was not easily reconciled].

As per New Mini (2), preparing the consumer for the generational transition was key, and I was initially aghast at the size of the wheel-arches being put on the run-out series of  the original car, since it had made it so cartoonish. But this done to deliberately mold market perspectives from the yesteryear ADO15 based car and toward the new R50 based car. Hence the intermediate cartoonish look and visual of "wide-track" handling was deemed a necessary part of the generational hand-over.

But to the Product Designer in me R50 had never been as intellectually enthralling and so not aesthetically nor technically absorbing, as the Issigonis creation. From a design purist's perspective, R50 was too stylistically contrived to be considered as on par with the utter wonderment original 1959 Issigonis Mini; even if from the Marketeer, Accountant and BMW investor's perspective, R50 / R53 was the perfect commercial answer.

When Rover Group's Board, Management and Staff realised by 1997 that the New Mini project had effectively been taken over by BMW employees, it was recognised that BMW was cherry-picking and inevitably prioritising its future over that of RoverGroup.

By 1999 the writing was on the wall.

But if the remnants of the company was to be divested from BMW AG - without Mini and likely Land Rover and MG brands - and an entity of Rover Cars was to survive, any such  company would need to think very differently for itself, and utilise a low cost design and manufacturing methods that could inject something new and affordable into the centre of the mass market, so as to obtain a small slice of that large cake.

Something akin to a very well considered 'Mini 3'.

Hence, these were my thoughts in early to mid 1999 which had been influenced by a set of other manufacturers' innovative cars that had appeared in small and other segments:

1. Audi A2 - low structural mass, interior volume, aero consideration
2.Smart Car - composite panels (interchangable personalisation feature), small capacity engine, rear engined for front crash management and enclosed safety cell
3. Merc A-class - interior volume and sandwich-floor crash safety solution (directing the crash path of the powertrain).
4. Lotus Type 111 - extruded aluminium base structure (although subsequently with steel subframes), and composite outer panels
5. Japan's 'Tallboy' Kei Cars - vehicle packaging centred around the importance of large interior space upon small dimensional footprint


The all aluminium Audi A2 had been under semi-secret development by VAG as Audi's re-entry into small/city cars (something not seen since the 1975 Audi A50, itself becoming the VW Polo), and shown as the concept AL2.

Hence, Audi had chosen to be obviously progressive prompted by the various Climate Change Treaties (Kyoto et al) and seemingly an innate desire to recapture the German glory days of advanced engineering in aluminium (Auto Union and Merceded 'Silver Arrow' race cars, Airships etc).

The concept AL2 then (before A2's launch) had been an inspiration in itself, and although the previous 100/200 series was 'pure' from an aero standpoint, the A2's deliberately overtly Modernist 'Bauhaus' appearance and packaging was for its segment as pronounced as the TT and A6 in their respective segments; all with direct lineage to the Auto Union-esque AVUS concept of 1991. But being 'all aluminium' it was even more progressive than its coupe or saloon siblings.

Audi Design and Engineering had effectively sought recast a modern Mini - according to purist packaging and aero principles.

[NB Those principles were very much 'Issigonian' given his own 1938 aluminium monocoque Hill-Climb car : the Lightweight Special, inspired at the time by Auto-Union race car design].

And of course since the establishment of the Swatch-Daimler JV in 1994, evolved into the Smart Car, had been widely publicised long before launch as a highly progessive new era City Car. Providing for ease of functional use given its small size, aswell as high levels of personalisation given the initially planned inter-changeable multi-coloured skin panels attached to sub-structures around the Tridion Safety Cell.

Also the importance of the original Mercedes A-class, which revolutionised powertrain packaging within a Sandwich Floor Architecture, for crash safety.

I'd seen the previous concept car at the Dutch Auto Show in 1993 (between under-graduate and post-graduate studies). That concept car 'Vision A' was tiny (virtually the size of ADO15) compared to the eventual production car, with it's highly space efficient monobox shape demonstrated what could be done for a given footprint.

And beyond these city cars, was the original 1996 Lotus Type 111 (original Elise).

[NB It's success only came after the poorly conceived M100 (Elan); itself seemingly overtly connected to the flaling Buick Reatta with sub-optimal FWD layout, and created from abject commercial theory rather than pragmatic reality, intended to broach the mainstream, gain volumes and so obtain the funds for Lotus-Isuzu to enter F1. 'Cart before the horse' product planning.

After the failure of Elan, the firm had to return to its roots to reobtain credibility, - and as well explained in Wikipedia - it was Concept Engineer Richard Rackham and his team that researched and realised what many in the low volume side of the industry had been considering for years: the use of cost efficient extruded aluminium to create an overall  structure that could be either mechanically fixed or ideally chemically bonded like Elise. The story of the Type 111, its own derivatives and those other badged sports cars are well documented.

And lastly, the massive importance of the revolution in car design that had taken place in forever forward thinking Japan. The story of the kei-car is well known - small cars for small streets with small engines for basic mobility, good fuel efficiency, Critically, a small engine meaning more comparitive space for the occupants.

But the true revolution occurred with the creation of the mini MPV, a car derived from a micro-van. (This became the set trend right across EM Asia). But in Japan that opened the way for true purpose designed monobox micro-cars. These were called initially called 'Tallboys' by Western observers (after the bedroom furniture and clock casing) and although initially odd-looking were immensely practical given such small overall width and length to height.

In a short timespan the kei-car became a defacto 'tallboy', and so that bodystyle in turn became considered the standard kei-car, as more and more models evolved into that style or new 'tall-boy' models emerged.


These 4 cars - Audi A2, Daimler Smart, Mercedes A-class and Lotus Type 111, plus Japan's Kei-Car sector ....aswell as the 1959 Mini - had formed the basis of my own thoughts in terms of ideally amalgamating the best features of each in a truly technically advanced 2nd successor to original Mini.

Something that would philosophicalland technically stand equal to the Issigonis original.

But quite obviously, given BMW's legal ownership of the 'MINI' brand, and such vehicle created under Rover Cars' direction would require an alternative brand name; and there would need to be enough spiritual / visual similarity to original Mini, yet also be wholly different to Frank Stephenson's re-interpretation for the BMW car.

In summary:

1. a characterful, very practical, safe and critically simple 'alternative' vehicle.
A back to basic philosophy which countered normative automotive trends for increased size and mass, consequential of ever more vehicle content. The cost, weight of size of every bought-in regulatory demanded feature, off-set from in-house creative design-engineering

2. targeted at a broad range of customer types: from 20-30 something progressive eco-minded 'first adopters' (as personal car), to 40-60 something Mini puriists (as second car), to fashionistas across the age range wanted to convey individualism.

3. a highly rational cost effective business plan based upon reduced CapEx, Operating Costs and Government incentives (tax breaks etc) - so demanding flexible and sensible renumeration rates - with complete (Japanese and German style) 'buy-in' from employees from Senior Execs to Apprentices.

4. use of conventional design and development methods per small team structures, Design and Concept Eng., CAD, Rapid Prototyping, CFD, CFM, DFA etc and testing resources (4 pillar etc, ), but with markedly shorter development timeframe enabled from tightly prescribed NPD brief.

5. use of high quality pre-proven components (in from heavier vehicles) to provide extended duty-cycles, and limited whole vehicle specification complexity so as to quickly specify, develop as necessary, test and prove  basic vehicle.

6. us of alternative manufacturing methods taken from the plethora of methods available to all industrial sectors: from metallic aluminium extrusions to proven composites and plastics molding, from Resin Injection Molding to Rotational Molding (see previous Rover 105 concept) to Matrix and Honeycomb advanced structural solutions.

7. a new highly entwined 'product, production and service' customer marketing  ethos, that allows the customer to be a far greater part of the process.

Given the need for product simplicity it would not follow the BMW process of a plethora of options (at least in the Gen 1 car), and would not follow the bespoke methods of the bespoke Personalisation of 'Atalier', and so would be far less about a trim and options mix for product personalisation.

Instead, the customers would be highly educated about the design and build ethos of the product to feel themselves enlightened about the details of design approach, methods, materials etc, done in person as formal lecture, with samples of the materials and design sketches provided to be kept in the home as dinner party talking pieces or object d'art.

Thus, as stated, the basic Product Strategy was to utilise the best attributes from each of the best product studies seen to that point and recognised by the public (as described above) per those 4 specific vehicles, whilst also encompassing all that the Issigonis Mini stood for, and aspects of the best developed  and (then) recently illustrated to the public.

To be the counter-point to BMW's R50 and its derivatives, the car had to reflect a 'less is more' theme, and so highly functionalist in appearence and highlighting and making a cosmetic virtue of its design intelligence rather than masking it with standard trim and hardware treatments, as per R50.

As such 'Technical' in appearence, as so a myriad of design solutions required. In spirit,  similar to the rationale of the external seam flanges seen on ADO15's BIW, used reduced built complexity, time and cost; ie making a visual feature of its DFM].

Thus creating a true cognitive and emotional connection for the customer to the orginal 1950 car - itself essentially an exercise in good Product Design, over the conventions of Auto Design of the period.And

And critically to simplify the development programme and BoM costs, parring down 'vehicle content'avoiding as much exterior and interior fitment design, manufacturing and sourcing costs as possible, whilst putting development monies into materials, structure, and user interface innovation (FUNction) as possible.

Given Rover Cars' financial woes of the period, such a wholly alternative new approach to every aspect of any new vehicle programme was required.

However, positively, Rover Cars at the time had a great deal of factory space available at the Longbridge plant, It also had a somewhat 'captive' workforce - many being their 'trade' since leaving school or college, and many with extended families who had worked their for generations as part of British vehicle manufacturing (hence obviously similar to that at Cowley).

But production line worker's wage rates were high compared to other similar industries in the region and elsewhere, so Rover Cars had been absorbing the disadvantageous high cost and somewhat inflexible manpower.  A major problems that required sorting and re-organising, and which had been begun by BMW's use of flexi-time.

Line workers were effectively paid for the much improved but still old style 'factory work', which meant long shifts, anti-social hours, repetitive simple actions and stark 'strip-lit' factory environment. Thus in actuality paid for inconvenience rather than skill. Infact (as was my experience) Graduate Trainees going into management roles were put on the line as part of their own development, precisely because the  grad-trainee salary was less than the standard line worker.

Production 'Associates' were restricted to their singular task, rather than being encouraged to become adept at various tasks, since that was ostensibly the supervisor's role (at higher pay) to take over if a person short for a period if absent or taking a toilet break.

(It seemed to me to echo the worst of 1960s-1970s labour practices, as exemplified by the comedy film 'Carry on at Your Convenience' about lavatory manufacture - pun intended)

My grad-trainee time "on the line"  had been at the Swindon 'Press Shop' (stamping-out original ADO15 Mini roofs) and Cowley (assembling Rover 600 instrument facias). The working practices (structures and routines) appeared archaic compared to Japanese production practices, this so even after Rover had been supposedly 'Honda-ised' given the learning from its previous Joint Venture].

To avoid the high cost of new conventional CapEx in tool press dies, the transportation costs of moving formed panels from Swindon to Longbridge, and the typical line maintenance and improvements (from vehicle cradles to engine 'stuff-up' (as it was called) of the conventional production line, a very different Manufacturing Strategy was required.

One which would utilise low cost production solutions to in part help ensure strong continued local employment (for the good of the local economy) even if highly likely a cost-saved  slimmed workforce or cross the boards pay cuts was to avoid entire and complete redundancy of the site (as was to happen some years later).

The idea that Rover Cars in its then near present condition would be bought and operated in its then current state by another VM (European, American, Japanese or other) was very very unlikely. Since, those other VMs sought to see the demise of a competitor in their fight for UK and European market share, and unlike BMW's use of Rover Cars as a mainstream affordable brand, the VMs were obviously mainstream, actually seeking to move their own brands either upmarket or creating new brands].

So for Rover Cars - as whatever subsequent entity - to survive, it would have to offer something new, attractive and profitable. Something that echoed the best of perceived advanced technology, whilst combining the most pragmatic practices of niche and low mid-scale manufacturing.

And so the very notion of a 'High-Niche / Low-Mid' manufacturing plan had to be conceived, one which could run to between 30,000 and 40,000 vehicles a year, on a a strictly enforced 45 weeks of production per year (requiring a full seven weeks unpaid leave from the workforce).

Manufacturing would consist of not one fast-build production line, but multiple slower-build parallel lines, which were fed from in-house component construction. This necessary given curing time of composites, the retained level of labour, and critically the ability to immediately "switch lines" if problems arose in a specific 'station' location, this more likely given the lesser technical sophistication of the build line and so greater variability in build process.

At 40,000 units per annum, that would equal 223 cars per week, at 44 cars per day.

That sounds ridiculously small compared to mass manufacture, but these vehicles were to be drip fed into the market through what would need to be new retail sites placed in Shopping Malls, Rail Termini (see previous Tech Centres), and the best Rover Cars Dealerships as seperately branded entities.

Critically the internet was obviously available, but without the general e-commerce sophistication to follow. So would be utilised as the advertising and media space, to off-set little or no TV advertising (given its rates) and teaser press and bill-board campaigns.

The Marketing Strategy had to be as efficient and accountable as the Product and Manufacturing Strategies.

The drip-fed 40,000 were designed to create a high demand ferver from the marketplace, so  demand would deliberately outstrip supply.

That somewhat limited supply of the Series 1 car would allow those dealers who had not defected from Rover Cars division, to sell 'Mini 3' above its RRP 'sticker-price' (within officially prescribed limits) so as to re-gain their own profitability. Limited supply would also allow for the creation of a very buoyant pre-delivery auction process, whereby those higher-up the order list could sell their place in the queue to another willing to pay a higher price (again within prescribed limits).

[NB Nissan had previously created a lottery system for its niche Pike series cars (Poa, Figaro, S-cargo etc) in the early 1990s and had been inundated with interest, but only the lottery winners were able to buy].

Whilst creating excitement, it also left many hopeful buyers deflated, so this 'auction' method would instead create an immediate liquid market for the new car, and as such was arguably more democratic, and allowed people more order to delivery flexibility.

And those people "seeking the new" would be informed of and so expect a vehicle that was very different when encountered and used, since designed and manufactured differently. it's very DNA would be its own 'Technical Marketing' and so admired by the automotive cogniscenti, informed progressives and others alike:

In summary:

1. Off the shelf engineering materials (eg steel and aluminium tube)

2. The same kind of low cost AL Extrusion tooling (ideally co-expensed by Norsk Hydro (given eco credentials) or another Aluminium manufacturer.

3. The use of 'in-house' produced 'advanced' composites for sections of internal BIW structure, and crash conformity panels.

4. The use of conventional composite panel manufacturing via male-female molds for Resin Injection Molded and Vacuum Formed Molds, specified as necessary. But with high dimensional tolerance (for skin panel A-surface finish and panel gap consistancy - not minimal panel gap)

5. Engine Strategy TBA...

Option 1 : since in-house K-series production was costly compared to other manufacturers' engine families, and had been seen as prone to a number of problems  (I thought K-series an enormous waste of development and warranty monies), use of GM's 3 cylinder (as developed for Corsa Eco model of the period) for both Eco detuned variant, standard variant and turbo-charged for performance variant. (The much reduced vehicle mass would have added appreciable bhp/tonne in its own 'light-weighting').

Option 2: (Given the previous thoughts on Land Rover AID), the use of a re-engineered air and 'flat' Boxer engine or laid-flat dry sump small IL4 engine sourced from a Motorcycle manufacturer. This engine to be located mid vehicle in a sandwich floor, so substantially raising the floor height (and so roof height) but having very advantageous Centre of Gravity and Polar Moment of Inertia.

6. Large aperture opening into cabin, with use of "clap-hand" doors (ie no B-pillar)
(NB this seen 8 years later with BMW's first R55 Clubman variant per single 'Clubdoor', then upon later BMW i3, aswell as other models such as Mazda RX-8 etc).

7. One-piece clamshell bonnet, itself integral part of external crash structure. Fully removable for Service and Repair Technicians to provide unhindered access to engine bay and 'front end', and for engine removal. Owners able use access panels in either grille or under lamp clusters to top-up coolant, oil or hydraulic fluid if necessary.

8. Bulkhead comprised of 'concertina crush' aluminium Bulkhead Ring - made of interlocking extrusions - with structurally advanced composite crash panel sandwiched between.

9. Behind the Bulkhead Ring, frame and brace construction (as per 'superleggera') with lugs etc for stressed panel attachments. Steel lower - Aluminium upper, (the chemical bond between both surfaces negating electrolytic degradation). Basic frame strength assisted with structural internal and external composite bracing.

10. Aero Front and Rear - reduced frontal cross-section with use of front wheel fenders (as per Smart Car), tapering bonnet and deeply curved windscreen. Rear ostensibly 'Kamm Tail' with 'Bustle Back' to better manage airflow delamination, likely use of thin C-pillar foils.

11. Recognisable 'Mini' like face, but altered to provide a Modernist aesthetic derived from form and function and be recognizably different to BMW's New Mini.

This would require delicate consideration of various themes at the Design phase.

As shown herein, location of small front lighting clusters away from typical impact area to beneath A pillar, to also illuminate front wheel arches / corners at night to assist parking (also akin to position on the early 1922 Austin 7, spiritual predecessor to 1959 Mini).    

The overall appearance intended to be more 'product' and 'architectural'. So akin to the thinking of much from yesteryear, from 1959 ADO15, to 1947 Citroen H-van or even 1990s Renault Magnum truckcab unit. Rather than obviously derivatively stylistic and so 'automotive' as R50 had been penned.

'Mini 3' was to be a true city and suburban tool, appreciated by the 'intelligent' aswell as a likely anti, counter-culture statement against overt consumerism and the 'throw-away' fashions (in cars aswell as clothes).

12. New Customer After Sales Schemes for additional income streams via likes of vehicle updates, personalisation, club membership, motoring trips etc.

13. The central theme to vehicle was an aspect of After Sales that sought to interest and educate the owner regards many aspect of Design as lead component of Culture, and vice versa  progressive technology in various fields (autos, aeronautics, marine, civil engineering, architecture), so as to instill the Issigonis (and others') Design Mindsets. In turn re-emphising the uniqueness of the vehicle itself and bringing people closer to the new brand.

[NB This Design in Context perspective was applied whilst in the Design Studio. I had created what was intended to be the foundations of a basic but powerful Design Management Guide which provided directional formulae for the design ethos  of each of the 4 group brands : Land Rover, Mini, MG and Rover.

Each already had there own loosely referantial 'Design Templates' at different stages of maturation - Land Rover most complete, yet still simplistic.

So each marque required greater design definition within broader cultural context.

The intent was to correlate each brand's innate 'DNA' with a specific historical design traits from its history, approapriate to its original innate design philosophy, set within cultural framework of the period, as regards when it was established and in its heyday.

This to provide more directed artistic inspiration set within broader avenues of directed exploration. It was the antithesis of 'retro', seeking to recapture and mix the original thinking of the previous age to be re-interpreted.

Hence:

Rover Cars - est 1904 to 1920s heyday : Neo-Classical / Art Nouveau / Arts and Crafts. Referance to original Viking Longboat (as per R95 / R105 concept of 1997)

MG Cars -   est 1924 to 1960s heyday : 'Streamlining' pertaining to 'Performance Aero', as illustrated by 'Old No1', the 'Airline' bodies, EXE181 speed record car, EX-E concept and later MGF based EX 'Bonneville' prototype. Together with the subtle application of Octagonal detailing within varying 'Art Deco' influence, the extend of extravagance dependent upon model type.

Land Rover - est 1948 : 'Utility' obviously pertaining to its conceptual origins per 'form follows function' and its multi-task capabilities. Highly simplistic proportions and forms, use of 'Clean yet Deconstructed' aesthetic able to emphasis features and accessories,  with influences from British 'Utility' design campaign (ie clothes to furniture).

Beyond this, the importance of 'Engineering Artform' recognizing that the  most functional components that represented the uniqueness of the brand - underbody / chassis, exterior and interior -  could feasibly be created as delight features to behold or to use.

(As a separate Design Studio exercise I'd also spent seperate time seeking to develop the L-R Design Template beyond its then simplistic interpretation. Encompassing much to feed back into the brand beyond basic iconography like 'Alpine lights': 'Honesty of Construction' from Defender to application of 'Golden Ratios' proportions for future Freelander, Discovery and Range Rover).

'Mini 3' - est 1959 : 'Modernism' meets 'Pop-u-Lux', whereby underlying rational design principles (of Issigonis) would be overlayed and so warmed by the cosmetic applications pertaining to various cultural or personal tropes, from body graphics to select interior fitments].

Hence as can be seen, the thinking behind 'Mini 3' was part of a far greater considered design and commercialisation basis for all 4 group brands. Something that gave the Studio greater Design Management direction and yet broader exploratory freedoms.

As described the vehicle was the output of first and foremost a sensible and so likely feasible business model and detailed plan.

In effect, the Product Strategy, Design Strategy, Development Strategy and Manufacturing Strategy were envisioned around some of the parametres of what called of 'Micro Factory Retailing'.

This ideology moved away from the 'centrism' of a large central mass manufacturing base using conventional vehicle building techniques and there inherent high costs, and toward a model that consisted of alternative build materials and processes to produce shorter manufacturing runs.

That model was envisaged to sit between the polar opposites of Mass Manufacture (then considered 200,000 units pa upwards, depending upon model type and profitability) and Niche Manufacture (then considered 200 - 1000 units pa).

Its goal was the creation of a manufacturing model that could be replicated across a region or nation or continent in different locations, and was believed the panacea by the investment community and automotive seniors because it seek to would avoid the enormous sunk-costs of conventional manufacturing and the typical legacy costs involved when forced to close a plant.

[NB  It was this commercial ideology that would later underpin Gordon Murray's  'iStream' offering  8 years later in 2007 for his 3-seat T25 city-car concept, as thereafter licensed to Shell and Yamaha. Though obviously he had been considering it previously].

My own 1999 background thinking to this rationale for 'Mini 3' was as follows....

Just before my own Master's Degree, in the summer of 1991 I had visited (ex Ford Exec) Karl Ludvignsen's Consulting office to meet with his assistant (the Dutch born) Mr Neuhuis. (He later worked with Prof Garyl Rhys at Cardiff Business School).

And it was there in 1991 that I first learned of the Investment Community's and Auto-Sector's interests in 'Micro-Factory Retailing'.

Given the economic realities of the time - that of a short recession within  expanding credit and so boom period for vehicles -  to me appeared simply too 'academic', and so an over-hyped notion of new business models for the auto-industry at large that was still absorbed with increasing capacity through merger and acquisition.

Yet it still obviously had specific  uses for SME firms and large VMs in various ways

[NB It was in part the notional 'golden promise' of MFR which inturn prompted me to focus my Master's Major Thesis upon a Design/Engineering Management review for a broad spectrum of UK Automakers, from Niche to Mass, interviewing:
1. Reliant Motors - Chief Engineer - John Hawthorne
2. Aston Martin Lagonda - Chief Engineer - Robert Watson
3. TVR - Chief Engineer / Design - John Ravenscroft
4. Rover Group - Director of Product Design - Gordon Sked
5. Ford - Chief Engineer Europe - Richard Parry-Jones]

MFR was undoubtedly over-egged as a new revolutionary business model, since the sector was by and large had a predetermined default to scale economies, consolidation and so conventional 'Budd' Steel Press manufacturing systems to ensure quality, and typically left unorthodox labour intensive Niche methods to the Specialist small fry; the likes of Morgan, Lotus, Reliant, TVR and a host of others past and present.

Hence at the time I believed the rhetoric about MFR to be overly optimistic, given the structure of the sector. And the fact that as and when large VMs needed low capacity production solutions for typically high-value, small-run prestige models, they would 'farm' the work out to specialist sub-contractors as they had done for years, depending upon the skills of that specific sub-contractor.

However, I immediately saw its relevance to:
1. Niche Manufacturers - systematically scale-up production in different 'phased-in' locations for an expanding demand of niche vehicles, so providing a continental or global sales base.

2. For Major VMs as a tool for testing the market with what might be considered an exploratory and revolutionary model at far lower CapEx and manufacturing unit costs; later able to either
2a. Replicate the build process elsewhere (as above) to add incremental volume
2b.  Re-Engineer a second generation vehicle to befit conventional production line, if the first generation car had been received well and was of limited supply ti high demand, hence the transition of that new redical vehicle into mass manufacture.

And so it was later recognised in 1999 as a potentially applicable route for an independent but cash poor Rover Cars in creating its version of a 'Mini 3'

But the trick was to get the best of both worlds of Niche and Mass manufacturing for low-end Intermediate Manufacturing, by gaining access more cheaply produced components with the ability to gain higher volumes through relative speedier build times compared to true niche production (even if far from mass benchmark), with advantage of comparative scale, gained from parallel-motion multi-location assembly centres.
But for 'Mini 3' that parallel motion assembly would be wholly in Longbridge, the birthplace of the Issigoniss' original.

Quite obviously, history illustrates that BMW's divestment of Rover Cars led to a Management Buy-Out of the MG and Rover marques, locations and plant, which itself lasted only a few more years before being 'lifted and shifted' to China.

China thereafter became the centre of the automotive universe for the major global players, and UK design, engineering and manufacturing became increasingly small and specialist  toward the specialisms regards Motor Sports, and with the danger of 'high value' services being replicated in EM countries by foreign others, the UK's Desgn and Engineering base spread its wings to encompass other sectors such as Rail and Marine, and grew the breadth of its Services as the engineering complexity of battling climate change in an increasingly cyber-led world grew.

But for a time between 1998 and 1999 - when it was obvious that BMW would reduct itself from the headaches caused by "the English Patient" - whilst straddling the Design-Engineering world of GDEC in Gaydon, and the company's Marketing world in Warwick Business Park, that a wholesale re-invention of a British icon appeared not just likely feasible, but very very necessary to reset Britain's reputation vis a vis Europe and the rest of the world, to once again "set the pace" in innovative small cars.

If the country is to recapture its glory days, far beyond the diatribe about "F1 Engineering" (in reality comparitively small export earnings), pure "Battery Electric Vehicles" (in reality a small % of global TIV) and "Autonomous Cars" (still hype over technical practability), Britain must return to its engineering roots and this time explore the alternative and practicable.

So before investment-auto-motives returns to its core mission regards Automotive Investment issues, from the Macro to Macro to systematic deployment of 'Coupled Ratios' investment analysis tools, the message to a younger generation is yet again to pick-up a pen or pencil and start communicating not in increasingly meaningless or verbose words, but through the medium of pen and paper.

Think for yourself and utilise drawing to do so, and so create your own dissected 'explosions' and see-through 'ghosts' when communicating your own concept ideas to others.