A comment before beginning this web-log proper....
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Given the previous Land-Rover Strategy and Concept related articles (Defender 2, 'Titan' and 'AID') - themselves envisaged to access additional and expanding income streams and simultaneously buoy the brand's original utilitarian persona - the natural instinct is to provide opinion regards the recently unveiled New Defender (in '90'and '110' level and pack guises), now that the immediate reaction from press and public has passed.
Obviously, previously I'd had my own thoughts regards Defender's overall design - not simply 'styling'...not simply 'engineering' but truly holistic answer; that followed the dictum of 'Engineering Artform' as per an extended design-guidelines template I'd prescribed when in the Studio in 1996.
Given the the launch of New Defender it would be wholly insensitive to divulge the detail of those ideas, even if it be over 20 years later.
Simply to state that the concept was far more 'Lego-Like' in philosophy, and made a virtue of reconstructing its initial simple and very clean basic exterior which could be 'deconstructed' panel by panel for accessories fitment and re-configurability for the spectrum of different user groups from Utility to Adventure to Leisure.
That mutual functionality in turn nurturing a cognitive connection between what were becoming the 'old' and 'new' sets of buyers, from very different socio-demographic and psychographic perspectives. So unifying the increasingly diverse buyer and user base.
With the various 'Pack' Options demonstrated at launch, allowing drivers and passengers to become more active and interactive, I sincerely hope Land Rover will consider a yet more interactive 'Lego Like' approach regards future innovation which then underpins the very rationale of Defender, as known for over 70 years.
And so given personal background, and the possible weight of my words, in the instance of New Defender - without the Commercial variants seen and still far too early to gauge real world product mix, take up and so revenues - any form of comment from an investor's viewpoint would be mere conjecture.
The vehicle will be considered upon its own merits and income provision to JLR over the quarters and years to come; and if able to straddle the 3 target sectors convincingly should provide for a rare auto model line that can off-set the wavering revenue norms of a cyclical industry.
Critically, I sincerely hope that a pick-up version of the '110' - in single and double cab variants - will have been developed alongside the notional "Station Wagon" or "County" 'hard-tops', given the global size of the double-cab market, and also opportunity for basic single cab to offer a longer bed to in part fulfil the '130's previous role.
(NB The '130' is reported as an expected addition in 2020/21, but because of the truly specific nature of the original 130 on ladder frame, its often custom engineered platform base, and previous very small volume, we shall have to wait and see if the '130' business case makes sense and it actually arrives. Positively, the Slovakian location actually assists the business case given labour rates compared to Solihull, so such SVO variants could in fact become an enlarged part of the global business model if well managed).
Yet without seeing such variants as existent, it is far too early to provide a meaningful comment on the vehicle in its entirety. So although a basic '90' - sign-written with 'Wilks Bros 1948' - was seen at the Frankfurt unveiling, other commercially orientated variants will be rolled-out, and will undergo near forensic analysis by its prospective users.
And so the exactitude of the overall product pipeline, breadth of variants, pricing, expected volumes, product mix etc, and hence entire New Defender business model is not yet wholly clear.
Well recognised by the TATA Motor's Board (given its own heavily plunged share price due to India's own contracted economy, within the global autos slowdown) is that Defender must at long last be of such high volume and overall profitability so as to provide a substantive long-term income streams.
That income from vehicle sales, finance provision, options and accessories, after-sales service and Land Rover 'experiences'. So whilst people have highlighted the new Slovakian plant (at incentivised yet still obviously high cost), that which has not been aired is the task of re-orienting the global Land Rover dealer-base to provide the very necessary support Defender will require at the customer interface, aside from the immediate internet interface, so as to retain customer loyalty given the inevitable first run product quality problems that occur, over and above its less than perfect product quality rankings.
Thus, for the present, no expansive comment, since in this matter discretion is required at such an early phase.
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The intention of this weblog is the continued message regards the importance of drawing when seeking to communicate an idea.
Perhaps more than ever, with the decline in the broad vocabulary and so exactitude of the English language, reduced to overtly simple English, Americanised English, slang words, abbreviation or metaphore, drawing itself seemingly grows even more important so as allow an idea to be conveyed almost automatically.
And ironically unlike language which conveys best with pedantic exactitude, the more simple and clean the drawing, the easier to communicate the central idea or concept
Having previously shown : loose sketches, side elevation, orthographic projection and the expansion of base construction lines, for vehicle concepts from 2 decades ago; displayed here is the use of 'Exploded' diagrams and 'Ghost' images, in very simple form, to illustrate:
1. How items / components are individually distinct
2. How items / components are assembled, or operated
3. The invisible items / components within.
And on the 60th Anniversary of Mini, what more fitting than the accompanying graphic window. whic illustrates the very basic design thoughts for a 'Mini 3'.
Initially sketched-out during the latter design phases of then New Mini (ie Mini 2) as of mid 1999; and later compiled into single A4 summary a couple of years later in 2001.
The initial thinking and original sketches done whilst at Rover Group as wholly unofficial exploratory thoughts over a couple of weekends, with recognition that the Rover Group as was, looked increasingly likely to be broken-up by BMW AG to secure its own long-term future, and the remnant that was to be Rover Cars would have to think afresh about its place in the market-place and automotive sector.
[NB at that point it was suspected that BMW would also 'naturally' retain MG aswell, as a midway 'British-Sports' and natural connection between both MINI and its own sporting Z-series, the success of the Z3 providing the cost amortised platform, and MG targeting the lower price range, so ability to chase the volumes of Mazda's MX-5/Miata. The business case was compelling at the time].
Hence the future scenario for the Rover Cars division was by then bleak, as it looked likely that it would have to eventually struggle-on by itself. The Rover 75 was in 1999 effectively brand new, but without BMW (or Land-Rover) sourced cash injections, all future model programmes spanning widely across A-B/B-C/D-E segments, would need to be primarily funded by 75's profitability, and that was nigh on impossible given the enormous CapEx demands of conventional car manufacturing.
Even so, with R75 launched, R55 still in clay form (but rejected by BMW as likely to cannabalise 3 and 5 series sales) and R30 (25/45 successor) being evaluated at concept stage via design sketches, initial engineering packaging and systems and trim levels specifications, the only vehicle in the theorectical pipeline not being considered was that of a dedicated A-segment car; as part of the ideolology of leaving small cars (eg Metro/100) behind in the bid to move the Rover brand upmarket.
[NB However in the 1990s the A-B segment had become a hotbed of creativity, and even premium manufacturers had been exploring the small 'mass' arena by which to grow their volumes and profits, so legitimising the rightly conceptualised small cars as being seen as city-chic and so prestigious, as seen with New Mini and New Fiat 500].
Hence my thoughts spawned firstly the 'City-Car' thumbnail (see top right) for Rover Cars, given the agedness of the Metro-based 100.
But critically the high cost of any such conventionally engineered replacement looked increasingly unrealistic, since as a likely eventual single brand company itself still in 'Turnaround' mode, it would be unable to access amenable re-financing. The City would require what was effectively a high-yield 'junk-bond' level dividend/coupon upon its financing 'Notes' for taking the risk of backing Rover Cars.
Moreover, any new small car had to vie against an increasingly highly competitive crop of exciting and somewhat radical A segment cars (eg Renault Twingo, Ford Ka, and Suzuki Wagon R (rebadged by others) aswell as conventionals such as Peugeot's 106) and impressive arrat of B-segment cars (eg Ford Fiesta, GM Corsa, Renault 5, Peugeot 205/6, VW Polo etc .
Globally, A-segment cars had grown into their own in the 1990s, as both affordable trendy runabouts in Europe (led by Twingo and Ka), and in Asia and increasingly Europe as newly affordable yet practical monoboxes across Asia (after doing so in Japan).
[NB Later as MG-Rover, the company with no development funding, resorted to the rebadging of the TATA Indica as CityRover; itself a sign of the foreseen perilous state of the firm].
But even in 1999, it had become obvious that poor state of Rover Cars' divisional finances and high likelyhood of dissolution of the 4 brands by BMW, meant that for Rover Cars any new car that sought to set itself was a breed apart in the broadening A or A-B segment, would require a wholly unconventional business model to become feasibly born.
A wholly new 'low cost' development approach was necessary if an independent Cars remnant of Rover Group was to survive and possibly even eventually re-flourish.
Convincingly recasting the engineering attributes and brand values of the R75 into a small newly engineered package would be nigh on impossible, given the worn base-structure tooling on 100 (poor tolerances) and 25/45, aswell as the innate width of the 25/45 car, unsuited to an A-segment car.
[NB Toyota was able to achieve that unconventional wide-short package on its iQ, simply because it was Toyota and had the brand strength to convince the public]
Yet there was an alternative - and necessary radical - path for any such remnant firm, if it was to think outside the box, in the same way Issigonis did for Austin-Morris in 1957 for the ADO 15 project that became the 1959 Austin Mini 7 and Morris Mini-Minor.
To my mind, something could be done with the two A-segment virtues of 'Character' (Twingo / Ka) and ' Practicality' (Wagon R) when convincingly combined.
This had not really happened thus far with different vehicle types, and although Twingo had undoubtedly moved into that space with its egg-like monospace, it had not been made available in the UK, and itself was seen as overtly feminine and cute, and tended to attract a majority of female buyers.
[NB that was Renault's commercial intent as central to the design brief of the Twingo programme.
So obviously any new small car solution would have to offer character and space and to provide a compellingly attractive proposition for customers of both sexes, so creating as wide a captive net over various socio-demographics as possible.
And critically could only be commercially realised using the very lowest development and manufacturing cost formulas to suit the inevitably much slimmed enterprise that Rover Cars would inevitably become, if it was to survive at all.
Thus, any such any new car would have to follow the path of the original Issigonis Mini, yet also become even more radical.
[NB Remember that ADO15 itself relied upon the conventions of an already cost amortised (A-series) engine (tho' innovatively turned transversely) and the use of conventional high cost press tooling. Austin-Morris then in 1957/8 putting its development faith and money into the in-sump gearbox, rubber-cone suspension and neccessity of sub-frames to reduce stresses on the BIW shell and reduce NVH].
Thus, as a 30 year old Business Strategist from a Design-Engineering and Corporate Design Management background (ie per the reality of designing within the strictures of commerce and economics), it was my own love of the Issigonis Mini and the manner in which it was born by good design to meet the needs of its then new segment, aswell as being affordable to BMC.
This meant that very quickly it became apparent to extinguish any such ideas about a small Rover badged car - whose conventional engineering and so development costs were prohibitive to grow Rover's very neccessary build quality credentials - and instead, with rightful 'Purist' intent, re-imagine something much more along the lines of the original Mini
[NB even though the MINI (Austin and Morris) nameplates were owned by BMW, a new brand could be feasibly created alongside Rover Cars that had similar overtones of original Mini ADO15 in its very spirit and innovative solutions].
Infact would need to 'advanced' be so as to necessarily separate any such interesting new car from obvious associations to BMW's MINI. But it could still have a subliminality per the best case examples from the past (ie Mini and Austin 7, and likely other People's Cars)
As stated, in mid 1999, the BMW NewMini (ie 'Mini 2') project was, from a Design and Product Engineering perspective, very near completion. With only minor fettling arising from Production Engineering considerations as the myriad of tasks under Manufacturing Engineering were being completed.
[NB As is well known by now, the Designer Frank Stephenson had been seconded to Rover Group from BMW (Munich and Designworks) since his Modern-Retro approach had been much preferred by the BMW Board; given MINI brands re-invention centred around the dynamic Cooper actings as the prime inspiration and able to obtain premium pricing.
By mid 1999 it was well into the Production Engineering phase for Production Set-Up, with the innate process of Quality Snagging much reduced at the Cowley plant thanks to the very systematic BMW Engineering and Production 'Gateways' approach deployed from the very start, and Cowley's own previous learning from Honda].
It must be emphasised then that BMW was in no way thinking of any kind of a 'Mini 3', recognising New MIni and its generational successors created on the premis of the conventional development of the New Mini aesthetic and driving and quality principles.
Hence, there was no formal 'live' NPD process, but I could read between the lines of unfolding events and likelihood of outcomes, and sought to map out a possible new chapter for a remant part of a once powwrful and proud portion of UK industry; aswell as seeing a contemporary parallel of the relevance of that Leonard Lord - Alec Issigonis foresightedness. in 1956.
[NB Like others I had been a life-long fan of Issogonis's effort on ADO15. So much so that when I read some of his letters on show from the Gaydon Heritage Museum Archive, I noted a serendipitous specific similarity between the name of the road he lived with in Edgbaston, Birmingham, where he died, and the road name of my first home in London when born. So there - at least appeared - seemed a spiritual connection of sorts - which in 1998 led me to - a decade after his death - visit his old house as an homage to the man].
Thus personal thoughts about ideal re-interpretation of a small car as a kind of 'Mini 3' would inevitably follow in the progressive footsteps of ADO15 in terms of its package volumetric efficiency and even greater onus upon fuel efficiency, with through the advantages of lightweight structures, ability to gain performance advantage on a bhp/tonne basis.
But first and foremost it was to be a urban runabout and so everyday 'shopping car' that could by virtue of its engineering DNA also be easily developed enjoy performance variants in standard box (but low C of G) body-shell or altered sporting / aero body-styles
Hence, the tiny City-Car thumbnail doodle (with backdrop silhouette) of a Rover Cars consideration, was soon redrawn in similar proportionate size, but with far more aforethought, regards original Mini principles and aesthetic.
This then in fact the very antithesis of the BMW car, which rightly for its intended client base, put style and performance over simplicity and functionality.
As seen from its multi-generational success since 2001, the BMW New Mini was from a corporate persepective waswholly perfect as a zeitgeist relavant durable consumer good.
Frank and his team of Modellers and Concept Engineers gave the consumer exactly what was required at the time (after New Beetle) and before his similar efforts on New Fiat 500. R50 / R53 ticked all the boxes for NPD success given its formulaic mixture of 'visual memes' of the original (especially in its face), whilst adding handling and product quality attributes. It was what a global marketplace had been primed for and was subconsciously waiting for, and hence its enormous success.
Thus New Mini was commercially 'right' because it had obvious derivative character and so 'soul' - even if 'manufactured' - itself the invocation of the post-modern, hyper-real object.
And - although it was overtly formulaic to me - from a business and corporate standpoint, it was something that I was wholeheartedly behind given the fragile state of Rover Group and the need for MINI income to substantially buoy the company's top and bottom lines. That only possible if itself left with some commercial autonomy over MINI, which became increasingly unlikely between 1995 and 1999.
[NB even then with New Mini revenues, Rover Group would have had to very well balance research, development and amortisation costs to provide a strong strong ROI (needing to string-out the absorption of costs as much as possible to restrengthen its financial position. And given its past track record and 'need' to operate 4 brands that was not easily reconciled].
As per New Mini (2), preparing the consumer for the generational transition was key, and I was initially aghast at the size of the wheel-arches being put on the run-out series of the original car, since it had made it so cartoonish. But this done to deliberately mold market perspectives from the yesteryear ADO15 based car and toward the new R50 based car. Hence the intermediate cartoonish look and visual of "wide-track" handling was deemed a necessary part of the generational hand-over.
But to the Product Designer in me R50 had never been as intellectually enthralling and so not aesthetically nor technically absorbing, as the Issigonis creation. From a design purist's perspective, R50 was too stylistically contrived to be considered as on par with the utter wonderment original 1959 Issigonis Mini; even if from the Marketeer, Accountant and BMW investor's perspective, R50 / R53 was the perfect commercial answer.
When Rover Group's Board, Management and Staff realised by 1997 that the New Mini project had effectively been taken over by BMW employees, it was recognised that BMW was cherry-picking and inevitably prioritising its future over that of RoverGroup.
By 1999 the writing was on the wall.
But if the remnants of the company was to be divested from BMW AG - without Mini and likely Land Rover and MG brands - and an entity of Rover Cars was to survive, any such company would need to think very differently for itself, and utilise a low cost design and manufacturing methods that could inject something new and affordable into the centre of the mass market, so as to obtain a small slice of that large cake.
Something akin to a very well considered 'Mini 3'.
Hence, these were my thoughts in early to mid 1999 which had been influenced by a set of other manufacturers' innovative cars that had appeared in small and other segments:
1. Audi A2 - low structural mass, interior volume, aero consideration
2.Smart Car - composite panels (interchangable personalisation feature), small capacity engine, rear engined for front crash management and enclosed safety cell
3. Merc A-class - interior volume and sandwich-floor crash safety solution (directing the crash path of the powertrain).
4. Lotus Type 111 - extruded aluminium base structure (although subsequently with steel subframes), and composite outer panels
5. Japan's 'Tallboy' Kei Cars - vehicle packaging centred around the importance of large interior space upon small dimensional footprint
The all aluminium Audi A2 had been under semi-secret development by VAG as Audi's re-entry into small/city cars (something not seen since the 1975 Audi A50, itself becoming the VW Polo), and shown as the concept AL2.
Hence, Audi had chosen to be obviously progressive prompted by the various Climate Change Treaties (Kyoto et al) and seemingly an innate desire to recapture the German glory days of advanced engineering in aluminium (Auto Union and Merceded 'Silver Arrow' race cars, Airships etc).
The concept AL2 then (before A2's launch) had been an inspiration in itself, and although the previous 100/200 series was 'pure' from an aero standpoint, the A2's deliberately overtly Modernist 'Bauhaus' appearance and packaging was for its segment as pronounced as the TT and A6 in their respective segments; all with direct lineage to the Auto Union-esque AVUS concept of 1991. But being 'all aluminium' it was even more progressive than its coupe or saloon siblings.
Audi Design and Engineering had effectively sought recast a modern Mini - according to purist packaging and aero principles.
[NB Those principles were very much 'Issigonian' given his own 1938 aluminium monocoque Hill-Climb car : the Lightweight Special, inspired at the time by Auto-Union race car design].
And of course since the establishment of the Swatch-Daimler JV in 1994, evolved into the Smart Car, had been widely publicised long before launch as a highly progessive new era City Car. Providing for ease of functional use given its small size, aswell as high levels of personalisation given the initially planned inter-changeable multi-coloured skin panels attached to sub-structures around the Tridion Safety Cell.
Also the importance of the original Mercedes A-class, which revolutionised powertrain packaging within a Sandwich Floor Architecture, for crash safety.
I'd seen the previous concept car at the Dutch Auto Show in 1993 (between under-graduate and post-graduate studies). That concept car 'Vision A' was tiny (virtually the size of ADO15) compared to the eventual production car, with it's highly space efficient monobox shape demonstrated what could be done for a given footprint.
And beyond these city cars, was the original 1996 Lotus Type 111 (original Elise).
[NB It's success only came after the poorly conceived M100 (Elan); itself seemingly overtly connected to the flaling Buick Reatta with sub-optimal FWD layout, and created from abject commercial theory rather than pragmatic reality, intended to broach the mainstream, gain volumes and so obtain the funds for Lotus-Isuzu to enter F1. 'Cart before the horse' product planning.
After the failure of Elan, the firm had to return to its roots to reobtain credibility, - and as well explained in Wikipedia - it was Concept Engineer Richard Rackham and his team that researched and realised what many in the low volume side of the industry had been considering for years: the use of cost efficient extruded aluminium to create an overall structure that could be either mechanically fixed or ideally chemically bonded like Elise. The story of the Type 111, its own derivatives and those other badged sports cars are well documented.
And lastly, the massive importance of the revolution in car design that had taken place in forever forward thinking Japan. The story of the kei-car is well known - small cars for small streets with small engines for basic mobility, good fuel efficiency, Critically, a small engine meaning more comparitive space for the occupants.
But the true revolution occurred with the creation of the mini MPV, a car derived from a micro-van. (This became the set trend right across EM Asia). But in Japan that opened the way for true purpose designed monobox micro-cars. These were called initially called 'Tallboys' by Western observers (after the bedroom furniture and clock casing) and although initially odd-looking were immensely practical given such small overall width and length to height.
In a short timespan the kei-car became a defacto 'tallboy', and so that bodystyle in turn became considered the standard kei-car, as more and more models evolved into that style or new 'tall-boy' models emerged.
These 4 cars - Audi A2, Daimler Smart, Mercedes A-class and Lotus Type 111, plus Japan's Kei-Car sector ....aswell as the 1959 Mini - had formed the basis of my own thoughts in terms of ideally amalgamating the best features of each in a truly technically advanced 2nd successor to original Mini.
Something that would philosophicalland technically stand equal to the Issigonis original.
But quite obviously, given BMW's legal ownership of the 'MINI' brand, and such vehicle created under Rover Cars' direction would require an alternative brand name; and there would need to be enough spiritual / visual similarity to original Mini, yet also be wholly different to Frank Stephenson's re-interpretation for the BMW car.
In summary:
1. a characterful, very practical, safe and critically simple 'alternative' vehicle.
A back to basic philosophy which countered normative automotive trends for increased size and mass, consequential of ever more vehicle content. The cost, weight of size of every bought-in regulatory demanded feature, off-set from in-house creative design-engineering
2. targeted at a broad range of customer types: from 20-30 something progressive eco-minded 'first adopters' (as personal car), to 40-60 something Mini puriists (as second car), to fashionistas across the age range wanted to convey individualism.
3. a highly rational cost effective business plan based upon reduced CapEx, Operating Costs and Government incentives (tax breaks etc) - so demanding flexible and sensible renumeration rates - with complete (Japanese and German style) 'buy-in' from employees from Senior Execs to Apprentices.
4. use of conventional design and development methods per small team structures, Design and Concept Eng., CAD, Rapid Prototyping, CFD, CFM, DFA etc and testing resources (4 pillar etc, ), but with markedly shorter development timeframe enabled from tightly prescribed NPD brief.
5. use of high quality pre-proven components (in from heavier vehicles) to provide extended duty-cycles, and limited whole vehicle specification complexity so as to quickly specify, develop as necessary, test and prove basic vehicle.
6. us of alternative manufacturing methods taken from the plethora of methods available to all industrial sectors: from metallic aluminium extrusions to proven composites and plastics molding, from Resin Injection Molding to Rotational Molding (see previous Rover 105 concept) to Matrix and Honeycomb advanced structural solutions.
7. a new highly entwined 'product, production and service' customer marketing ethos, that allows the customer to be a far greater part of the process.
Given the need for product simplicity it would not follow the BMW process of a plethora of options (at least in the Gen 1 car), and would not follow the bespoke methods of the bespoke Personalisation of 'Atalier', and so would be far less about a trim and options mix for product personalisation.
Instead, the customers would be highly educated about the design and build ethos of the product to feel themselves enlightened about the details of design approach, methods, materials etc, done in person as formal lecture, with samples of the materials and design sketches provided to be kept in the home as dinner party talking pieces or object d'art.
Thus, as stated, the basic Product Strategy was to utilise the best attributes from each of the best product studies seen to that point and recognised by the public (as described above) per those 4 specific vehicles, whilst also encompassing all that the Issigonis Mini stood for, and aspects of the best developed and (then) recently illustrated to the public.
To be the counter-point to BMW's R50 and its derivatives, the car had to reflect a 'less is more' theme, and so highly functionalist in appearence and highlighting and making a cosmetic virtue of its design intelligence rather than masking it with standard trim and hardware treatments, as per R50.
As such 'Technical' in appearence, as so a myriad of design solutions required. In spirit, similar to the rationale of the external seam flanges seen on ADO15's BIW, used reduced built complexity, time and cost; ie making a visual feature of its DFM].
Thus creating a true cognitive and emotional connection for the customer to the orginal 1950 car - itself essentially an exercise in good Product Design, over the conventions of Auto Design of the period.And
And critically to simplify the development programme and BoM costs, parring down 'vehicle content'avoiding as much exterior and interior fitment design, manufacturing and sourcing costs as possible, whilst putting development monies into materials, structure, and user interface innovation (FUNction) as possible.
Given Rover Cars' financial woes of the period, such a wholly alternative new approach to every aspect of any new vehicle programme was required.
However, positively, Rover Cars at the time had a great deal of factory space available at the Longbridge plant, It also had a somewhat 'captive' workforce - many being their 'trade' since leaving school or college, and many with extended families who had worked their for generations as part of British vehicle manufacturing (hence obviously similar to that at Cowley).
But production line worker's wage rates were high compared to other similar industries in the region and elsewhere, so Rover Cars had been absorbing the disadvantageous high cost and somewhat inflexible manpower. A major problems that required sorting and re-organising, and which had been begun by BMW's use of flexi-time.
Line workers were effectively paid for the much improved but still old style 'factory work', which meant long shifts, anti-social hours, repetitive simple actions and stark 'strip-lit' factory environment. Thus in actuality paid for inconvenience rather than skill. Infact (as was my experience) Graduate Trainees going into management roles were put on the line as part of their own development, precisely because the grad-trainee salary was less than the standard line worker.
Production 'Associates' were restricted to their singular task, rather than being encouraged to become adept at various tasks, since that was ostensibly the supervisor's role (at higher pay) to take over if a person short for a period if absent or taking a toilet break.
(It seemed to me to echo the worst of 1960s-1970s labour practices, as exemplified by the comedy film 'Carry on at Your Convenience' about lavatory manufacture - pun intended)
My grad-trainee time "on the line" had been at the Swindon 'Press Shop' (stamping-out original ADO15 Mini roofs) and Cowley (assembling Rover 600 instrument facias). The working practices (structures and routines) appeared archaic compared to Japanese production practices, this so even after Rover had been supposedly 'Honda-ised' given the learning from its previous Joint Venture].
To avoid the high cost of new conventional CapEx in tool press dies, the transportation costs of moving formed panels from Swindon to Longbridge, and the typical line maintenance and improvements (from vehicle cradles to engine 'stuff-up' (as it was called) of the conventional production line, a very different Manufacturing Strategy was required.
One which would utilise low cost production solutions to in part help ensure strong continued local employment (for the good of the local economy) even if highly likely a cost-saved slimmed workforce or cross the boards pay cuts was to avoid entire and complete redundancy of the site (as was to happen some years later).
The idea that Rover Cars in its then near present condition would be bought and operated in its then current state by another VM (European, American, Japanese or other) was very very unlikely. Since, those other VMs sought to see the demise of a competitor in their fight for UK and European market share, and unlike BMW's use of Rover Cars as a mainstream affordable brand, the VMs were obviously mainstream, actually seeking to move their own brands either upmarket or creating new brands].
So for Rover Cars - as whatever subsequent entity - to survive, it would have to offer something new, attractive and profitable. Something that echoed the best of perceived advanced technology, whilst combining the most pragmatic practices of niche and low mid-scale manufacturing.
And so the very notion of a 'High-Niche / Low-Mid' manufacturing plan had to be conceived, one which could run to between 30,000 and 40,000 vehicles a year, on a a strictly enforced 45 weeks of production per year (requiring a full seven weeks unpaid leave from the workforce).
Manufacturing would consist of not one fast-build production line, but multiple slower-build parallel lines, which were fed from in-house component construction. This necessary given curing time of composites, the retained level of labour, and critically the ability to immediately "switch lines" if problems arose in a specific 'station' location, this more likely given the lesser technical sophistication of the build line and so greater variability in build process.
At 40,000 units per annum, that would equal 223 cars per week, at 44 cars per day.
That sounds ridiculously small compared to mass manufacture, but these vehicles were to be drip fed into the market through what would need to be new retail sites placed in Shopping Malls, Rail Termini (see previous Tech Centres), and the best Rover Cars Dealerships as seperately branded entities.
Critically the internet was obviously available, but without the general e-commerce sophistication to follow. So would be utilised as the advertising and media space, to off-set little or no TV advertising (given its rates) and teaser press and bill-board campaigns.
The Marketing Strategy had to be as efficient and accountable as the Product and Manufacturing Strategies.
The drip-fed 40,000 were designed to create a high demand ferver from the marketplace, so demand would deliberately outstrip supply.
That somewhat limited supply of the Series 1 car would allow those dealers who had not defected from Rover Cars division, to sell 'Mini 3' above its RRP 'sticker-price' (within officially prescribed limits) so as to re-gain their own profitability. Limited supply would also allow for the creation of a very buoyant pre-delivery auction process, whereby those higher-up the order list could sell their place in the queue to another willing to pay a higher price (again within prescribed limits).
[NB Nissan had previously created a lottery system for its niche Pike series cars (Poa, Figaro, S-cargo etc) in the early 1990s and had been inundated with interest, but only the lottery winners were able to buy].
Whilst creating excitement, it also left many hopeful buyers deflated, so this 'auction' method would instead create an immediate liquid market for the new car, and as such was arguably more democratic, and allowed people more order to delivery flexibility.
And those people "seeking the new" would be informed of and so expect a vehicle that was very different when encountered and used, since designed and manufactured differently. it's very DNA would be its own 'Technical Marketing' and so admired by the automotive cogniscenti, informed progressives and others alike:
In summary:
1. Off the shelf engineering materials (eg steel and aluminium tube)
2. The same kind of low cost AL Extrusion tooling (ideally co-expensed by Norsk Hydro (given eco credentials) or another Aluminium manufacturer.
3. The use of 'in-house' produced 'advanced' composites for sections of internal BIW structure, and crash conformity panels.
4. The use of conventional composite panel manufacturing via male-female molds for Resin Injection Molded and Vacuum Formed Molds, specified as necessary. But with high dimensional tolerance (for skin panel A-surface finish and panel gap consistancy - not minimal panel gap)
5. Engine Strategy TBA...
Option 1 : since in-house K-series production was costly compared to other manufacturers' engine families, and had been seen as prone to a number of problems (I thought K-series an enormous waste of development and warranty monies), use of GM's 3 cylinder (as developed for Corsa Eco model of the period) for both Eco detuned variant, standard variant and turbo-charged for performance variant. (The much reduced vehicle mass would have added appreciable bhp/tonne in its own 'light-weighting').
Option 2: (Given the previous thoughts on Land Rover AID), the use of a re-engineered air and 'flat' Boxer engine or laid-flat dry sump small IL4 engine sourced from a Motorcycle manufacturer. This engine to be located mid vehicle in a sandwich floor, so substantially raising the floor height (and so roof height) but having very advantageous Centre of Gravity and Polar Moment of Inertia.
6. Large aperture opening into cabin, with use of "clap-hand" doors (ie no B-pillar)
(NB this seen 8 years later with BMW's first R55 Clubman variant per single 'Clubdoor', then upon later BMW i3, aswell as other models such as Mazda RX-8 etc).
7. One-piece clamshell bonnet, itself integral part of external crash structure. Fully removable for Service and Repair Technicians to provide unhindered access to engine bay and 'front end', and for engine removal. Owners able use access panels in either grille or under lamp clusters to top-up coolant, oil or hydraulic fluid if necessary.
8. Bulkhead comprised of 'concertina crush' aluminium Bulkhead Ring - made of interlocking extrusions - with structurally advanced composite crash panel sandwiched between.
9. Behind the Bulkhead Ring, frame and brace construction (as per 'superleggera') with lugs etc for stressed panel attachments. Steel lower - Aluminium upper, (the chemical bond between both surfaces negating electrolytic degradation). Basic frame strength assisted with structural internal and external composite bracing.
10. Aero Front and Rear - reduced frontal cross-section with use of front wheel fenders (as per Smart Car), tapering bonnet and deeply curved windscreen. Rear ostensibly 'Kamm Tail' with 'Bustle Back' to better manage airflow delamination, likely use of thin C-pillar foils.
11. Recognisable 'Mini' like face, but altered to provide a Modernist aesthetic derived from form and function and be recognizably different to BMW's New Mini.
This would require delicate consideration of various themes at the Design phase.
As shown herein, location of small front lighting clusters away from typical impact area to beneath A pillar, to also illuminate front wheel arches / corners at night to assist parking (also akin to position on the early 1922 Austin 7, spiritual predecessor to 1959 Mini).
The overall appearance intended to be more 'product' and 'architectural'. So akin to the thinking of much from yesteryear, from 1959 ADO15, to 1947 Citroen H-van or even 1990s Renault Magnum truckcab unit. Rather than obviously derivatively stylistic and so 'automotive' as R50 had been penned.
'Mini 3' was to be a true city and suburban tool, appreciated by the 'intelligent' aswell as a likely anti, counter-culture statement against overt consumerism and the 'throw-away' fashions (in cars aswell as clothes).
12. New Customer After Sales Schemes for additional income streams via likes of vehicle updates, personalisation, club membership, motoring trips etc.
13. The central theme to vehicle was an aspect of After Sales that sought to interest and educate the owner regards many aspect of Design as lead component of Culture, and vice versa progressive technology in various fields (autos, aeronautics, marine, civil engineering, architecture), so as to instill the Issigonis (and others') Design Mindsets. In turn re-emphising the uniqueness of the vehicle itself and bringing people closer to the new brand.
[NB This Design in Context perspective was applied whilst in the Design Studio. I had created what was intended to be the foundations of a basic but powerful Design Management Guide which provided directional formulae for the design ethos of each of the 4 group brands : Land Rover, Mini, MG and Rover.
Each already had there own loosely referantial 'Design Templates' at different stages of maturation - Land Rover most complete, yet still simplistic.
So each marque required greater design definition within broader cultural context.
The intent was to correlate each brand's innate 'DNA' with a specific historical design traits from its history, approapriate to its original innate design philosophy, set within cultural framework of the period, as regards when it was established and in its heyday.
This to provide more directed artistic inspiration set within broader avenues of directed exploration. It was the antithesis of 'retro', seeking to recapture and mix the original thinking of the previous age to be re-interpreted.
Hence:
Rover Cars - est 1904 to 1920s heyday : Neo-Classical / Art Nouveau / Arts and Crafts. Referance to original Viking Longboat (as per R95 / R105 concept of 1997)
MG Cars - est 1924 to 1960s heyday : 'Streamlining' pertaining to 'Performance Aero', as illustrated by 'Old No1', the 'Airline' bodies, EXE181 speed record car, EX-E concept and later MGF based EX 'Bonneville' prototype. Together with the subtle application of Octagonal detailing within varying 'Art Deco' influence, the extend of extravagance dependent upon model type.
Land Rover - est 1948 : 'Utility' obviously pertaining to its conceptual origins per 'form follows function' and its multi-task capabilities. Highly simplistic proportions and forms, use of 'Clean yet Deconstructed' aesthetic able to emphasis features and accessories, with influences from British 'Utility' design campaign (ie clothes to furniture).
Beyond this, the importance of 'Engineering Artform' recognizing that the most functional components that represented the uniqueness of the brand - underbody / chassis, exterior and interior - could feasibly be created as delight features to behold or to use.
(As a separate Design Studio exercise I'd also spent seperate time seeking to develop the L-R Design Template beyond its then simplistic interpretation. Encompassing much to feed back into the brand beyond basic iconography like 'Alpine lights': 'Honesty of Construction' from Defender to application of 'Golden Ratios' proportions for future Freelander, Discovery and Range Rover).
'Mini 3' - est 1959 : 'Modernism' meets 'Pop-u-Lux', whereby underlying rational design principles (of Issigonis) would be overlayed and so warmed by the cosmetic applications pertaining to various cultural or personal tropes, from body graphics to select interior fitments].
Hence as can be seen, the thinking behind 'Mini 3' was part of a far greater considered design and commercialisation basis for all 4 group brands. Something that gave the Studio greater Design Management direction and yet broader exploratory freedoms.
As described the vehicle was the output of first and foremost a sensible and so likely feasible business model and detailed plan.
In effect, the Product Strategy, Design Strategy, Development Strategy and Manufacturing Strategy were envisioned around some of the parametres of what called of 'Micro Factory Retailing'.
This ideology moved away from the 'centrism' of a large central mass manufacturing base using conventional vehicle building techniques and there inherent high costs, and toward a model that consisted of alternative build materials and processes to produce shorter manufacturing runs.
That model was envisaged to sit between the polar opposites of Mass Manufacture (then considered 200,000 units pa upwards, depending upon model type and profitability) and Niche Manufacture (then considered 200 - 1000 units pa).
Its goal was the creation of a manufacturing model that could be replicated across a region or nation or continent in different locations, and was believed the panacea by the investment community and automotive seniors because it seek to would avoid the enormous sunk-costs of conventional manufacturing and the typical legacy costs involved when forced to close a plant.
[NB It was this commercial ideology that would later underpin Gordon Murray's 'iStream' offering 8 years later in 2007 for his 3-seat T25 city-car concept, as thereafter licensed to Shell and Yamaha. Though obviously he had been considering it previously].
My own 1999 background thinking to this rationale for 'Mini 3' was as follows....
Just before my own Master's Degree, in the summer of 1991 I had visited (ex Ford Exec) Karl Ludvignsen's Consulting office to meet with his assistant (the Dutch born) Mr Neuhuis. (He later worked with Prof Garyl Rhys at Cardiff Business School).
And it was there in 1991 that I first learned of the Investment Community's and Auto-Sector's interests in 'Micro-Factory Retailing'.
Given the economic realities of the time - that of a short recession within expanding credit and so boom period for vehicles - to me appeared simply too 'academic', and so an over-hyped notion of new business models for the auto-industry at large that was still absorbed with increasing capacity through merger and acquisition.
Yet it still obviously had specific uses for SME firms and large VMs in various ways
[NB It was in part the notional 'golden promise' of MFR which inturn prompted me to focus my Master's Major Thesis upon a Design/Engineering Management review for a broad spectrum of UK Automakers, from Niche to Mass, interviewing:
1. Reliant Motors - Chief Engineer - John Hawthorne
2. Aston Martin Lagonda - Chief Engineer - Robert Watson
3. TVR - Chief Engineer / Design - John Ravenscroft
4. Rover Group - Director of Product Design - Gordon Sked
5. Ford - Chief Engineer Europe - Richard Parry-Jones]
MFR was undoubtedly over-egged as a new revolutionary business model, since the sector was by and large had a predetermined default to scale economies, consolidation and so conventional 'Budd' Steel Press manufacturing systems to ensure quality, and typically left unorthodox labour intensive Niche methods to the Specialist small fry; the likes of Morgan, Lotus, Reliant, TVR and a host of others past and present.
Hence at the time I believed the rhetoric about MFR to be overly optimistic, given the structure of the sector. And the fact that as and when large VMs needed low capacity production solutions for typically high-value, small-run prestige models, they would 'farm' the work out to specialist sub-contractors as they had done for years, depending upon the skills of that specific sub-contractor.
However, I immediately saw its relevance to:
1. Niche Manufacturers - systematically scale-up production in different 'phased-in' locations for an expanding demand of niche vehicles, so providing a continental or global sales base.
2. For Major VMs as a tool for testing the market with what might be considered an exploratory and revolutionary model at far lower CapEx and manufacturing unit costs; later able to either
2a. Replicate the build process elsewhere (as above) to add incremental volume
2b. Re-Engineer a second generation vehicle to befit conventional production line, if the first generation car had been received well and was of limited supply ti high demand, hence the transition of that new redical vehicle into mass manufacture.
And so it was later recognised in 1999 as a potentially applicable route for an independent but cash poor Rover Cars in creating its version of a 'Mini 3'
But the trick was to get the best of both worlds of Niche and Mass manufacturing for low-end Intermediate Manufacturing, by gaining access more cheaply produced components with the ability to gain higher volumes through relative speedier build times compared to true niche production (even if far from mass benchmark), with advantage of comparative scale, gained from parallel-motion multi-location assembly centres.
But for 'Mini 3' that parallel motion assembly would be wholly in Longbridge, the birthplace of the Issigoniss' original.
Quite obviously, history illustrates that BMW's divestment of Rover Cars led to a Management Buy-Out of the MG and Rover marques, locations and plant, which itself lasted only a few more years before being 'lifted and shifted' to China.
China thereafter became the centre of the automotive universe for the major global players, and UK design, engineering and manufacturing became increasingly small and specialist toward the specialisms regards Motor Sports, and with the danger of 'high value' services being replicated in EM countries by foreign others, the UK's Desgn and Engineering base spread its wings to encompass other sectors such as Rail and Marine, and grew the breadth of its Services as the engineering complexity of battling climate change in an increasingly cyber-led world grew.
But for a time between 1998 and 1999 - when it was obvious that BMW would reduct itself from the headaches caused by "the English Patient" - whilst straddling the Design-Engineering world of GDEC in Gaydon, and the company's Marketing world in Warwick Business Park, that a wholesale re-invention of a British icon appeared not just likely feasible, but very very necessary to reset Britain's reputation vis a vis Europe and the rest of the world, to once again "set the pace" in innovative small cars.
If the country is to recapture its glory days, far beyond the diatribe about "F1 Engineering" (in reality comparitively small export earnings), pure "Battery Electric Vehicles" (in reality a small % of global TIV) and "Autonomous Cars" (still hype over technical practability), Britain must return to its engineering roots and this time explore the alternative and practicable.
So before investment-auto-motives returns to its core mission regards Automotive Investment issues, from the Macro to Macro to systematic deployment of 'Coupled Ratios' investment analysis tools, the message to a younger generation is yet again to pick-up a pen or pencil and start communicating not in increasingly meaningless or verbose words, but through the medium of pen and paper.
Think for yourself and utilise drawing to do so, and so create your own dissected 'explosions' and see-through 'ghosts' when communicating your own concept ideas to others.
