Autumn Interlude - Statistics, Issigonis and Mini - Objective Empirical Research >>> Holistic Industrial Innovation >>> Consumer Education >>> UK Self-Development.

An Interlude within an Interlude -

Before the few eventual final examples of 'Drawing from the Past', to highlight the importance of drawing skills - investment-auto-motives takes the opportunity to return to its central remit of Micro and Macro automotive issues, by delving in almost 'real-time' into perhaps  the most economically successful and socially progressive era Britain ever saw in the 2Oth century - the 1950s.

Doing so by contextualising the rather astounding new product development story of the automotive icon that was Issigonis's Mini, against the corporate environment it was conceived within, and criticall the socio-economic backdrop of the time.

A time of economic boom, social mobility and a popularised attunement to what would be later quoted as "the white heat of technology".

A time that appears oh so very different to where Britain unfortunately sits today.


Macro and Micro Entwined 'Real Time' Historical Books -

This delve into Britain's past prompted by the current parallel reading of:
1. the 1960 : The Social (and Economic) Framework - JR Hicks
2. the 1964: The Mini Story - L. Pomeroy / A. Issigonis (re-reading).


The Social Framework - HR Hicks:

This 1960 third edition treatise sought  to educate the new generation about the socio-economic basis of the UK. Though written previously, it was only by 1957 that exhaustive economic data and so facts were able to be collated and deployed via the government's 'Blue Book'. This unsurprisingly showed a very different and increasingly prosperous picture compared to the previous immediate pre and post war editions of 1938 and 1949.

Consisting of 5 main chapters it spans the Macro and the Micro of Economics, and critically seeks to create through good descriptive illustrateion a picture of Britains economic flows within and beyond its shores.
Telling, is its title, and the bias toward the word 'Social' over and above 'Economic', when seeking to explain (in a very balanced, yet socially sensitive manner) the very construction of the national economy and varying perspectives regards it.

This because the previous 1929 Crash had tainted the previous almighty idea of Capitalism per se, and by the 1930s a definite Socialistic atmosphere prevailed, whilst the Churchillian war years had promised better days beyond, and Attlee's post-war win harboured a continuation of that Socialistic atmosphere. That atmosphere merged with renewed economic strength during Churchill's return as PM (exporting to the USA and Commonwealth) and present but declining through the 1951-1964 Conservative era, and re-instated - though as technically progressive - under Wilson's 1964-67 term. Thus the book reflects the general zeitgeist over its 3 editions.


The Mini Story - Laurence Pomeroy / Alec Issigonis:

The Mini Story, recounts Issigonis' professional background over a similar timeframe, the mid 1930s to late 1950s. From concept for lever operated auto-gear change clutch for a Mr Gillett, through to the Mini's full development story; with his professional landmarks. starting with Humber Motors in 1934 (appreciating the importance of independent suspension on  road cars), applying that knowledge at Morris Motors and its sub-division Morris Garages (MG) in that decade.

En route, to Mini, mention of Issigonis's hillclimb cars, his readybought Austin 7 'Ulster' and his self-designed 'Lightweight Special' (aluminium bodied and rubber sprung), and the critical influence of his early FWD concept for what became the conventional RWD Morris Minor.


1959, Stark Contrast to 2019 -

The present machinations concerning Brexit only serves to illustrate the major sociological and economic rifts inside the UK, that have philosophically grown over the last 2 decades. And although it is overtly simplistic to generalise, the core narrative that abounds is that there has never been a more marked divide between a supposedly multicultural, pro-European Left and a (if at all possible) a supposedly mono-cultural, anti-European Right.

This problematic enough. Yet when also set within a background of the UK's historically slow-growth and periodic stagnation of its economic engine (across most Service and Manufacturing sectors), the vagueness surrounding Brexit's ultimate impact understandably worries corporate executives, managers and staff, and so the public at large.

Those geo-political shifting sands creating enormous operational challenges to business undergoing  that affect the very structure - and sometimes very mission - of many enterprises.

Add in the backdrop of slowed and more fragile global economic conditions driven by geo-politics, trade concerns / wars (now re-emerging in US corporations' Q4 earnings projections), China's self-centred economic growth expansion policies (actually assisting local production JV agreements such as that with Jaguar Land Rover), and EM regions own stuttering growth problems, so prompting re-use of past 'Import Substitution' policies to follow China, aswell as a still very fragile Europe - and the UK's comparative position - with its own small internal market and no meaningful new trade agreements, is obviously at a new low point; and could be viewed as desperate.

Prime Minister Johnson offers Adam Smith's (OxBridge promoted) 'lassez-faire' rhetoric, aligned to the WTO, and promise of high potential new horizons. Whilst Labour undoubtedly views that outcome as simply "jam tomorrow" regards the ultimate levels of inward investment from global foreign companies considering various global locations for their expansion plans. Hence its focus on Re-Nationalisation and Employee Share-Holder policies. Both party's obviously have respective pros and cons, depending upon the perspective of specific issues.

For all the nationalistic and near jingoistic ferver behind Brexit, and the concommitant growing new focus on the UK's own regional sub-identities as distinct production units (from Eco-Farming to Eco-Food to Eco-Fashion), presently the national psyche amongst the average person is that of befuddlement; and as such prone to believe their specific 'political saviours'.


1945, A Time for Re-Birth

Britain has been here before, immediately after WW2.

Yet very pertinently, that was arguably a time of far less population fragmentation, and so greater genetic and cultural unity.

(This the imagined 'utopia' those furthest Right wish to regain with their 'England for the English' campaigns.

At its best, about re-installing more virtuous values in society and being rid of the worst aspects of today's society (eg immorality, organised crime, petty crime, illegal immigration, the absence of well paid average employment, etc), but also all too sadly and ironically echoes the similar calls made from the very Left leaning National Socialist German Workers Party (ie the 'Nazi' Party) of the 1930s.

It may be distasteful to many, but any form of social cohesion typically derives from ethnic unity, of whatever background. When that cohesive identity is fragmented through racial or religious mixing, so more social fracture lines appear upon which 'blame-game' frictions will inevitably be created. And that as seen today reverberates between the ethnic multi-mixes of large cities (that have enough of their own inter-group problems) and provincial towns that until recently were typically ethnically mono-cultural.

But given the UK's status quo, and its ambitions to grow its economic activities with many other Non-White, Non-Christian countries, Britain needs to somehow create an atmosphere of national virtue that all colours and creeds should attest to - perhaps a personal pledge or similar, as seen in the Scouts etc].

Like it or not, given the shared experiences of War, there appeared to be far greater social cohesion of the time, between the English, Scots and Welsh; as depicted in films such as Noel Coward's play and David Lean's film interpretation of 'This Happy Breed'.

Even with its inevitable small social fractures, centred around fairness in time of need, the War provided for unified social consciousness, and VE and VJ Days, the new social impetus toward a better tomorrow..

A decade later and Britain's renewed vigour had been much assisted by continuation of that spirit and critically its Commonwealth connections for material imports and finished exports, from 'black', 'brown' and 'white' countries (Carribean, East Africa, India and Australia).

And that inter-connected trade cohesiveness had begun to show good strong economic results.

By the mid 1950s, the NHS had become the darling of not just individuals and families, but also industry as it grew and maintained a healthier labour force. Private and public housing investments had delivered the previous War's promise of "Houses for Heros" and the country was abuzz with fundamental change within the UK's new Golden Era.


Exemplar of that New Age -

The 1959 Mini - in guises of 'Austin 7-Mini' and 'Morris Mini-Mnor' - was just one of a plethora of new products in consumer and industrial realms that exemplified just how far the UK had come in the past decade.

[NB And all too ironically, designed by an immigrant whose ancestry was maternally Bavarian-German, paternally Greek, and born in a province of Turkey. So what would have been in the eyes of the typical xenophobic Brit of the time less than revered given his background].

The car itself was notionally inspired by the advent of the September 1956 Suez Crisis, when Egypt's President Nasser nationalised the narrow channel between the Mediterranean basin and Arabian Sea / Indian Ocean, and the Syrian oil pipeline was cut by Pan-Arab nationalists. But in reality there was a far greater raison d'etre at home.

Although The Suez Crisis was front page news, the fact is that given the economic and military firepower of Britain and the USA (ie the various air bases and ports) and the need for Arab states to export oil, in real terms the fracas would inevitably be relatively minimal. Furthermore, what has rarely been stated is that the true impact was only upon 20% of the UK's fuel supply - so not wholly disasterous.

Instead, in the everyday Britain a far bigger macro-economic effect was underway. One that urged the design of new affordable, small and energy efficient car.

As shown before, the country was the still under-going Reconstruction and simultaneously grasping Re-growth. And increased private travel was a key element of the ambition.

[NB Obviously, just as it was in Europe, where 1930s designed FIAT 'Topolino', the VW Beetle, Citroen 2CV actually came of age in the 1950s, after the inevitably much delayed ideas of mobilisation of the masses for national growth].

The difference being that by the mid 1950s, given its substantive but still lesser wartime devastation, Britain was able to effectively able to redeploy its labour and infrastructure assests more efficiently that its ex European counterparts and foes. So able to obtain quicker productivity enhancing social-mobility thanks to its inventory of relatively unscathed trains, cars, vans, trucks, motorcycles and bicycles.

[NB Obviously given the War, mainland Europe had seen far greater diminishment of its private vehicle parc, from what was a relatively large vehicle parc by 1939.

Very interestingly a programme was shown on Channel 4 on the evening of Sunday 13.10.2019 depicting personal film footage of France in 'the last summer' before war (France: the last Summer). Yet even here, unfortunately, propoganda is all too obvious to the automotive enthusiast.

Herein, with regards the later commandering of private and public vehicles, with a supposed 1939 diary extract read by the narrator.

He says "trucks next to Porsches" ("Camions a cote de Porsches") when taking about street views in mid-late 1939.

The only Porsches dated 1939 were 3 hand fabricated Type 64 race cars (based on the spare parts from the prototype set of KdF Wagen) for race-track use only.

The first Porsche available for general sale to the public was the 356, starting in very low numbers in 1948, then more as of 1950. Very few if any bought in France, even 5 years after the war.

Hence in 1939 there were no "trucks parked next to Porsches" on French streets, and the apparent personal diary was thus fabricated to provide believable emotional effect, through building false imagined imagery for the viewer. Prompt a person to imagine something and their more likely to believe it, and so the whole tale told.

Moreover, the supposed 1939 personal film footage of also shows a family playing next to a post-war type of low budget car with faired-in fenders, pointing the 1950s. More content inconsistency. The colour film grainy, when even then actually quite clear given the expense and quality of colour film footage.  

As regards the use of deliberately false information on publicly formed internet space, to support specific agendas, please see later mention of  the Wikipedia content regards Mini, later in this weblog].

So unlike a devastated and progress hindered Europe, by the mid 1950s Britain sought to much improve yet further, so as to make more and more people economic protagonists, by engaging newer sets of untapped consumers to create 'new car' drivers. These new entrants into reliable and aspirational motoring from lower category demographic groups, the young and with greater attention to previously non-driving females.

The policy-makers of Whitehall wanted its people to be able to travel further by consuming more capable and affordable transport, to step-away from the discomfort of motorcycles when commuting to work and higher education, to buy new rather than used, and prompt the middle-classes to purchase a 2nd car for greater suburban interactivity (ie shopping, and leisure activities) to further muster local economies.

All of this set within broader, meaningful and very visible socio-economic change and improvements, as showcased by the 1953 Festival of Britain and its central influence of Modernism and Futurism, the two merged with primary colours and motifs. As seen across all realms of new ideas, from architecture to kitchen equipment

The lower and lower-middle masses were directed into new lives with Inner-City slum clearances set against the new prospects of various highly planned nationwide New Towns. And - aside from Green-Belt'd London - most cities and towns with and without old slums were transformed by newly expanding outer suburbs.
Beyond such prime domestic concerns was the national need to export. To both earn foreign currency and critically maintain strong trading connections and so soft-power connections to countries dotted around the globe, from Australia to the Caribbean.

The UK's industrial re-birth had reflected by the previous 'Britain can Make It' campaign, which was accompanied by that infrastructure building, a new wave of 'modern' homes with greater functional and pleasurable amenities both at home and near-by (though not as bemoaned by some, so in all cases).

Critically, increasingly with that industrial transformation from 1945 to late 1956 - the time of 'Suez' - the country had seen the ending of rationing for most items and a return to re-expansion of B2B (plant, machinery, office equipment etc) and B2C goods (foods, clothes, white and brown goods, vehicles etc); and it would continue to do so  for another 14 years or so.

This was the everyday and so substantively real backdrop to UK manufacturing, from furniture to motor vehicles. The 'Suez Crisis' a mere blip that no doubt boosted the profits of Anglo and American oil companies given the high demand, reduced supply, and likewise boosted national belief about international importance across the Arab World.

Nevertheless the UK's domestic backdrop told an high-fueled economic expansion story, as the country began to transform its workforce toward advanced manufacturing of the time and toward an expanding technical services capability, for use at home and abroad.

Improved education through Apprenticeships, Technical Colleges and 'Redbrick' Universities meant a new better skilled generation of youngsters sought their own life opportunities, close to and far from their origins. The normative ideals of a wife/husband, a car, a home, children, pets and ever more interesting annual holidays.

That higher education and stable homelife the spring-board for further educational advancement  by the follow-on generation - in theory at least.

Thus as regards the idea of 'The Suez Crisis' and threat from 'Bubble Cars' (from German BMW Isettas to 'Kabin' Heinkels, Messerscmitts to British Peels) being Leondard Lord's strategic prompt for Austin-Morris, it was infact the broader Macro trends to satusfy commuter and weekend travel needs for the millions of people with higher disposable incomes, greater life aspirations and to ensire higher rates of personal mobility - so promoting expenditure - amongst the hithertoo over-shadowed masses.

With furthermore, the need to create a cheaper smaller utility vehicles (van and pickup) for likewise growing numbers of small to medium sized firms, nationally-owned industries (Post Office, Electricity and Gas Boards, the Armed Forces and the new era of multi-conglomerate corporates.  

The short period of returned petrol rationing of the Suez Crisis, did alter the minds of many, but that wake-up call regards national energy security was itself a useful ignition spark for a new era, itself for a new generation, who sought new products to befit newly expanding  personal horizons.
Mini in Austin, Morris, and later Riley and Wolseley guises would befit and itself propel that era

And critically, as very well described by JR Hicks in 'The Social Framework', it was not until the mid 1950s that Britain managed to compile detailed and meaningful economic data (by modern standards). Since prior to WW2, even with large scale international trade and domestic consumption, it had been a far more haphazard affair relying upon industry bodies of varying capabilities, and during the War efforts had been necessarily centralised upon War Planning.

It was only the Wartime experience of becoming far more objectively critical about Micro and Macro economic flows within the UK, into the UK and out of the UK, to reduce inefficiencies and maximise outcomes, that such detailed practices began to take greater hold in the public economists' mindset.

[NB The learning curve that both the US and Britain went through, likewise put to good use by Ford HQ in Detroit, under Robert MacNamara's 'Whiz Kids' and new calculating technologies, to better mate broad economic and market data to production and logistics planning and methods].

Hence ironically, for Britain and BMC alike, their own respective metamorphoses were a blend of old 1920s style (Henry) 'Fordism' mixed with a 'Neo-Fordism' applied immediately after WW2.

It was both common-sense of scale efficiencies and beyond that Ford's and GM's cross company rationalisation policies that prompted the formation of BMC, and led Leonard Lord's central mode of thinking between 1952 and 1956.


The Birth of an Icon -

By 1956 BMC had largely rationalised the operational synergies between its prime Austin and Morris and secondary MG, Riley and Wolseley divisions.

[NB A dacade later it would exploit the vertical aspect of the overall value-chain by acquiring Pressed Steel, before merging with Leyland Motor Corp in 1968].

The author Laurence Pomeroy tells a compelling story about the Mini's development process, imparting very good appreciation of the matter, from Issigonis himself.

[NB in the Foreword Issigonis simply relays his path of learning from small and lightwieght cars: the Austin 7 (per his 'Ulster') and the George Dowson assisted 'Lightweight Special', and about his preferance for a nose-heavy, FWD vehicle to induce safe understeer at its limits, (which took a further 16 years to realise after his initial 1941 FWD 'Mosquito' concept became the RWD Morris Minor.

Moreover, the short Foreword conveys his dislike of writing..."a disagreable occupation", hence leaving the task to Pomeroy].

Thus where as Minor had been the birthchild of immediate post-war austerity and so highly conventional engineering that rebuffed Issigonis's initial ideas stemming from his admiration of the Citroen Avant, the Mini would allow him to flourish in creativity.

That recognised, the Minor still provided for the protyped beginnings of his FWD. enlarged cabin-space dream, since it utilised smaller than standard wheels (14 inches) and one initial prototype demonstrator was built with a 'Flat 4' engine / FWD layout.

[NB Pomeroy makes no mention of what in enthusiasts circles becam the legend about the 2 inch 'cut and shut', to widen the car, a decision made only when on the verge of production. This being of such significance to British industrial folklore, that this legend - as with so many in the auto-industry - appears ultimately mere myth, no doubt stated or invented at the time to add product interest, by highlighting the width of the cabin over pre-war segment design.

To me, this 'legend' had always seemed utterly implausible, given the financial and time realities and constraints of a vehicle programme with pre-set budgets and deadlines. So I was glad to not read of it in Pomeroy's retelling].

[NB At time of writing this weblog the comprehensive Wikipedia article about Mini refers to ADO 15 as having been widened by 2 inches. This is utter nonsence. As seen, that myth only relates to the 1948 Minor and its 2 inch bonnet-band.

This also unfortunately illustrates how an online publicly accessed information facility can be easily manipulated to furnish false information (or even - as may be here seek to confuse 'gaslight' or undermine investment-auto-motives - not for the first time!

No doubt by time of this web-post, it will have disappeared again! Such is the neferious activity of neferious groups and individuals in today's Britain, very much part of the 'social fragmentation' issue mentioned previously]

[NB Also critically in the book, no mention whatsoever of Issigonis' war-time and post-war designs for the military. Such as the amphibious motorised 'Guppy' 'wheel-barrow', or suspension design of the 1950s Austin Champ 4x4, which in its prototype form (like 'Mosquito') did use that boxer-4 watercooled engine. Possibly because it was still confidential at the time (1964).

And Though a later prototype - so after the book was written - Issigonis also created the 4x4 Austin 'Ant' deploying a transverse engined 4WD system.

30 years later Rover Group's Chief Programme Engineer for the CB40 programme, Dick Elsy, would opt for a similar system for the drivetrain of the Land Rover Freelander.

BTW...The next weblog illustrates my own 1998 thoughts regards the ideal Body-In-White Features Development for CB40's successor, Freelander 2].

After initial mention of 'Mosquito',  The Mini Story, begins proper, utiling the style code XC9003 before official project name ADO 15, between 1957 - 1959.

Having regained Issigonis from his previous departure from Morris to Alvis in 1952, Leonard Lord provides an almost free-reign to the Design-Engineer. All but the engine type, since he needed to maintain the central business threads that had been central to BMC's profitability over the previous 5 years regards BMC group.

Namely synergies (eg simplified development and production, reduced dealer parts inventory and so reduce overall costs throught the corporation's value-chain. None negotiable was Issigonis's to use of a current production engine - the 'A' series from Austin in Longbridge.

Very pertinantly given his importance to small car design, the basic investigative research of FIAT's Chief Engineer Dante Giacosa is mentioned. As to the engineering and performance reasons for why European makers inevitably preferred rear engined layouts for small cars, such as VW / NSU- Prinz / Renault, as did Japan's Mazda with its first R360.

[NB This somewhat echoed again over the last 20 years on specific models such as the 2 Daimler Smart variants, the 5 door sharing a platform with Renault's latest Twingo, and TATA's use on its Nano.  (as well as in a manner, Rover Group's Spiritual and Spiritual Too concepts of 1997 by Oliver Ie Grice - beautifully resolved, but likewise limited by  mid-rear engine position, even if laid flat). Though primarily for reasons of crash management over production cost, the latter the prime consideration in the 1950s).

Giacosa showed that on the global export level in 1955, the small rear engined cars from Germany, France and Italy took 80% of the market, simply because they were not necessarily the best practically - given imposition of the rear engine per luggage space and configurability, but because they were available, cheap and reliable.

[NB Because of the over-inflated, panic -inducing, news stories about the 'Suez Crisis', the even smaller 'Bubble Cars' were gaining some popularity in the UK, with iobvious previous popularity in Germany, Belgium and Holland. But the UK's news stories of the time depicted far greater apparent popularity than was actually so in terms of true demand and sales figures. Which highlights the likely connection between the vested interests of Bubble Car importers and the Cinematic News Organisations such as Pathe].

Giacosa also pays tribute to the 1922 Austin Seven (itself much influenced by Peugeot's Bebe), for its comparitively greater practicality as a small car; itself prompting the 1936 FIAT 'Topolino' Cinquecento. But he also critically notes that these cars (Peugeot, Austin and FIAT) were ostensibly 2-seaters posing as 4 seaters; and that vitally it was impossible to build what was really a 2 seater for half the price of a proper 4-seater.

So it made sense to build proper or near full-sized 4 seater even as a lower cost basic Small car. And that the business rational made even more sense when vehicle weight is reduced as much as possible; so as to reduce direct input costs, whilst of course high unit volumes are achieved. To in turn spread and reduce the company's overhead costs.

And because overheads were often static - especially when operating 'lean' - and so not easily altered to operate at base efficiency, it made sense to take the cost out of the production costs of the car itself, since little could be done with the firm if it were not to operationally 'wax and wain', so creating inefficiencies in itself.

All of this why European cars were largely as they were - rear engined. (Without also stating to his British audience, that the Europeans typically were behind the British in terms of overall car parc and product expections, and obviously then far further behind the Americans as of 1955.

The Italian critically highlighted the importance to the firm of "mass to price", comparing the much heavier  typical American car that weighed 3,000 lbs and so sold for 5 - 6 Shillings per lb of mass, to the typical European cars that weighed 1000 lbs and so of 7 - 9 Shillings per lb of mass.

[NB of course what Giacosa does not state, is that the socio-economic and cultural differences between 1955 America and Europe, and so vehicle demand levels were enormous, as illustrated by comparitive and even available consumer goods of the time.

The successful Americans firms (GM, Ford, Chrysler) had undoubtedly accounted for this examination of material inputs costs in their 1950s platform planningn. Able to gain back profits from their higher specification low level Chevrolet, Ford, Dodge/Plymouth cars, whilst gaining greater still profits on their Buick-LaSalle-Cadillac, Mercury-Lincoln, and Chrysler-Imperial models].  

Nevertheless, some of what Giacosa said from a starkly commercial perspective undoubtedly seeped into Issigonis regards small UK and European cars, especially regards the importance of production costs per vehicle weight (ie the basic measurement  aspects of the Bill of Materials). This so even though he'd well learned the weight-saving lesson in race cars two decades earlier regards performance, the re-emphasis here per production costs.. (No doubt Leonard Lord, as a former Production Engineer - had echoed this factor time and again at BMC, but as Pomeroy elucidates, it struck home to Issigonis coming from his renowned contemporary. (In 1956, Giacosa was 51, whilst Issigonis was 50).

The book goes into detail -with useful Issigonis sketches - regards the initail 10x4x4 ft Box Concept, his material (steel) cost calculations, and numerous simple and complex Product Engineering and Design for Manufacture solutions and sketches.

Thereafter, the importance of the in-sump gearbox solution to minimise engine bay mechanical packaging, and the early Development Mules fabricated and run with the engine in its initial orientation, then re-orientated 180 degrees to protect the carburettor from  icing-up. And frustratingly for Issigonis, that necessity requiring a transfer-set of 3 more gears within the gearbox to re-orientate the direction of forward drive; so adding complexity, weight and cost (very galling to the 'Simplitician').

And critically why -given Giacosa's valid points about the advantages of rear engine, why a front engine was unquestioningly preferred in its novel layou to free-up the rear of the platform, to maximise load space and provide for varied body-type permutations., aswell as ability to extend the wheelbase for such variants.And

The European small cars had been designed by their manufacturers as fundamental low cost and low sales priced runabouts, with far less attention drawn to the platform's reconfigurability.

[NB I suspect this done in Italy and France - less so Germany - after the War, so that different vehicle segments (private vs commercial, small vs medium / large) within the market could be effectively monopolised by specific manufacturers, and so better accord to partially centrally planned Reconstruction efforts. This seems the only plausible explanation as to why FIAT's Cinquecento went from front engined for the earlier 1936 'Topolino' in various body-styles, to rear-engined and essentially one body-style of 1957 Nouvo Conquecento(excluding the space inefficient, poor selling, estate variant called 'Giardinera')].

Like the Austin 7, ADO 15 had been designed to encompass as wide a client-base as possible. And yet more so over the earlier 7 (which itself was obviously body on frame and essentially designed as two distinct units using standard production considerations), with necessarily far greater consideration for Manufacturing and Assembly cost and ease.

Thus Issigonis was not simply thinking 2 Dimensionally per the opposites of (van) Utility and (car) Leisure-Functionality for his car, but 4 Dimensionally, including considerable concentration regards Manufacturing and Assembly.

This was his true 'genius', his breadth of holistic appreciation.

[NB By the 1990s, the Auto-Industry had already absorbed very effective Japanese production philosophies, and then began leaning toward reducing NPD times by deploying 'Simultaneous Engineering' techniques. (Such as cross-functional matrix teams, more use of 'real-time' CAD and Admin IT etc).

But Issigonis demonstrated the ability to 'Simultaneously Engineer' from concurrent alternative perspectives inside a single mind - the true mark of a good Designer.

As for the 1990s, for those in the Auto-Industry who'd devoted themselves to years of homework and were passionate about their subject from many angles, and so innately 'knew' - in the Issigonis manner -  by the 1980s and 1990s the industry had become frustrating.

Under 'corporatisation', 'management theory' and 'management speak' , the raft of theorums emenating from the theoritician's pens in Business Schools started to arguably disadvantage quick and proficient New Product Development.

'Simultaneous Engineering' was supposedly in the Japanese manner - yet theories were often based upon limited research and so little true appreciation, driven by the astounding capabilities of IT to provide 'real-time' information on Design Update changes between Concept Engineers, Development Engineers and Manufacturing Engineers.

There were arguably "too many chefs in the kitchen" simultaneously, with the minutia of Manufacturing issues that would not be enacted for 20-30 months becoming discussion points in late Concept and early Development stages. Thus a virtual Merry-Go-Round of conflicting perspectives and voices, which had to be settled by the Chief Programme Engineer.

Furthermore, such theorums were increasingly becoming pushed and adopted by senior company-(wo)men who themselves had limited real interest in the broad subject nor the overall design process. Hence the likes of promoted early CAD Engineers who'd seen the true benefits of early CAD and so transposed the same thought process regards 'Simultaneous Engineering' and IT managers who had never been privy to the holistic process or had even personally built or re-built a car; so had virtually no practical understanding, besides the view through a computer screen.

Yet for the sake of their careers (and to include in their own MSc or PhD work) wanted to be seen to be following the latest IT driven Management Theory practices to gain internal and external recognition and so notional credibility.

It was itself painful to watch as teams of costly Engineers would be sat around doing virtually nothing as decisions had to be constantly made about minutia problems that were being over-played in a partly politicised atmosphere, by either the Concept, Development or Manufacturing quarters. Especially so since inevitably little more was actually learned, less so applied given real-world operational pressures of the firm, and importantly cost the company's time, resources and money and so inevitably affected the bottom-line.

Undoubtedly the likes of Simultaneous Engineering has its place when practicably applied , but so much better to have very capable Senior Engineers and Board Members (employee and independent) who understand the whole process from Market Research, Concept Packaging, Design/Styling, Development Engineering, Manufacturing Engineering, Production,  Distribution, Sales and After-Sales, and so back into Market Research, etc. Aswell as having afar bigger appreciation for the bigger picture in which the firm is operating, from Competitors to Global Economics].

In this regard, as a singular conceptual creative hub, with strong practical understanding, Issigonis appeared to have been imbued with that big picture perspective, even if likely unable to know about accounting 'Depreciation' rates or the different types of Funding Options available to his company.

Hence, from the product perspective, although Issigonis had been interested in race cars before WW2, unlike so many engineers, he had no personal bias in predetermining the end point. He simply went by the requirement of the brief and the recognised and emergent facts.

Which in ADO15's case was far greater appreciation for ultimate Use: Design Practicality, Ride and Handling Driveability, Manufacturing Ease and Overall Cost.

[NB Likewise to the myth about the Minor, it also appears unlikely that the story about Ford engineers reckoning that each Mini produced cost more than it sold for, was true. Leonard Lord and George Harriman would have seen to that. And if so perhaps only upon Ford's then altered accounting basis of heavy early depreciation of fixed assets (prior to its Public Listing to boost mid 1960s profits), and Time and Motion studies, all under the supervisory wisdom of its Henry Ford II appointed 'Wiz Kids'.

Or perhaps Ford's 'Tear Down' specialists misinterpreted perception of overall expected unit volumes, against set-up costs. That story also helped to 'tear down' BMC's repuation in the industry at the time, whilst ironically Ford was running two separate European companies in the UK and Germany.

It is guestimated by investment-auto-motives that the ammortisation costs of the new BIW and part-paid

Supplier tooling would have 'broken even' by the 80-100,000th car, off-setting the development costs of suspension and tyres, with its carry-ver engine, body-shell simplicity, reduced labour build time.

Mini, in all its simply designed utility and upmarket rebadged variants ultimately sold nearly 5.4 million units].        
The number of conceptualised and ultimately produced model variants and variations illustrate the very rational yet Humanistic approach Issigonis had.

He could understand the needs of the specific end user, partly because he was in himself an 'everyman'. From the stereo-typical gin-swilling member of the high-culture loving upper middle-classes, to the methodical and detail-orientated hands-on capabilities of an 'under the arches' mechanic of the period.

The man undoubtedly radiated an everyday societal interest, to be translated to his vehicle solutions, and no doubt never 'blew hot air'.

He was able to see through the lives and uses of many others and see through the eyes of those many others; from a Squaddie using a Moke as an Army Base drone vehicle or Signals Corps messenger buggy in the field, to leader of the local Women's Institute driving a well appointed Riley or Wolseley variant.
He obviously observed and obviously absorbed.

As for the idea of 'genius solutions', even Issigonis was fallible, since his initial complete monocoque structure proved torsionally weak and warped during initial development testing. Thereafter design and use of front and rear sub-frames to carry engine, suspension, steering, brakes and wheels, which as separate entities added a modularity to the build process and so sped-up factory build times, aswell as allowing for more body variants later as wheelbase could be easily altered without redesigning the sub-frames.

The Moulton originated suspension needs no more than mere mention here given its stature in British engineering history on Mini, other models and of course his own fold-away bicycle.

Pomeroy highlights the importance of the 10 inch wheels; highlighting that this was at least as important as the transverse engine, since they were so critical to maintaining the cub-like cabin and small length and width, and so ultimately outstanding manouvreability. This achieved through new tyre development from Dunlop.

[NB the author also refers to the Body and 'the Hull', which illustrates the manner in which the Brits utilised the marine analogy for a pressed steel shell, given its proximity to a boat's hull, before the US term Body-in-White became commonplace].

[NB History recalls ADO 15's small team of Alec Issigonis, Jack Daniels, Christopher Kingham and the few additional draughtsmen and 2 students. But typically ommits the Buck's and specifically the 2 Prototypes fabrication technicians who had to have worked hard and may have provided critical feedback regards likely stress points, as came to be seen in testing at Chalgrove, and so substituted use of sub-frames. And also for years, omitted the initial experimentation with a Twin-cylinder set up that proved very problematic and comparatively costly, and so early elimination].

Of interest is Pomeroy's mention of the cars launch and the initial inertia shown by the middle and lower-middle classes, who sought a car that their neighbours would admire, status being a prime motivator in vehicle purchase. Issigonis remonstrated that he designed a car for its size, economy, manouvreability, ease of parking and safety, not for its status; reckoning that anything mass-produced has no true 'status'.

The irony was that, unlike the 'petit borgeois', the upper-middle / upper class, young and working class, immediately took Mini to their hearts, realising what a brilliant motoring solution it was; the former able to immediately purchase - and so create an aspirational effect on the car - whilst the latter (and more needy and demanding) had to typically wait as they saved.

Pomeroy goes into detail about the Cooper, Downton and Cooper S variants, and highlights the importance of the Van (and less so Pick-Up) variants from launch, since the Commercial models would be very attractive to small and large businesses.

The van variant launched in May 1960 was of particular note since - as with the car - it was functionally much better than the A35 version it replaced. Furthermore, it provided a yet cheaper access to new vehicle motoring for the middle-class young. This because the van did not incur Purchase Tax, so could be had for £360, when the car at £350 incurred £146, so determining a price of £496.

[NB This boosted by its 'artistic' connotations as band-members (hauling drums, new electric guitars, amps, etc) or sculptors or painters, and was seen by them as a multi-functional, all purpose vehicle, a kind of rudimentary all-purpose utility cross-over its time.

The fact is that whilst the Middle and Upper Middle were buying the car, it was the van variant that provided motoring access to the other less well off demographic groups. Take a look on you tube at old film footage of 1960s everyday British traffic and the mini van often appears alongside the older and bigger Austins and Morris's].

The author provides limited comment on those variants initially built by the Experimental Department: the Military Moke, double-engined Moke, Moke Beach Car and the  (front and mid engined) 4WD Twini for possible race competition purposes.

He also highlights the wonderment of modern production methods, stating that the majority of Minis to be sold would be in 'De Lux' trim akin to the most popular A35 predecessor, sold as seen for £496, whilst the A35 was  £537. Thus a better car in all measures for nigh on £40 less than its predecessor.

And the production of the Van then allowed for the launch of the wood-framed Estate variant, four moths later in September 1960, using the same one-piece floor-pressing. This ironically expanding the attraction of the car to initially the Upper Middle, since it mimicked a smaller version of the 'Shooting Break', and so the aspirant Middle who liked the 'town and country' overtones.

And in October 1961 the Riley and Wolseley versions appeared with different face and small 'fin-tail' rear with boot, and plush interiors to mirror the larger stablemates. Issigonis was somewhat displeased by these versions since they were then heavier than his orginal concept and so less spritely in use. Additionally, these upscale versions attract a 50% Purchase Tax on RRP, which was already £127 above the base car. So sales were poor and the additional effort and cost to BMC was actually wasted.

[NB Likely that with BMC's nationalistic remit to 'keep the flag flying' for Britain, especially abroad, the Riley and Wolseley versions were viewed as inalienable to ensure a complete bottom to top model range, even if business sense recognised that sales would be low. The mass variants to subsidise the niche variants].

Though designed as a cheap small city car by Issiginosis, the BMC Marketing Department actually sought to 'Premiumise' the car from the very start (much as BMW did 40 years later). No doubt that required from above to ensure earlier financial breakeven of the programme and thereafter good profitability.
The previously ammortised A35 was used as the business template had provided good profits. But since A35's introduction inflation had affected the Mini programme's Input Costs and Leonard Lord was adamant that BMC would recoup costs asap and then maximise profitability.

This is why although Issogonis simply saw the car as the architype cheap spritely runabout, yet certainly not a 'racer', BMC 's seniors were happy to develop relations with John Cooper and then Downton Engineering. Recognising that rally and race-track success would add a performance dimension to the vehicle range and so attract additional sporting and sporty clientel; and likewise use the Sportier Minis as connection and  to MG and (and later Triumph) racing prowess. The first Cooper, as of late 1961, started at £679, so £25 more than the Riley version.

Pomeroy states that Issigonis warmed-up to John Cooper's involvement because Cooper Engineering's Grand Prix efforts had been mighty, yet from small resources in Surbiton, South London. Infact initially Cooper had been disinterested aswell, focused upon GP. But he had become familiar with the 'A-Series' engine in Formula Junior and had bought a Mini for his own use, and gradually became more and more impressed by it. So he prompted Issigonis to forge relations between Cooper and BMC.

[NB The Mini Cooper obviously became legendary. So much so that BMW years later orientated its R50 programme around Cooper as the centre of gravity of the brand, between One and Cooper S].

However, initially the Cooper was designated as a road-orientated, more 'peppy', 'driver's car' distinctly for the public road, not rally and race, though it was having increasing successed by the Factory Team and Privateers. To up the anti in proper Competition, the Cooper S was created, prompted by Downton Engineering's ability to tune the engine to propel different gear ratios to have the car reach 100 mph.

And BMC was able to offer the new 'S' model at the same price as the previous Cooper, because The Treasury had reduced Purchase Tax from 50% to 25%, so to qoute Pomeroy, "by such simple means did Chancellor Maudling motivate major mechanical modifications without monetary penelty".

[NB It had been recognised by Whitehall that to better serve the broad economy by better assisting the population's consumer aspirations, and so better serve domestic Industry, a sizable change in Purchase Tax was needed if Britain was to expand its effort in wealth creating value-added goods; seeking to create a more virtuous circle of specialist industries which could then provide for broadened wealth distribution across the demographic spectrum. Consumers would gain the aspirational products they sought, companies would enhance revenues and profits, and more technically specialised staff would be worth more to the economy, and so paid more by employers. Hence the Tax change sought to prompt a spiraling upward wealth effect].

[NB Not described here, between 1960 - 1964 BMC also investigated the idea of a Mini based MG with very different bodystyle, under AD034 and ADO70 project names, and so two versions created, the first simple with typical European convertible 'barchetta' style, the second more stylised with greater horizontal emphasis as a Targa-top. This explored because initially niche producers like Marcos were fitting more streamlined sporting fibreglass bodies for far better aerodynamics onto the Mini's platform and markedly increasing performance. These unofficial coupe versions of Mini then opened the way for possible sportier version from the factory itself].

The book continues by describing the early prototype and early production car problems that were overcome spanning: repositiong of gear lever from fascia to floor, water ingress into the footwells, oil forced onto the clutch surface, engine movement stresses upon exhaust system, ventilation problems caused by high air pressure area upon front quarter-light windows, change to radiator fan blades, the stiffening of the rear suspension structure.


'The' Industrial Case Study Lesson for a Self-Developing Nation -

In business academia case studies abound, with in referance to the auto-sector, the seemingly ever-lasting tale of the Ford Model T and its production efficiencies, set against the Ford Edsel for badly timed overt business ambition and its mis-reading of the marketplace and massive financial losses to Ford as the 1950s turned into the 1960s.

With what was in essence a WW2 boom period for American industry in war-manufacture, that profit(eering) went to largely to good use when set toward post-war consumerism with cars the very vehicles to transport the average American's mind and efforts toward a glamorous (seemingly) Hi-Tech future.

Detroit's Big 3 had found its own course and based largely on the style and marketing re-skinning of older body-on-frame and then later monocoque vehicles to excite the masses with looks, brands and feature content, (having seen its initially more technically advanced competitors seeking expensive technical advantage fall by the way-side as CapEx costs overtook profits).

Yet, in Britain BMC's notional product planners recognised that by 1956, prompted more by Big Picture socio-economic reality and the desire to grow the nation's consumer-base, as  the actual backdrop to the 'Suez Crisis' - something very pragmatic yet innovative, small, efficient and yet 'maximal' for its size, could bring very real mobility advantages to many people, old and young and across the social spectrum.

The Mini joined many other very progressive efforts of the period, as stated earlier in public road transport, public aeronautical transport, public marine transport, pollution-free energy generation, etc....all as part of a greater socially driven 'democratisation' toward better lifestyles for all.

The UK was on an economic and infrastructure basis far behind the USA, but far ahead of a devastated Europe, and still developing 2nd world across the globe. As such - with American ambition, yet European constraints - it was able to muster the creative energies to create its own innovative future, and plan through public and private enterprise spheres, its own future.

Alec Issigonis was one of the very few who molded the everyday experiences of Britain and far beyond. In the mold of others such as: Whittle in jet propulsion, Durrant-Curtis-Scott in Routemaster bus design, Cockerell per hovercrafts etc. People who broke with convention to create something better to make life in Britain itself better, both economically and socially.


An Objective and Balanced Mindset -

Issigonis's early background of of mixed Greco-German parentage, British influenced early education environment and Turkish birthplace, undoubtedly shaped him from an early age.

The need to flee Turkey in 1922 to Malta and then onto Britain and the ealry loss of his father infused an understanding of the impact of geo-political turmoil and so the importance of a secure homeland in Britain.
That together with his highly conflicting ancestry and heritage meant that from birth he was socially and so philosophically multi-dimensional. Blended from much and yet also seperated from the all too typical shortcomings of blinkered overt national identty and so 'nationalism'.

His experiences shaped him as broad-minded in scope (of society) and yet also highly pragmatic and very objective (per design solutions). That ability to view through that multi-perspective lens much matured from the overtly idealistic initial engineering approach to Mosquito/Minor, but matured and brought to bare unde the right macro-economic conditions for Mini.

More than anything, he was a particularly insightful and incisive 'everyman', who could simultaneously see 'all' in the outside world, and see 'small' in technological response to that outside world.

In a country who's recent past of increasing specific business and technical specialisation as part of its domestic and export Services orientated economy, there has arguably occurred an unfortunate separation from the Big Picture 'whole' and Small Picture 'detail', as other countries - with Britain's help - create their own futures. And often doing so without Britain's help, just as Ratan Tata did with the 'Nano', seeking to replicate the Issigonis thought process for India]

And that role as international 'knowledge  brokers' has to a degree served well across various sectors, from the Eco-Engineering of all transport types, to the burgeoning realms of ever more sophisticated Fin-Tech.

But beyond previous and current domestic research efforts in Aluminium Structures (previously 'conquered for mass manufacturing at JLR) and presently exploration of Electric Propulsion solutions, able to self-power guiding Artificial Intelligence systems...it  may be that the boundaries of directed Innovation have been over-defined along these wholly Eco-directed avenues, which often when tied to ever growing 'carbon foot-print guilt' actually often seem overtly prohibitive and restrictive, even if lightweight EVs eventually become the norm.

Britain should seek to develop its own expanded new model of automotive innovation which surpasses simply satiating the eco-guilt of drivers by deploying 'virtue-signalling' solutions as new status symbols.
It should think afresh as Issigonis did, to provide expanded horizons for people's who day by day feel themselves ever more hemmed-in by their (media-brainwashed) obligations to the planet.

Issigonis called himself the 'Reluctant Revolutionary' with Mini.

And now that James Dyson has rightfully belatedly ceased his efforts regards a Dyson Premium EV (sat directly against Aston Martin's Lagonda concept), perhaps the likes of the revolutionary 'Rebel Extinction' crowds might wish to proactively lead the way, with their own financially feasible and highly meaningful value-adding personal transport solutions,  that like the 1957 ADO 15 concept, proliferated one base idea into a myriad of solutions for a myriad of peoples.


To End -

That said, the central message of this weblog is the idea of reading different and yet comparitive material from a specific era to in gain insights into the Macro (JR Hicks) and the Micro (L. Pomeroy).
And regards that end, with those two books read in parallel, it became more than appatent that there exists a strong feed-back loop between ever enhanced macro data and the ability to when necessary create something highly innovative based on sound principles.

It was statistical feedback from Whitehall publications regards Britain and the Commonwealth, that allowed for confidence by BMC in a very quick New Product Development Process for Mini.
And it was similar meaningful and transparent Macro information that likewise had underpinned Britain's high innovative ambitions of that 1950s/1960s New Age, from Mini, to Routemaster Bus, to Hovercrafts, to Commercial Jet travel, through to first phase (and initially very well safeguarded) Nuclear Reactors for Clean Energy, so together ending 'Pea Souper' Smogs whilst expanding travel possibilities.

The products and infrastructure solutions - often combined - themselves created the new culture and so the broader progressive socio-economic context, from which a new more optimistic generation thrived.

Hicks states that Britain had not really overcome the previous socio-economic inflictions of WW2, until the mid 1950s, when things appeared somewhat (to paraphrase) 'normal again; and the country became again highy productive on its renewed peacetime footing.

Infact 'normal' was an under-statement given the pace of progress shown.

ADO 15 went from verbal and written brief from Leonard Lord to 'blue-prints' and a wooden 'Buck' dimensional and style mock-up (XC9003) in 120 days, and then to initial 2 Prototypes build and testing - the first known as 'the Orange Box' - after only another 100 days. And onto full production in less than 2 years.

Let us hope that paradoxically, there are more 'Reluctant Revolutionaries' amongst the vociferous Green Set who can do aswell as Issigonis.