Saturday, 24 April 2010

Company Focus – FIAT SpA – Family Planning

From the long-view perspective FIAT Auto has ridden tumultuous, good and troublesome times over the last decade. The potential energy for its previous turnaround was actually created by the effectual cash injection brought into play when GM decided not to take its 'call-option' on the then flailing Italian firm, and instead had to pay its way out of contractual obligations. Those monies were used to buoy FIAT, its brands and credit division which with the help of asset and balance-sheet leverage enabled FIAT to create a virtuous circle of product development and credit availability.

Of course late 2008/9 saw the credit bubble burst which impacted FIAT's (and many others) business models – including the US auto sector. With a contrarian mindset, Marchionne took the challenge as an opportunity to court Washington to create a performance related 'equity walk-up' deal for Chrysler, and although a hard task master, at least the apparent savior of the smallest Detroit player.

FIAT is undeniably battered, as are most, but having weathered the storm of the last 2.5 years and noting the recent term stability of risen capital markets, the FIAT Board see the time as right to present its future to the investment community. As a signal of refreshed mid-term optimism is the appointment of Agnelli family heir John Elkann – who heads the family's Luxembourg based investment fund Exor - from V-C to Chairman; so replacing Cordero di Montezemolo.

[NB Exor sits within the master investment holding company Gianni Agnelli & C. Sapaz].

Importantly, Elkann's dual role as both head of family investments and the cars division indicates progression toward the unbundling of FIAT Group divisions – Auto, Iveco, CNH Global, Magnetti, etc. This strategy means that FIAT Group retains Autos as its central pillar, but evaluates divestment of the remaining.

As witnessed, first off the block is release of Iveco, CNH, FPT Industrial and Marine merged to form an 'Industrial Vehicles' business. That leaves Auto with: FGA, the Chrysler stake, Ferrari, Maserati, Magnetti Marelli, Teksid, Comau and FPT Passenger & Commercial Vehicles

This news boosted the company's shares on Milan stock exchange by 8% almost immediately, demonstrating the air of expectation that something big is in the works – very typical of historic major Milan market moves where nuance over-powers fundamental metrics.

The Q1 2010 results were set out as a game of 2 halves, the nominal last quarter sales, revenue and profitability report, aswell as the presentation of what seems essentially Marchionne's 5 year plan.

Q1 Results:
investment-auto-motives expected less than many in Milan, the City or Wall St; and it proved so. Given the structural market headwinds and the retraction of EU scrappage schemes – in which FIAT was not a prime beneficiary outside of Italy – and indeed its poor alignment to such scrappage schemes without a true B-segment car, the inability to claw in greatly expanded revenue was always to be the case. In effect, having seen much of the incurred cost to generate latter efficiency gains from previous structural downsizing, and the sizable loan repayment to maintain a plausible credit rating, Q1 was always set as a period of the Auto unit ostensibly 'treading water' (although at a quicker pace awaiting full swim) as far as external observers were concerned, and so a continuation – though at far lower level of net losses. (Q409's E-283m / $380m). To expect more was perhaps naïve, but nonetheless the improvement on 'paper-based' reasoning is momentarily encouraging., even if overshadowed by the 'family planning' announcement that added upward and concomitant downward price volatility.

Using LSE/ThomsonReuters data, Q1 offered revenues of E12,926m (vs Q109 of E11,268m), EBITDA was not stated, but EBIT offered E352m (vs Q109 E-129m). [This E352m faces an estimated average of E345m from FIAT listed external investment analysts, as reported by Bloomberg; and as one analyst correctly states “results broadly in line with forecasts are not market prompters”]. Pre-Tax Profit was E157m (vs Q109 E-360m), Net Income was E-25m (vs Q109 E-410).

Within this given FIAT's 20% Chrysler stake – intended to raise to 35% in 2 years – the US company's tax-payer funded turnaround seems underway, with Q1 showing a loss of $197m, markedly smaller in comparative terms than the June 10th to Dec 31st 2009 loss of $3.78bn – though this comparison has obviously been chosen to flatter given the odd June 10th date elected. ($2.1bn of this was a charge to the UAW healthcare fund). Marchionne however was proud to state that Chrysler gave an operating profit of $143m demonstrating its improved break-even level at 1.1m units in the US. In an improving US market TIV, it was stated that revenue is expected at $40-45bn, with EBITDA of $2.5-2.7bn. Cash at hand (presumably of all liquid instruments) increased to $7.4bn from $5.8 at year-end, with an additional $2.4bn available from US & Canadian government sources. Q1 market share was up in the US, Canada and world-wide to respectively: 9.1% (from 8.1%), 13.7% (from 11.6%) and in vehicle terms global sales reaching 334,000 from 318,000.

[NB investment-auto-motives believes that given the strength of competition, and Chrysler's lack of small cars, this was probably largely achieved via incentives on passenger cars and the revenue input of ever faithful Dodge Ram truck buyers].

The 5 Year Plan:
Marchionne states that it has been recognised that for some time the transparency of FIAT Group has been lacking, thus creating a harder detailed forecast picture to be painted by both sell-side & buy-side analysts. That inter-dependent structure has however played a vital role in leveling out the cyclical nature of FIAT Group's separate divisions, especially Autos. However that was through historically normative economic cycles. Yet (apparently similarly to FIAT thoughts) investment-auto-motives believing that the 2008 western crisis changed the 'normative', each sector effectively individually starting from scratch from 2010 onwards, hence the logic to largely unbundle. This unbundling a very necessary feature if the western auto-industry is to be re-aligned along more lateral lines instead of its historic vertical value-chain to improve investment rationale and RoI.

Automotive News' post report identified its 'primary takeaways' of the announced plan as: Autos saving $4bn by 2014 in combined purchasing, Chrysler worker retraining and $126bn in revenue earned by 2014, that very year supposedly offering E64bn in turnover of which giving E3.8bn in trading profit. (FIAT's definition of trading profit being the subtraction of top-level costs and additional extra-ordinary costs – typically restructuring costs – thus a measure providing far greater flexibility to achieve).

[NB by its very nature FIAT has re-orientated the adage to set a E64bn question!].

The 2014 financial goals for the new Industrials division are a turnover of E29bn giving a trading profit of approximately E3.3bn.

Interestingly the Group's debt present debt structure will be evenly split between Autos & Industrial, that debt rising from E4.4bn year-end to E4.7bn by end Q1; hence its seems that much of the debt incurred to date for Autos is disproportionately being given to Industrial, adding to the chance of financial performance improvement for Autos in the mid-term.

And it may well need it, if new product cadence does not live-up to ambition.

Looking forward...

Marchionne of course recognises that FIAT has not marketed an archetype B-class car in Europe for some years, instead hoping that the introduction of a (new) 2011 'Novo Uno', fills the void between Panda and Grande/Evo Punto. Hopes are that it can replicate the success of original Mk1 & Mk2 Uno between 1983-1995 (though maintained in EM regions under different names with evolved body-styles), and the idea to both drive economies of scale from a shortened Grande-Punto platform and simultaneously obtain conquest sales from largely French (Renault & PSA) and Korean (Hyundai & Kia) competitors, aswell as of course GM Corsa and Ford Fiesta, yet using Japan's Mazda 2 as the BIC benchmark. Interestingly, initial pictures suggest it takes on a more functional aesthetic than its more svelte peer-group, mimicking with softer lines the clean boxy, partial asymmetrical detailed, appearance of 1970s o/Strada and 80s Uno.

If this is indeed the case the styling ethos appears to visually merge the historically separate offerings to EU and EM markets, no bout heavily influenced by Chinese acceptance of visually simple body-styles. Thus FIAT hopes to expand its RoW design philosophy into Europe. How ultimately successful this will be in practice is in Europe open to debate, but in an age of 'classy super-minis' from most manufacturers, including increasingly the Koreans, the concern is that Novo Uno is perceptually lumped together with more utilitarian cars like Dacia's Sandero.

FIAT obviously wishes to differentiate itself, and needs a suitably clean body-style onto which it can graft Dodge and even Jeep identities, but will need to better explore how a 'functional aesthetic' should be conveyed so as to be aspirational. Not doing so will only create a pricing pull-down effect as EU potential customers re-classify FIAT's small cars as increasingly 'cheap & cheerful', and discordant with the more up-market image of 500, and Abarth performance variants. The 21st century EU is far more complex than 1960s Italy or 1980s Europe.

Marchionne is aiming at 35% of Chrysler in 2 years time. That will depend upon a success FIAT rebound, itself dependent of a managed mix of both, a) new vehicle offerings which the markets will embrace (harder in Europe & the US) and b) the manner in which FIAT Group (inc ultimately Auto – though not stated) is divested and re-equitised, so as to give FIAT Auto and Exor (via Elkann himself) as large a return as possible to re-pump back into Autos thus able to acquire a latter-day increased stake in Chrysler.

The new added transparency provided by a split conglomerate will of course help external valuation and, as the WSJ states, the 'conglomerate discount' presently seen should wain. It recounts Credit Suisse's estimation that at E10 per share FIAT trades nearly 30% below its nominal E13.90 for the sum of its parts. (investment-auto-motives has not undertaken a similar proportionate evaluation and so cannot ratify that figure. Typically conglomerate discounts run at 15-20%).

Moreover, investment-auto-motives believes it would be only natural to suspect that over the last each of the individual companies have been reformed so that respective balance-sheet accords 'light-values', especially regards heavily written-down asset values, boosted cash reserves and other accounting tactics – the natural schema for what could well be a stream of spin-offs from each of the 2 new divisions, with probable doubt latter-day re-ties on an independent basis between Auto & Industrial sub-units

[NB investment-auto-motives believes that one such examplar could well be that the Industrial Vehicles business may in due course absorb FIAT's small van business 'FIAT Professional' to better separate the car-derived vans from the van-derived cars in FIAT Autos range. This separated relationship for Iveco thus increases its commercial vehicle range, provides for greater leverage of unfettered fixed transfer pricing of goods sold by Autos to Industrials, but interestingly also allows the new Industrials division to overlap the technologies and systems of vans/trucks and tractors/diggers etc.

This not only generates synergistic savings but also provides promise for vehicle overlap, such as that seen by the successful JCB Fastrac, which measurably changed the AgCon vehicle playing field. To do something similar would be of great advantage to FIAT given its EM exposure]

As for the tactical timing of the FIAT presentation itself, very probably to over-shadow the relative financial quarter under-performance that could alone have damaged share-price, with the market promise of “jam tomorrow” - and it seems to have worked.

This presumably intended to put a new perceptional share-price 'floor' for the Group at the E10 – 11 mark, which in time will improve due to the income effect of Autos enjoying slow but stable market-tide growth, and in turn raises the very generalised apportioned valuations for each division when separation occurs; the current investors expected to receive 2 shares of the Industrial Division for every 1 Group share owned.

Thus FIAT is using a 2-stage ploy by which to increase the value of each division when they eventually individually come to market.

So whilst the Torino FC readies itself in its fight back to Seria A after its relegation, across town in the industrial and financial realm FIAT Group is readying itself for a continuation of its fight on the national and world stage. Given that Marchionne's expects domestic car demand will fall 30% and EU demand 15% in 2010 FIAT must face yet another trialling period; in the belief that challenges bring eventual opportunities.

[NB the FIAT TIV forecasts are believed by investment-auto-motives to be over-exaggerated, so as to assist Autos beating self-set and externally set earnings guidance).

However, as Marchionne well knows, presently the over-capacity of European autos will keep generating long-term value-destruction until the (long-awaited) shake-out to his quoted 6 players emerges.

The scrappage scheme has assisted FIAT enormously, especially domestically, eve though the strength of its BIC low CO2 emissions ratings (possibly inadvertently boosted by lack of a B-segment car) was ultimately hindered by the reduced appeal of its aging product.

But, the question for most investors regards the auto-industry – especially after GM & Chrysler bankruptcies and EU bail-outs, is the innate value of an enterprise if stripped essentially bare. This is presently an academic exercise given FIAT's capital market credibility generated to date, but if seen from PE eyes - beyond the dynamic of hazier public capital markets - the harsher, real test is that of 'on-paper' value vs 'bare asset' value. As of Q1 2010 FIAT reports its value as E68,027m: the Equity & Liabilities value = Current & Non-Current Assets value). Remove the Asset-Backed Finance Payable of E7,482m and a sub-total of E60,545m appears (as FIAT displays). Remove the Unsecured Financial Payable of E20,818m and the new sub-total of E39,727m appears. Remove the Equity level of E11,457m and the new sub-total of E28,270m appears. Remove General Provisions, Employee Benefit, Trade Payables, Taxes and Other Liabilities of combined E36,746m and the new subtotal reads E-8,476m. Remove Intangibles/Goodwill of E7,446m and the final total reads: E-15,922m. FIAT Group when stripped bare in its consolidated conglomerate form, fundamentally operates as a value-destructive enterprise to the tune of E-16bn.

This is admittedly purely a paper-based, academic exercise but it underpins the Agnelli family's raison d'etre that Marchionne perceptively release and separate FIAT's internal value-creation mechanisms so that they gain market-reflective values and can have the autonomous futures to best ride the separate sector-relative economic upturns when they arrive.

FIAT is a long way from being out of the woods, with the mainstream FGA element still facing market headwinds, but the basic industrial plan of separating into 2 distinct enterprises has shown to win market favour. But much remains in the execution, the debt burden playing a critical role in the short term, as will generated synergies and the ability for any full transfer-pricing between the 2 divisions and within a division as each company is tasked further to seek a greater portion of external non-FIAT business.

But ultimately, investors will be asking themselves not only about the new Industrial division's PaT, but if it will be used as a FIAT Autos 'Patsy'. The question being: will it be laboured by Iveco's having to buy Auto's car-based small & medium vans and FPT engines, gearboxes & other components at full market rates, to ultimately help bolster Auto's revenues and margins? If that is part of the invisible big-picture – and reasonable to think so given Marchionne's “New FIAT” ambitions – pressure will be put on the new Industrial division to both grow at a pace for each company beyond their respective sector TIVs, but also seek-out mutual programme development, technical systems and production-build synergies across the Iveco – CNH – Marine group.

Ultimately, in the quest to become a truly viable 'sexy' global car company, the FIAT board will need to try and avoid Industrial (FI) becoming the inadvertent 'whipping-boy'. As Elkann, Marchionne et al develop their IPO plans – as part of the new transparency edict - that is perhaps the central investor issue that requires elucidation.

Tuesday, 20 April 2010

Company Focus – Automobili Lamborghini SpA – Stretched between Sant'Agata and the 21st Century.

Lamborghini's rise from its tractor origins to supercar is part of automotive legend. Founder Ferruccio's ambition was to improve upon Enzo Ferrari's creations, to produce useable, 'liveable' supercars that created a formula for sales success on the street, whilst on the track a mantra of only privateer team racing, so as not to undermine the purely commercial raison d'etre of the operation.

The disruption of the 1973 oil crisis to sales and consequential commercial 'de-railing' means that Ferrucio's ambition still being chased some 47 years later – though at last with increasing success.

Sportscar and (bull-badged) tractor operations were completely separated in 1972 entities, the latter sold to SAME [latterly Same Deutz-Fahr] to retain Italian ownership. The car company, in a very different sector to tractors, experienced the extremities of the economic cycle: the typical norm for what are capital intensive, yet high reward entities, only as long as company stewards can judge the economy and its correlated marketplace vagueries.

However, today in a manner 2010 revisits 1962 in as much as there is the requirement to 'stretch' the company's internal activities and capabilities, but this time instead of jumping sectors very much centred on expanding the automotive success story this decade.

[NB Lamborghini Holding SpA is the holding company of Automobili Lamborghini, and holds as seperate sister sub-divisions the previously linked elements of Lamborghini Merchandisng and Lamborghini (V12) Marine engines and portions of VW Italian retail interests.

VW Group parent and Sant'Agata executives are hoping to radically extend the capabilities of the Bolognese enterprise; essentially forced to do so in light of an increasingly competitive, able and high-profile peer set. This the case relative to both the traditional external foes such as Ferrari & Aston-Martin, 'resurgents' such as Maserati, McLaren & Lotus and relative newcomers such as Koenigsegg (now holding SAAB) and others, and indeed the ever increasing internal threat from internal brands within the VW empire such as Porsche, Bentley & Bugatti.

Lamborghini Cars, having seen success over the last decade with a renewed 2-tier product portfolio – Murcielago & Gallardo – is now considering its instrinsic future strategy beyond replacement and range extending vehicles – such as the 4 door Estoque. It is having to look beyond normative marketing practice that build-up its fan and client base via efforts such as typical merchandising (ie Collezione), a factory-linked museum, track-days (ie Lamborghini Academy) and brand convoy drive events (ie GiroLamborghini) which incorporates charity fund-raising, so adding a 'do-good' CSR dimension to such conspicuous consumption.

Now beyond the outward-looking Marketing platform which has created the success to date, is a renewed inward-looking stance, reviewing at a much deeper level the manner in which it must evolve within its own being to take charge of its own destiny. In doing so to progress onward from overt reliance on inward capital & technical flows from its VW-Audi parent to create the basis of self-sustainability.

Thus, assessing its own in-house, and probably globally networked 'capabilities-base'- something very necessary amidst (and in line with) similar ever-strengthening actions of its peers.

Set within the big picture of combative global sales, perhaps at the core is the battle between VW Group and FIAT Group, their respective sportscar divisions their corporate halos and so cultural leverage across the prime battlegrounds of Europe, the US and China. And thus for Lamborghini the eponymous 'creative friction' versus Ferrari.

Yet even with its 21st century success story, headwinds are amassing for Santa'Agata, its cars effectively aging versus a broader, more market-reactive and quickly refreshed Ferrari model portfolio. Ferrari's commercial balance comes from offering both mid-engined sportscars (F458) and front-engined GT cars (California, 599 GTB/GTO, 612 Scaglietti) in V12 and V8 guises. Importantly Ferrari has been able to gauge the market dynamic very well, the introduction of the cheaper, more versatile California reflecting the relative downsizing and economising of recent times for established and conquest clients.

The question of Lamborghini's future came back into focus recently, pricking investment minds when the FT's European View - hosted by Paul Betts – re-highlighted it relatively new research activities within Washington University. Since October 2009 its remit to develop general research knowledge across processes and applications that span and inter-feed automotive and aeronautical engineering realms which is envisaged to underpin the development of composite-centric future generation parts to supersede steel, aluminium and low-grade plastics in structural and surface applications.

[NB the Reventon concept car, with 20 production units, reflects this auto-aero ideology given its reportedly F-22A Raptor fighter jet inspiration].

This is a good indicator that the company seeks to unhook itself from overt reliance on VW Group R&D, so as to build an independent stock of technical weaponry which provides brand distinction in the marketplace and ideally cannot be replicated by external or internal competitors.

[NB see note* below as post-script]

However, although such mid-long term goals remain valid, it cannot be ignored that the prosaic context for the 'Lambo Lab' news, is one in which VW Group/Lamborghini gains access to Seattle-centric aero-derived knowledge, and as such enables UW-Lamborghini to access green-tech funding from the Obama administration; made available from the Energy Bill and other similar prompters. The cognitive inter-connectedness of Washington state and Washington DC is not lost in either Wolfsburg or Sant'Agata, and is very probably a Wolfsburg directive, possibly from Dr Piech himself recognising the ground gained by Marchionne at FIAT within the corridors of US power.

Moreover, even with the understandable lack of detail regards the R&D context and content – for confidentiality reasons – the 'Lambo Lab' will serve a secondary, if more 'surface' PR, goal. That is to provide the company with a greater level of gravitas within the US, something very necessary if it is to be seen as a credible, stable competitor, and thus sales alternative, versus the almighty Ferrari in North America.

Its own financial woes and the poor US performance of all the Italian brands (except Ferrari) during 1970s & 80s set Lamborghini back, for a time overtaken by the Japanese with cars such as Honda NSX, aswell as other British and US homegrown offerings, such as TVR and Calloway.

As stated, in Europe, Japan and Asia, the eventual comeback and sales success was thanks to Audi division's assisted development of Murciellego and Gallardo, the original remit to enhance product capability, reliability and improve procurement efficiencies via the use of Audi division's R&D, development methods including latest version release CAD platforms and the required German pedantry regards programme progression only when criteria 'gateways' have been properly satisfied.

In the same vein, the 4-dr Evoque concept is very probably well matured 'on paper' given a type of 'lend-lease' arrangement regards the Audi A8 platform and the improved mutual understanding between parallel German and Italian development teams. But it will obviously require resource which Piech et al may feel is better utilised elsewhere within VW Group.

Press reports and informal 'read between the lines' conversation with a Bentley representative indicates that the A8 platform will help spawn not only the debuted Mulsanne, but also a possible Bugatti saloon. The fourth natural derivative being the Lamborghini as Evoque, allowing VW Group to fight against AML's Rapide in a pincer movement with both Porsche Panamera and Lambo Evoque; the Lamborghini very probably sculpturally similar to the rear-heavy, mid-engined concept car, but ultimately packaged as front-engined as per Audi A8. However, much depends upon capital & labour resource spread between Sant'Agata - exploring the next generation mid-engine cars - and Ingolstadt

Whilst revenues and profitability over the last 8 years grew apace, in 2009 sales took a severe hit, down 50% YoY, a poorer result than the general market sector decline of 35%. Critically, Ferrari sales declined by only 5% thanks to a mix of new product introduction and improved Asian demand 'off-setting'. Hence Sant'Agata took a heavy comparative toll, though presumably expected given the point in both cars' lifecycles (8 & 6 years respectively), fewer Asian dealers, and so high elasticity of demand. As a result, commercially Ferrari has put greater space between itself and its notional rival.

Yet there would have been wranglings inside Audi-Lamborghini given that it appears that Lamborghini was prohibited from marketing a V8 Gallardo, so as not to inadvertently compete with Audi's own Gallardo derived V8 R8 car. Adding insult to injury, the R8 was latterly made available in V10 guise thus directly vied against Gallardo. So whilst Ingolstadt did indeed assist Sant'Agata, it has been seen to have done so with its own interests at heart.

The bigger question is whilst undoubtedly there are proven and potential synergies to be leveraged by VW Group's stablemate brands, just how they are managed to maintain relative distance is important. In this instance, Audi's growth strategy to chase BMW & Mercedes was rightly put before Lamborghini's requirement, yet the execution (especially regards V10) may have been rather
more sensitive, given the relatively little additional exposure and revenue R8 V10 would have brought.

Ultimately, internal and external expectation is that Lamborghini's cars have proven themselves enough to set firm foundations under the marque, the requirement now for deep appreciation of what needs to be done across the board both strategically and operationally to buoy as much as possible the former sales momentum. However, the natural sales and revenue decline of both cars indicates that the company should have since 2008 been seeking full spectrum cost efficiencies and leveraging any low cost external funding. The UW 'Lambo Lab' points to the latter, presumably something similar being mirrored in Italy also. But the issue of Sant'Agata's operational streamlining at fixed and variable cost levels will have been key over 2009/10.

Typically from an organisation undergoing such pressures little has been formerly announced, Lamborghini management being 'challenged' by the Audi division (with VW Board acquiescence) to show its in-house ingenuity relative to reduced formal assistance and in the face of declining revenues and margins until the Murcielago replacement (nominally code-named Jota) arrives in 2011.

The evolution of Lamborghini technical development for sub-structures can be seen between the 'body-on-steel frame' Murcielago and the (Audi derived) aluminium space-frame of Gallardo. The nomenclature 'Superleggara' has been applied to one Gallardo limited edition car which - whilst not conforming to the true original build method as invented by Carrozzeria Touring of Turin in 1937- does reflect Lamborghini's focus on improving the basic construction method using advanced metals and composites to enable cross the board vehicle performance improvements.

Today then is a time that combines both the need for step change yet partially constrained in execution by financial frustration. However the change is necessary given the increasingly out-dated legacy methods of Sant'Agata which effect not only the build-method and so efficacy of the vehicle dynamic, but also commercially critical, the innate efficiency of production and thus capacity and per unit cost.

The following impression of the in-house build process for the 2009 Murciellago LP670/4-SV is taken from a National Geographic documentary film, and as such cannot be considered truly meaningful appreciation, yet perhaps broad enough to provide useful observations regards the 'legacy' factory methods which Sant'Agata is endevouring to improve. Recognising the importance of the construction method relative to farming-out cost via larger bought-in sub-systems, the level of assembly difficulty, thus level of labour input and so degree of factory efficiency and indeed efficiency variability. Here Gallardo and presumably NG 'Jota' demonstrate the required step change from the old world Italian carrozzeria mentality to that of VW's more systematic approach.

The Murcielago assembly process consists of 14 stages, and delivers only 2.7 cars per day, so inadvertantly limiting Murcielago availability, yet ideally the process should be flexible enough to work with seasonal & annual demand fluctuation, as opposed to imposing a client wait time. This may be acceptable for the likes of Morgan Cars given its history and materials, and indeed almost a delight to highly status orientated Chinese clients that delight in the expectation (and associated extended pre-delivery bragging time, but whilst the ideology of under-supplying demand is by its very nature commercially sub-optimisation of capital and resources – the question is just by how much? Firms must always seek to balance the supply-demand flow marginally under par, so that both client expectation is raised yet not at the overt expense of commercial (and thus financing) optimisation.

The following conveys the broad impression:

Starting with the construction of a steel frame with secondary structural and non structural panels as its central body on frame' BIW (body-in-white) solution. This then creates a shell which for build-up purposes appears like a normative monocoque. Similarly the engine, gearbox and trim builds are done on site.

Without a paint-shop that factory built shell is transported 35 kms to Auto Carrozzeria Imperiale to undergo outsourced painting - a typical characteristoc of the old Piedmont and other regional local works network. Esentially a multi-phase surface treatment from initial bare-metal inspection to build-up of undercoat to new surface inspection and rub-down to undercoat rebuild to multi-phase repeat painting which dictates that only one man undertake the task to ensure quality. ( Apparently no 2 sprayers work in the same manner, and so the use of 2 or more painters supposedly results in a less even and lustrous finish). Lastly comes the polish routine, viewed as the 'silver bullet' finale. If understood properly, this process takes a total of 250 hours (31.25 days / 6.25 weeks) per shell. Obviously not are all 'man-hours' given that a portion of that time is for primer & paint curing, but compared to mass-manufacture, commercial auto-body sprayers and even other niche manufacturers, the time required appears extra-ordinary. Of course there is the 'quality' aspect, and the idea that the firm wants to highlight the time taken by the 'craftsman', but the lengthy process may in itself be causing additional inefficiencies as sprayers alter between work on differing shells of differing colours at different paint phase points, so possibly increasing the level of 'switch-over' downtime. (This could be seen in a similar vein to the press factory re-tooling which in the 1950s took a whole day, yet by the 1990s was reduced to 45 minutes thanks to Japanese lean production / sigma six methods). Simply to state that an innately lengthy process can generate additional inefficiencies. The adoption of certain advanced structure parts such as the carbon fibre floor and transmission tunnel on SV of course obviate paint coverage as lessen process time, but the innate process is one that is ripe for re-evaluation – assisted by Gallardo's latter day learning – given the future volume ambitions sought and relative improvement in throughput numbers.

This highly valuable shell (in terms of labour cost and fragility) is then rolled-out of the paint-shop for sub-assembly fitment in what is realistically an exposed condition, to be protected as necessary by work-over covers at each build station. Essentially the car is built in a 'outside-in' manner, instead of the ideal of 'inside-out' which logically layers the process and avoids the constant danger of damaging the exposed painted bodywork. Thus from the beginning this approach theoretically requires proportionately greater use of costly man-power given the need to thenceforth fit the multitude of cabin items (from dashboard to seats to carpets etc) through a small body-contorting aperture even with doors off (typically requiring a smaller framed person, thus female), the insertion of bulky powertrain mass into the rear aperture via a moveable (unstable) hoist/winch, and lastly inside what are termed the 'closures' the fixing of under-bonnet ancillaries, etc etc. Fitment of under-body components such as prop-shafts and front trans-axle is enabled with use of a 90 degree swing frame to roll the body over to provide the under-floor vertically to the fitter. This obviously improved ergonomic access, but the very task of securely fitting the car to the frame in the first place, rolling it over to vertical position, thereby exposing the body to the costly consequences of frame or fitment failure, fitting the components, rolling it back laterally and de-coupling the body is a time consuming process with ultimately inherent risk, no matter how well designed the process itself to mitigate that risk.

One, singular build-action appears to be telling of Lamborghini's quandary between appearing 'crafted' and delivering a repeatable faultless build process.

The fixing of the revered company badge on front closure (front bonnet) appears by typical industry quality standards as somewhat haphazard, open to process failure for even the relative 'craftsman' let alone any stand-in, less skilled substitute. In short, the process consists of the fitter drilling by eye a hole into the badge recess of the painted finished aluminium front cover (on the finished body) so as to provide a location point for the bolt/spur on the reverse of the Lamborghini badge, before gluing and bolting. The badges are locked away given their value, yet potentially the drill action is once again open to process failure if the hole is misaligned or drill-bit slips so scratching the painted recess or surrounding panel, thus incurring damage that would require costly repair/refurbishment, add to build time and possibly clog the through-put system. A better alternative practice would see the hole drilled whilst the cover was in an unprimed, unpainted condition so that the inner ring of the newly exposed raw-metal hole is primed and painted fully. This done using a template to ensure that any fitter - not necessarily the supposed 'craftsman' - could perform the task/ At the very least a template should be used 'as is'.

At the other end of the build process, as part of the quality validation procedure, the cars are taken on a 60 km road-test over local roads given the fact that the factory lacks its own test-track. Things are appreciably different at Ferrari SpA, and a world apart at group stablemate Porsche AG.

[NB investment-auto-motives believes that FIAT-Ferrari executives have intended the 'infiltration' of ex Ferrari management into Lotus to probably deny
VW-Lamborghini possible acquisition of, or alliance with Lotus, and so access to its more comprehensive R&D facilties, including a test-track].

Thus, seemingly today, Lamborghini executives allow a freedom for processes to be done in a lassaiz-faire (some would say “very Italian”) manner, which necessitates a level of fitter knowledge (as we see with the drilled badge point) which supposedly conveys a hand-built, craftsman ethos. This may be the case for some areas, but others as described clearly demonstrate that the crafted ability only derives from making the process harder and concomitantly 'mystifying' it. Ultimately the build method should be a combination of best practice from both mass-manufacture and crafted build to improve risk-avoidance and build-in quality. This mantra would have been a constant call from Audi and VW Group, with undoubtedly fitters begrudging the commoditisation of their stock-in-trade, but Lamborghini management must continue to rationalise the build process both through designed-in assembly ease at the engineering concept development stage and by questioning the factory's legacy methods.

2010 onwards appears to be a period of strategic and operational change at Lamborghini, a time when the core capabilities of the enterprise have to be reconsidered across the board from R&D to final assembly so as to strengthen the company both vertically throughout its in-house value-chain and laterally relative to its functionally relative business partners, such as the initiative in Washington state. All the old methods reviewed and improved so as to maintain philosophical and commercial 'track-pace' with its counterparts in Maranello, Stuttgart, Woking and elsewhere that are simultaneously strengthening their own strategic & operational selves.

This of course includes the brand's expansion plan across the ever growing, BRIC+ countries, part of this the issue over regaining licensing rights of the brand – for vehicle build and merchandising -
in Mexico, sold-off in 1995 to a third party with his own sportscar knowledge network, and probably implicitly agreeing the use of the already in-place production centre – with required upgrades - to assemble Sant'Agata specified cars so as to leverage the lower local cost base and NAFTA regulations for US market access with improved unit margins.

Another important element of the growth path will be the centralised control of used vehicles, given that credible sources estimate that 25% or so of all Ferrari's built to date are sold 'turned-over' annually, so making for a very profitable downstream official-dealer activity.

As Alitalia and Air France planes ready themselves for take-off through European skies after the chaos of the Icelandic volcano, utilising aero-influence – real or indeed otherwise perceived - Lamborghini seeks an increasingly independent and prosperous future. It may not be immediate given economic sluggishness and unspoken VW Group internal friction, but relative to the bigger VW vs FIAT battle, it still has seeming cause to be optimistic.

In time, with ongoing balanced self-determination, the world may be conquered , but as many in Sant'Agata recognise, the raging bull spirit dictates that “there is no place like home”. And as part of that innate culture, that is where the bull will stay, close to its roots. Yet it will also need to evolve and grow on all fronts, incorporating driven emotionality with pragmatic rationality to serve the founder's single-mindedness of purpose.

To regain its successful run over the last decade Lamborghini will need to be cognitively aware yet consciously oblivious to others people's (ie Ferrari's) 'red rag-top' cars who's accomplices and fans repeatedly shrill their horns. The race continues, 2010 and ever onward.


Post Script

[NB*. as a relevant aside, in 2006 investment-auto-motives in its 'Auto-Antenna' report previously called that Ford would be ideally suited to nurture such a cross-industrial and inter-academic R&D base. Given CEO Mulally's previous connections to Boeing, it was suggested that seat engineering be explored to provide single seating system solutions applied to both surface vehicle and air vehicles.

The basic hypothesis (to be remoulded as necessary), was that car and private light aircraft could share a similar structural solutions, whilst private passenger coaches and commercial airliners could share an alternative solution. As 'functionally intermediate', Bus and Train public seating could be simultaneously used as technology demand stimulator – giving additional scale economies -, with possible latter-day refurnishing incorporating any relative higher-cost electronic-systems integration once proven-out in car and plane use – thus viewing a 20 year plus time-horizon to harmonize the eco-tech solutions for private and public transportational seating. It is understood that part of Aston Martin's remit regards the cabin refurbishment of British Airway's fleet includes the far horizon, costly topic of seating.]

Wednesday, 14 April 2010

Macro Level Trends – Input Prices – Auto Players Dropping Hints to no 'a-Vale' while the Price Keeps Rising

The European and US auto-sectors enjoyed the temporary reprieve given by the various national scrappage schemes, but now reality hits and possibly much harder than previously expected. The profitability crunch now heightened by the fact that the mining industry has re-tabled the notion of sector consolidation – long on the cards – to improve its own performance; especially now that China has been identified as a net importer of coal, this demonstrating its economic hunger and continued demand for base commodities.

As expected, the Rio Tinto - BHP Billiton concept of up-stream production integration is obviously growing increasingly real, the companies managing expectations over the last few months, with today, a letter in the FT from the legal and external affairs executive indicatively not only defending the position, but highlighting the fight it is willing to take on to achieve the ambition.

Understandably, the global industrial base is holding its breath given the possible consequential outcome, and so presents its case to relative sector bodies - in the automotive case, the voice of Europe's ACEA now being heard vying against this “duopolistic” intend. However, even it must know that to state that such a move was unexpected would be disingenuous.

The growing gap between iron ore's long-term contract price and its near-term spot price has been growing over the last year, ever since the equities rebound and miner's angst that they had ultimately locked-in their contract prices too early, but had little choice given the fragility of sentiment at the time. The 2009 commodities surge led to a historic watershed in the negotiational stance between iron ore miners and steelmakers when on 30th March the usual benchmark setting, first-round Japanese talks effectively changed the game for all. The previous annually set price agreements (based on average mid-term trend pricing) were abandoned, instead becoming a quarterly event with direct relevance to spot prices.

Having been a victim of the price/inflation turnaround the miners were keen to make-up ground, and it seems to ensure supply for its rapidly re-aligning industrial base Japan was happy to oblige as was a similarly keen China, itself experiencing a lesser re-alignment. That sets a new price of between US$110-120 per tonne for the Q2 2010, hence up 100% over the 2009 contract settlement price. 'Wet finger in the air' predictions from sector analysts indicate that the biggest 3 miners: Rio-Tinto, BHP-Billiton & Vale would enjoy a $5bn boost to bottom-line performance.

In what appears a tactic to essentially get ahead of the future demand curve, attract investment capital and so increase capacity, efficiencies and further improve profits, Rio & BHP are fighting hard to demonstrate the advantages of its proposition. It says Chinese Walls will create split between the combined upstream and still separate downstream components of their operations, so gaining the best of both worlds: creating scale-efficiency at source (primarily W. Australian mines) and encouraging sales and marketing competitiveness at the retail level to its customers.

For the large capacity steelmakers primarily operating in hungry markets, the price increase can be ammortised over the capacity and steel type, with of course probable scale-ordering discounts made quietly available. This silent but expected reality would best serve India's ArcelorMittal; No1 by a tonnage processing factor of x3. And so in effect ArcelorMittal can afford to let Japan's Nippon and China's Boasteel and their 'brethren' set a global price that it very probably won't have to pay. Equally S.Korea's POSCO with similar processing tonnage to the Japanese and a lesser structural cost to endure should theoretically have the ability to swallow the revised prices; indeed this action possibly expected by the relevant national governments as part of their ongoing export drives and cross-sector, cross-economy profitability hopes to maintain economic balance; assisted by the Won's recent international deflation as a consequence of the Renminbi's maintained FX stance.

But it will be the comparatively smaller others like TATA, US Steel, NucorCorp, Severstal, Corus etc with less of a bargaining stance that will be forced to pass-on the 12 month price increase (of $380 to $550 to $725 by Q2 end for high-quality hot-rolled) to try maintain their own margins.

[NB investment-auto-motives expects that the steel-sector's smaller players will in due course need to consolidate further, primarily via allegiances with a few M&As to maintain negotiating strength, whether the Rio-BHP consolidation is enacted or not].

Thus, for the vehicle industry, whilst China and Japan very probably intends to swallow the iron-ore price via absorption at the steel-processing level and as part of operations overhead at the manufacturing level (possibly with relative in-place tax relief), others vehicle producers elsewhere will be forced to pass-on much if not all of the input price hike.

That is bad news for the US, Europe & Russia. In India TATA may have the ability to re-jig its transfer-cost arrangements so as to reduce the on-shock to its burgeoning customer base (especially obviously on Nano). Whilst in Brazil, the local big 4 – VW, GM, FIAT & Ford – will probably be able to gain government assistance in compelling the local supply-chain to partially suppress local consumption pricing – probably adding any lost component 'invisibly' into iron-ore and steel export pricing.

So, at first glance, the big losers appear to be GM, Ford, FIAT-Chrysler, VW, PSA, Renault, BMW , and Daimler. Thus yet again, for the nth time, the western region structural cost bases of these manufacturers will come under pressure, especially so now that the expected volume decline appears now the green consumer incentives have disappeared and governments cannot afford to replay them.

Obviously investors will be keen to see just how prepared these companies are to react to the input price hike, the advantage of scale, platform / systems / parts commonality being key, whilst also recognising the importance of CEO's and CFO's proven performance in previously locking-in long-term contracts with steel-suppliers. In relation to the last issue, any that did will be sure to convey that to the investment community.

The ramifications present the all too familiar juxtaposition of 'winners & losers'. For the near-mid term.

The former camp consisting of VW Group leveraging purchasing scale and commonality, Ford on the same basis and Renault-Nissan absorbing into previously cost-amortised 'old' platforms. Although both BMW & Daimler are a long way from leveraging the production scale increases from next generation small cars, basic business-model economics indicates that they can better absorb the on-cost given their premium position, internal ability to create a pricing elasticity, and the ability to adopt alternative materials (aluminium or composites) where brand/model relative.

[NB the aluminium price slowly falling as large national inventories are being run-down].

In the latter camp, PSA may well have leveraged Varin's steel-supply know-how but it still faces ongoing structural and model portfolio headwinds,, whilst FIAT-Chrysler – even though working rapidly towards - have yet to realise the volume efficiencies Marchionne envisaged, which in itself it is suspected will take longer than envisaged unless Chrysler effectively buys its US market share.
Critically this will be a harsh test for GM-Opel having been assisted through its restructuring, and it will need to re-demonstrate its EU production sites' commercial viability.

Thus, for the European view, the bet is that the relative positions of EU 8 are little changed – the sun will still shine for some, cloud for others. What is of consequence is the level of 'hit' each takes given individually maintained vs individually weakened sales volumes the endemic relative structural costs by unit, platform and marginal productivity site measures, and critically the methods announced by executive teams to combat this newly emerged massive headwind.

Pressure then once again builds, this time though with little apparent reprieve, and so the western industrial base for all steel-linked consumer goods – from cars to fridges - is put under the micro-scope to see if cracks appear, so in turn presenting re-structuring and/or alliance opportunities.

Some will crack....but the best of the crop – strategically attuned & operationally fit – have far from any intention in doing so. As the impinging price war rages at the input level, so no doubt the default position for the wavering mass manufacturers will be to create a price war at the dealer level, so as to try and create a virtuous cycle of spiraling volume and reduced per unit costs. That internally generated sales-focus pressure may be their all too typical undoing.

Yet more rounds of the same to come no doubt, whilst the intelligent producers look to balance-sheet strength and diminished-cost asset acquisitions across both the US & Euro regions. The ramifications of the commodities pricing wave throughout the sector are yet to be seen. A case of 'watch this space' as the automotive intelligensia leverage the resultant circumstances.

Tuesday, 6 April 2010

Macro Level Trends – US Metro Rehabilitation – Navigating Las Vegas through the Economic Desert

Recently reported upbeat US technical data has prompted Presidential Senior Advisor Larry Summers to state that the country approaches “escape velocity” in its bid for attained self-sustaining growth. For millions of citizens that technical data and the overtly positive rhetoric may presently appear as yet another examplar within the realms of that all too familiar quote regards statistics.

Yet, unquestionably the US administration must move beyond its stance on China's foreign reserve surplus in re-balancing global liquidity, and regenerate its economic base, building its way out of Main Street's tough recession. The topic of infrastructure, and its endemic relationship with the prime tenants of ecological responsibility and the individual, of course will play perhaps the primary role in the re-building of the US. But today - unlike J Edgar Hoover's relatively basic 'New Deal' that saw a geographically diverse population 're-centred' for infrastructure building projects from the agricultural dust-bowls of the Mid-West to unprofitable mining towns in Virginia – a new more expansive and forward thinking philosophy is required to regenerate America.

In a bitter twist of fate, one of the most desperate cities that requires the boost of such initiative is Las Vegas itself, once the 'escapist' older satellite town to Boulder City - created to house the construction workers of the New Deal's iconic Hoover Dam.

Given its relative youth and very murky origins, the 20th century story of Las Vegas is a well known addition to the US's history books. However having expanded rapidly over the last 15 years or so, it is the 21st century's near-term that must provide new solutions to meet the challenges that emerged when the economy rapidly contracted; effectively leaving economic devastation as the reality behind the glitzy facade of the city.

Of course recessions are typically a time of new build, the advantages of reduced labour & materials costs leveraged to bolster project costs, business models and of course add to the good of the local economy. Though not quite on the legendary scale of the Hoover Dam, Vegas has been espousing the regenerational agenda of 'City-Center', a reportedly different entertainment venue for regional residents and tourists alike in contrast to the character and remit of its Casino-related surrounds. Instead, it endeavor to bring 'culture' per se to Las Vegas via what is in reality a re-baked version of regurgitated 'Euro-Modernism': as seen before in Miami's 1930s originally 'clean' 'Ocean Drive Deco', this momentarily re-diverted by Lapidus hotels & Lincoln Drive's “Too Much is Never Enough” re-creation in the 1950s (that simply overlayed vibrant tones over simple geometric structures), and perhaps last seen back in the 'Euro' guise of Ford's 1961-69 Lincoln Continental.

Of course for Las Vegas after such pseudo-architectural landmarks like the kitsch original Flamingo and The Sands, the 1960s onwards brought on the idiom of the commercially successful but characterless 'decorated sheds' and 'neon boxes'; perhaps best illustrated by The Mint.

However, whilst an architectural atrocity that added no cultural value to the roadscape The Mint inadvertently assisted in growing the soul of city auto-culture in the guise of the The Mint 400 off-road race between 1968 and 1977– latterly put into legend As the Great American Desert Race - as a counterpoint to the better known and older Baja 1000.

The Mint 400 has been revived and runs annually from its Fremont Street start-point, but critically it nourished the small core of Vegas auto-culture. Today beyond that renowned desert race of Hunter S Thompson lore, it takes the form of NHRA Drag-Racing derived from its illegal start-point of counter-culture youth origins across America but perhaps most emblematic on the old Vegas Strip – very apt – to the running of NASCAR at the Vegas Speedbowl.

The business park grounds surrounding the Speedbowl also happens to be home of the US auto-legend Shelby - which today goes by the holding company name of Carroll Shelby International Inc since 2003, previously in the guise of Shelby American, that name now reborn as the manufacturing subsidiary of CSI (ticker CSBI:OTC for 'over the counter' stock trades).

[NB CSBI is today 06.04.2010 trading at $0.26, a quarter of the value it reached on 25.02.08, demonstrating the decimation to the national and local economy].

For today's media-connected, TV referential popular society that 'CSI' nomenclature has obvious overtones to the TV series CSI: Las Vegas. Whilst that may have been an obvious cognitive tool happily the only connection Shelby has to the judicial system has been the use of the prison system's low cost labour in the formation of 'hand-lay-up' composite body-shell surfaces (hoods, fenders, doors etc) for its niche Cobra and Series One cars.

In the dour economic climate of this Nevada state desert town, this picture of knocked automotive niche manufacturing confidence sits in apparent contrast to the overtly upbeat tones of the local Mayor et al regards the expensive 'City-Centre' initiative – something touted as an economic savior. It's true role as a commercially profitable cultural centre remains to be seen, though as with the case of any newly announced maximum capacity passenger aircraft that proffers space and new experiences like on-board gyms the reality ultimately reverts back to normal business practices and maximum capacity utilisation. This may be ultimately the case with City-Center, where good social intentions that seek to change the character of the city fall to the way-side as the demand-cycle for cheap accommodation picks-up as part of the recessionary-busting effort.

City-Center is perhaps the expected reaction to the recession, an evolution of the 1930s build initiative, this time using largely private funds (even if tussled over) of MGM Mirage and Dubai World. It at least demonstrates the much needed fluid and symbiotic interaction of private capital and an assistive town administration, and highlights an effort to think beyond the (neon) box for the social and commercial good.

And whilst it may be far more typical Vegas style 'Show than Substance' it highlights the need for the city to become self-sustaining in a re-balance of its commercial, productive and wealth creating base. Moreover, just as it became a leading examplar of the credit-bubble, the metropolitan area growing at historic record rates with the explosion of housing construction, so perhaps now the challenge is to re-mould the city as a model of future-thinking.

That means strategically reviewing its geographic and philosophical position, understanding its innate industrial capabilities that lay beyond the gaming tables, show stages, service hospitality to the self-sustaining practical nature of its businesses and inhabitants that once built a city in the desert. That spirit may have heavily depleted as Vegas's character changed with the boom times, but that character needs to be regained.

Look behind the surface and today the outskirts of Vegas into Paradise, Winchester and Enterprise counties are experiencing the same type of retraction as inner-city Detroit experienced over decades as the indigenous car industry slowly shriveled to new global conditions. This of course, it is hoped, is an exaggerationn of the troubles facing Las Vegas, but the wake-up call is clear that alternative growth models beyond City-Centre and ever lasting discounted hotel-room pricing.
.
As part of this exercise the automotive soul of Vegas should be re-examined to see what else can be built to serve a new era, vehicles beyond the generic limousine Lincoln Towncars, stretched Hummers, yellow cabs, Detroit-sourced white rental cars, police black & whites, and periodic appearances of Elvis' pink Cadillac that run up to 'drive-through' churches furnishing marriage services.

2011 sees a new electorial mayor, after 3 terms of Goodman, and s/he should pose that question to the City and get answers that go far further than simply the usual 'taking heads'.

It may be an over-used example that now has become about as kitsch as Vegas itself, but that original winning attitude of Carroll Shelby that originally took the seemingly unconvincing shell of an AC Ace and fitting it with the massive energy of the 427 power-plant, does serve as a lesson for the municipal ambitions of the city. Ambitions that could seek to create a self-sustaining ethos in everything from water-resources to personal mobility. With unemployment running high and the local prison system likely to see influx, the innate costs of the value-chain are probably at an all time (price parity) low.

Perhaps there is no-where better that could merge a can-do attitude with the American fascination for the automobile, recognising than whilst old fashioned mass-manufactured 'Detroit Iron' resides in the heart, the future calls for a vehicle type and manufacturing system that should be radically different, something far more in-tune with the needs of the earth, local-economies and local individuals. Look at the desert racers (and indeed the swamp racers of the Deep South) and it is obvious the ingenuity for auto-re-creation is there; prompted by a 'Strip' ethos that could see lightweight as key for the goal of fuel economy and US energy security.

Buggies parade the desert sands, why not an on-road philosophical equivalents of very different shapes and sizes, If 1960s European sportscars were revered as 'rolling sculpture' why not the case for 'rolling architecture' in Vegas, where the 'neon boxes' are made to move?

Carroll Shelby held an Ace up his sleeve forty years ago that changed the face of US autos. Time now that the Obama & Las Vegas' administrations back Private Equity resources, possible PPI schemes & Main Street America's capabilities, to fabricate an Ace of their own.

Evolutionary development in nature show how desert beetles are able to navigate their way around a parched Nevada landscape; and a similar 'fit for purpose' philosophy should be part of the US Auto sector's localised re-invention where plausible and amenable.

The sooner Las Vegas starts its re-invention, not glamourising its seedy past, yet merging excitement and its new (City-Center) higher ideals in way that creates something truly avante-garde, the better for it and the whole of the US.

Wednesday, 31 March 2010

Macro-Level Trends – Global Liquidity Movement – Looking Beyond the Surface of Ratios & Differentials

After the western stock rally of 2009/10, driven perhaps in large part by more speculative parties, caution has eased amongst the world's biggest funds slowly releasing historic levels of previously frozen liquidity. They seek as best as possible alternative safe haven homes given the paucity of western sovereign debt yields, and indeed the renewed concerns regarding sovereign default.

Perhaps the greatest of these actors are the major institutionals, often state run pensions firms and increasingly Asian, with ever increasing future legacy levels accruing as their national demographics age with increasingly inverted pyramids and ever increasing retirement expectations given the standards of living enjoyed having been through relatively recent industrial revolutions. Caught between future maturation demands and present poor returns across what were good RoI classes, they have started to employ cash by increasing exposure with their historically favourite asset-class - long-term, hard-physical asset-bases, typically 'future-proofed' & 'future-forward' infrastructure.

South Korea's National Pension Service move to purchase 12% of Gatwick Airport in the UK from US PE firm GIP is a good examplar of late.

[NB investment-auto-motives suspects that NPS took on the deal to align its future directly with that of the S. Korean economy. As a leading proponent in the creation of intelligent national infrastructure, emanating from Seoul, and as a designer and manufacturer of supporting electronics, S. Korea may well be hoping to be the world's leading force in delivering high-value intelligent infrastructure solutions as both West and East apply their massive infrastructure stimulus spending. To this end, Gatwick Airport could act as an a showcase for S.Korean systems tech, given that an airport must operate as efficiently as possible both 'air-side' and 'land-side'].

But it is not simply the 'Expectant East', others such as the high profile California's CALPERS scheme have gone as far as confronting Standard & Poors regards the integrity of the 'AAA' classification ratingg given in CDOs and ABSs. Given California's growing burden

So pressure builds the world over to find avenues of opportunities that offer both decent levels of return with the mitigation of risk. That is of course the investor's ideal, something which in today's still tumultuous western markets, is rarely apparent, as the ideal balance of risk-reward offered by healthy economies has been overtaken by general risk-adversity in low yield high-grade bonds, or for some relatively heavy 'risk-on' in junk territory, even if defaults have dropped from 14% to 5%.

Managers of large funds with a remit for a bias to safety will in reality have a broad portfolio of diverse asset classes over global geographies to review and allocate. However, an overtly simplistic yet useful tool is the comparison of Stock Market Ratios across the world, to gain a broad indication of both local economic well-being, the central pillar(s) of wealth generation, and importantly an estimation regards the level of 'investor fill' each market has experienced so indicating its place in the cycle.

Of course, each market has its own unique characteristics and whilst they can be generally grouped depending upon the similar underlying qualities that help drive the economy, the notion that they can be all laid out bare for direct cross-comparison is an anathema, even if the market data simplistically laid out as Average Yield & Average Price/Earnings, seems to beg immediate cross-border, inter-regional and continental comparison.

However, though overtly simplistic, the two data sets do provide a 'snap-shot' – albeit a very averaged out - view of specific national markets : as was illustrated as an influence in the previous post's Sterling Currency overview.

To expand this national & regional specific investment measure, the following highlights individual nation's Yield, P/E and the differential 'spread'. This latter figure, though not officially recognised as constituent part of the basic ratio analysis, can provide a useful indicator since notionally: the smaller the differential between Yield and P/E figures the greater the potential for profit-maximisation – though of course local inflationary factors and local 'currency capture' (in non & limited FX-trade environments) must be taken into consideration.

Thus the following, taken from the FT data pages on 29.03.2010, provides a basic overview :

Country/Region Yield vs p/e Spread

UK 3.0% vs 12.4 9.4

Europe
Austria 2.9% vs 22.6 19.7
Belgium 3.8% vs 17.6 13.8
Bulgaria 5.0% vs 7.9 2.9
(S.)Cyprus 5.0% vs 4.1 (0.9)
Czech Republic 5.8% vs 12.4 6.6
Denmark 1.1 vs 27.1 26.0
Finland 3.4% vs 21.1 17.7
France 3.4% vs 20.4 17.0
Germany 2.7% vs 18.7 16.0
DAX-30 3.1 vs 15.4 12.3
Greece 2.6% vs 12.0 9.4
Hungary 1.7% vs 15.7 14.0
Ireland 1.4% vs 21.4 20.0
Italy 3.1% vs 17.6 14.5
Luxembourg 2.4% vs 19.5 17.1
Malta 4.3% vs 5.0 0.7
Netherlands 3.1% vs 20.0 16.9
AEX 2.9% vs ??? ???
Norway 2.2% vs 17.2 15.0
Poland 2.5% vs 54.4 51.9
Portugal 3.6% vs 14.7 11.1
Romania 1.9% vs 12.6 10.7
Slovenia 1.5% vs 19.3 17.8
Spain 4.6% vs 11.2 6.6
Ibex 35 4.9% vs 10.3 5.4
Sweden 2.8% vs 14.0 11.2
Switzerland 2.6% vs 16.8 14.2

North America
Canada 2.6% vs 21.4 18.8
S&P/TSX 3.0% vs 19.9 16.9
USA 1.8% vs 20.6 18.8
Dow Jones 2.6% vs 16.4 13.8
S&P 500 2.3% vs 17.5 14.2

Central & South America
Argentina 6.2% vs 13.1 6.9
Brazil 3.1% vs 17.1 14.0
Chile 3.7% vs 19.7 16.0
Colombia 3.0% vs 22.6 19.6
Mexico 1.6% vs 17.3 15.7
Peru 3.2% vs 37.2 34.0
Venezuela 17.8% vs 0.4 14.4

Australasia
Australia 3.6% vs 17.3 13.7
Hong Kong 2.7% vs 16.4 13.7
HangSeng 2.9% vs 15.8 12.9
Indonesia 2.0% vs 19.4 17.4
Malaysia 2.6% vs 17.4 14.8
New Zealand 4.9% vs 20.6 15.7
Philippines 2.4% vs 16.3 13.9
Singapore 2.7% vs 18.4 15.7
South Korea 1.3% vs 19.5 18.2
Sri Lanka 2.0% vs 19.9 17.9
Taiwan 2.6% vs 25.1 22.5
Thailand 3.3% vs 13.9 10.6

Japan 1.8% vs 31.4 29.6
Topix 1.7% vs 17.6 15.9
China 2.6% vs 15.6 13.0

India 1.0% vs 20.7 19.7
Pakistan 5.1% vs 10.1 5.0

Africa
Israel 2.7% vs 16.8 14.1
South Africa 2.4% vs 16.7 14.3

Near-East
Russia 1.4% vs 13.3 11.9
Turkey 1.5% vs 12.4 10.9

A very brief overview highlights the best yields originating from: Argentina (6.2%), the Czech Republic (5.8%), Pakistan (5.1%), Bulgaria (5.0%), Cyprus (5.0%), New Zealand (4.9%), Spain's IBEX 35 (4.9%) and startling out in front Venezuela (17.8%). These best performers are largely either surging EM nations or arguably over-leveraged AM nations, the data but a snap-shot in time typically driven by past economic prowess and not discounting against what look to be rockier times ahead.

Venezuela's economy is typical of the region's yesteryear boom & bust cycles. It has been rocketed by the centrally governed industrial strengthening & diversification policy enabled by the petro-dollar income from state controlled oil assets. With the announced re-organisation of the PdVSA, the creation of Fonden – the National Development Fund - stabalisation of the national currency, and typically a 51% maintained stake in any JV enterprises the state is trying to create a self-sustaining economy and simultaneously move the populace inland to equalise resources, maintaining spending programmes under the 'Bolivarian Revolution' umbrella to do so. Thus private investment is riding – often in a PPP guise – the economic wave the government is trying to engender with the beneficiaries seen as heavy-hitter supporters of the Chavez administration. So here, although the data looks fabulous, as ever, the transparency, investment access and political dimensions are quite opaque.

As for other 'best performers'....

Argentina is a typically more stable nation compared to its northern counterpart, but it too seeks to diversify and strengthen away from its agricultural base, and seemingly following Venezuela's lead in oil extraction and export, has muted the fractious possibilities of drilling in the waters of The Malvenas / Falkland Islands – with the obvious irritation to UK international relations. This may be a vote-winning propaganda message at a time when the economy is in danger of slowing due to global contraction, but it does not add confidence for FDI; something Argentina may feel is in natural retrenchment anyway, hence its oil stance.

New Zealand stands in a similar spot given its heavy reliance on exported agricultural goods, but will undoubtedly simply continue to focus on Asian demand of meats etc. The Czech Republic has suffered less than other CEE countries given its proximity and relationship with Germany and the re-cycling of monies earned from outside the region and repatriated with returning EU workers, buoying residential property, retail and other sectors. As with Poland, the German relationship will be key as the Czech Republic maintains its localised role as lower-cost producer for German consumption. Cyprus & Bulgaria look in a weaker position given their respective reliance upon Greece and Turkey, neighbours which although diametrically opposed in terms of economic strength appear to be far more inward looking over the coming years given collapse of W.EU demand and importantly for Greece & Bulgaria the credit markets and its effect on public employment.

Looking at stock market valuations via the price/earnings measure, Poland, Peru, Japan, Denmark & Taiwan hold the greatest valuations at present with 54.4, 37.2, 31.1, 27.1 & 25.1 respectively. By established, conventional standards these are indeed high, when norms run between multiples of 10 – 20 x future earnings. However, as we saw with China's capital markets during their heyday in the run-up to the Olympics (reaching 30+ x), these valuations tend to be the result of non-conventional (by historical standards at least) factor(s). Typically the primary cause is inflation driven increased liquidity, the price spiraling effects of which can be exacerbated from circulation around/within a (near) captive currency market. This seems the case for Poland where returning migrants with wealth along with FDI have created a cross-the-board asset inflation, perhaps most noticeable in equities. Peru's boost from the commodity bull market, though a little dampened is still running with exports to Brazil & China the income of which in Peruvian Nuevo Sol has supercharged domestic capital markets, possibly also as a result of government interaction to buoy Peru's economy and international standing. Japan's high valuation is a result of the individual, corporate and institutional savings glut, essentially re-cycled Yen that provides personal and national feelings of security,
and a weather against externally created future systemic shocks The Denmark case appears similar is as much that the Euro-pegged Krone may have been domestically used to buoy capital markets during a period of immense western market volatility, instead of flowing-outward, so as to help stabilise the strength of the national economy; it's performance also assisted by the 'Flexicurity' labour market policy which enables companies to quickly adapt to changed conditions.

As stated, when seeking profit maximisation possibilities, one looks to the differential (or 'spread') between these two ratios. It is an inverse measure, so that theoretically the closer the figures are indicates a greater yield and lesser stock price/cost.

Here the immediately obvious best performers are (Southern) Cyprus (-0.9) & Malta (0.7). It is apparent that these figures, whilst attractive, relate to very small Southern European Island local economies which tend to a subordinate role in their related larger national economies – ie Greece & Spain – and undoubtedly benefit from protected and positive trade flows as a result of national policy toward agriculture, resource extraction and low-value secondary industries. Thus these star performers cannot be realistically compared to far deeper, broader and importantly transparent capital markets elsewhere, instead typically volatile relative to the level of government interaction and the level of domestic (possibly self-regarding) investor activity. Of the Bulgaria follows with a score of 2.9, it sits as a philosophical 'half-way house' situated between the characters of a small local entity (as described) and an increasingly maturing market structure given its EU membership ambitions. The 'spread' figure thus reflects this typical dynamic of a mechanism that operates in this transient territory, with A & B sections to Official & Unofficial markets, constituent players primarily related to oil/gas, mining, agriculture and machine parts – and thus highly correlated to the swings of W.EU & CEE macro-demand. With a 'spread' of 5.0 comes Pakistan, much like Bulgaria regards its original economic-base activities, but perhaps a further evolved Service sector, with the steadying influence of the US since 2004 (given Pakistan's Non-NATO Ally status) including US FDI and the sizable commercial trade interests with neighbouring India and China. That spread also perhaps indicates a cautious optimism as Pakistan rapidly moves beyond its 2008 economic crisis with the monetary and advisory support of the IMF, the 2010 onward growth rate expected at 4%+. Spain and the Czech Republic appear together at 6.6, yet it is expected that these two nations are travelling in opposing directions of economic fortune. Spain's sovereign indebtedness puts it amongst the harshly acronymed 'PIGS' group, a section that faces harsh, ongoing and possibly long, economic re-structuring which needs to both settle its over-leveraged and still over-valued property base whilst simultaneously creating new industrial/service foundations that must ultimately be globally competitive – this will not be an easy task. As the biggest player Spain has perhaps the hardest task, but positively (along with Portugal) it has the best cultural links to largely buoyant S.America; thus the possibilities of greater melding of cross-Atlantic interests – especially via banking (eg Santander etc) will need to be a major element of its future planning. For the short and medium term however, Spain looks to be effectively shrinking as its property-base valuation all too slowly diminishes so undermining the re-sparking of the economic engine. The Czech Republic, on the same 6.6 'spread' standing however, appears a better proposition given its rapid level of economic maturation and importantly being a beneficiary of Germany's overtly strong economic base; with in certain ways the country almost acting as an implicit economic annex.

To summarise, we can see that often beneath what appear outstanding Yield, P/E and 'Spread' figures many micro and macro factors come into play for the institutional investor. Critically at such still relatively fragile times is the question of market integrity, whether underpinned by true and proper, and critically exercised, regulation. As such doubts are trying to be eased even in the most advanced markets via the likes of the UK's FSA and US's SEC, it puts a greater onus on these typically developing capital markets to do the same, with the ambition to equalise confidence.

Importantly, such shifting times for these (and indeed all) countries and their capital markets, begs the question of national economic policy and the regional and global role that a country can credibly play. Given the ever pressing demand for personal and commercial mobility, still very high on the industrial agenda is the ambition for adoption, creation or re-invention of the local automotive sector, to something beyond the sales, service and repair of imported motor vehicles.

Part of the Czech Republic's success and Spain's downfall has been the differing approaches taken toward their indigenous auto-sectors. Of course given 1980s/90s history of FDI and Japanese & German 'transplants', and re-invention of SEAT cars under VW, Spain enjoyed the earlier economic injection which went on to propel standards of living and so the house-price bubble. From an Automotive standpoint the Czech Republic is simply latterly re-playing that model, but its innate geographic position leaves it in a less precarious position looking forward. The capital market masters of Spain must develop new realms for its auto-sector, perhaps better aligning SEAT with the high profile efforts in Spanish eco-tech so re-creating SEAT as a value-adding R&D hub, not simply the money-absorbing 'runt' of the VW brand stable it has seemingly becomes, even after much effort to re-invent it time and time again.

This is but a simple observational case for what ultimately should be a pertinent point of national economic modelling looking into the future. These ground-works should be being created today.

Ultimately, investors – institutionals especially – will look well past the surface-level data as presented in the FT, WSJ and increasingly elsewhere on the web. Capital Markets' 'Ratios and Differentials' provide an entry point of analysis and evaluation, but ultimately both Western & Eastern pension funds, insurance companies and similar conservatively driven asset-managers need to see national economic structures which make sense relative to national competence set against regional and global B2C and B2B demands. Even as the sociologically good ideology of an increase in public transport services takes grip amongst international politicians and green-activists, the reality is that the perilous state of many (esp Western) national budgets cannot possibly support the dream. So as transport systems become privatised or re-structured under privatisation – which in turn has a knock-on effect to its support-services base as we see with Jarvis plc's demise – so the question of personal and commercial mobility arises once again – a question that requires suitable solutions generated via private capital sources; which are at last being re-built in the West via personal and corporate balance sheets.

Monday, 22 March 2010

PESTEL Trends – Global Finance - The International Currency Debate

Financial debate continues to centre around the macro-economic factors which, by historical standards, are massively shifting the shape of currency markets. These consequences in turn shape investment sentiment; both spend level and timing, in both public and private spheres.

In the West the primary concern relates to sovereign debt levels, its affect on national credit ratings and the knock-on effect into currency valuation, which in turn effects the fiscal and monetary behavior of evermore integrated yet fractured and fractious inter-regional economies. Whilst portions of the storm seem to have passed, the reality means a very different future for government, public and investors alike. The stability seen through much of the latter half of the 20th century which led much of cross-the-board investment practice no longer exists, whilst the vibrancy of the 21st century credit bubble now seems very distant. The level of life-support provided by over-reactive left-of-centre governments has shackled what were once respected nations with onerous debt and policy constraint. The question of moral hazard in the western financial sector still exists this time underpinned by greater practical interventionism to save any 'on the brink' institutions now that depleted coffers negate monetary injections. And having 'saved' the economy – though in reality only having temporarily slowed the re-valuation mechanism – a 'flat-lining' of both consumer demand pull and corporate productive push demonstrates the innate caution that exists and appears not to alter anytime soon.

In the Middle-East the GCC states appear to have withdrawn from their ideas of a regional mono-bloc currency, having been an ideal inched toward during the boom years. The real-estate melt-down having blown confidence in everything but the core energy sector, with available liquidity moved to safe-haven instruments and blue-chip, typically energy-affiliated sectors and corporations. As Abu Dhabi acts as the implicit economic backstop for the region, given that 90% of Saudi Arabia's income is oil derived exporting to the US and Dollar-pegged Asian countries, there now seems little to gain from formally forming its own inter-regional currency group. Though the Dollar may be near an all time low from a global 'basket' perspective, the GCC Dollar-peg is here to stay for the foreseeable future so as to enable fluid trade both westward and eastward, and to provide the confidence to re-buoy GCC efforts to continued diversification the activities of the local economic base in the mid-term.

Asian countries - excluding China & India – have become increasingly strained as higher-margin exports to the West plummeted and the necessary heavier reliance on Chinese demand has meant reduced margins and so had an impact on the level of domestic economy growth. That slowdown has in turn hit local public & private and importantly FDI investment. Even though Asia remains the most prominent growth region both local and foreign liquidity has become more and more cautious and reactionary, hence the 'flight to safety' to US Dollar and Japanese Yen that has been a pronounced event of late, even when their domestic economic indicators are counter-pointed.

But of course the world's eyes are upon China and the US given their respective latter-day roles as economic demand-driver and financial safe-haven. Undoubtedly, it has been this schizophrenic schism which has added much of the market volatility seen over the last year.

US Dollar -
The previous fall from grace with record levels of international devaluation in the modern era appears to have settled. After such heavy-handed quarter-on-quarter actions of QE and a maintained near 0% base rate (set ongoing at 0.25%) the resultant devaluation should have theoretically been positive for export growth. But little evidence really vindicates that hypothesis, with instead the US's relatively high-value export products and services consisting of capital goods, affiliated know-how in 'demand-hold' circumstances as foreign countries slow their own investment programmes. Instead there appears greater use of non-US cross-regional trade, using an emerging bi-lateral trade agreements to effectively swap domestic commodities for foreign (lower-quality) capital goods – and vice versa.

Moreover, that initial competitive gap created from a de-valued $ has been minimised as others - having watched the US$ slide - recognised their own national/regional comparative cost-competitiveness decreasing. And so other countries & economic blocs have expectantly followed suite from Yen to Sterling to Euro, with of course a static Renminbi.

In short, the US Dollar leads the global race to slowly and stably devalue, to once again gain a pre-eminent global trade position whilst also simultaneously effectively forcing necessary cost-restructuring upon its own domestic base. Although a well recognised requirement, it is the speed and the manner in which this has and is being done which, arguably, is becoming more and more detrimental to its international standing.

The recent news that the 2-year US government bond now yields approximately 3.5 basis points more than Berkshire Hathaway's (and a number of other 'blue-chips') similar offerings, demonstrates the caution in money markets over the near-term future of US stability. [NB the rarity of this event is self-pronouncing]. And that is in itself is a concern for the Dollar's international rating and points to the possibility of a 'Dollar-drop' if the previous run of good news stories are overtaken by a run of bad news stories.


Renminbi/Yuan -
The PRC administration is keen to obviously continue its march of economic progress, yet with US$ deflation recognises its own increasingly perilous position as a major exporter to NA given the concomitant FX pressure. Moreover, it has come under political pressure from Washington to appreciate its currency so as to re-balance the overt Eastern bias of global liquidity. Given the apparent precariousness of the US$ this would presumably be done largely via buy-back sales of China's US$ cash & bond reserves, expectantly buying-back these reserves at less than today's record high open market rates, or swapping near-term maturities for less costly long-term debt.

Yet, as the likes of various WSJ columnists and Morgan Stanley's Stephen Roach (MD – Asia) rightly state: in the face of Western economic collapse, it has largely been China's role of global economic engine that has been perhaps the saving grace. With that attitude as the 'set-tone' in Beijing, and its recognition that EU & BRI[C] leaders are keener than ever to court China with the real vacuum of US economic leadership, the PRC is unlikely to take Washington's remarks seriously and will continue to state that the Renminbi correctly valued at present, much of this sentiment actually representing the view that the global market slow-down, by de-facto, equates to a reduced value of the Renminbi/Yuan.

The drop-off of global demand for Chinese consumer orientated goods requires that the PRC undertakes an inward-facing stance to keep national growth at acceptable levels, something it has long recognised and seemingly planned for.

Thus, as reports now indicate, a major element of this re-orientation is a process of commercial and industrial consolidation and self-containment using the technical, operational and strategic lessons learned from domestic JVs to drive improvement in 'proprietary Chinese' R&D, development and manufacturing capabilities.[NB the laxness of R&D law was typically a precursor to this phase]. This period of industrial and financial consolidation will seek to improve overall national competence, both by satisfying domestic commerce and the population. With improved national products, services and brands walking business and the consumer up the quality-expectational curve.

This then raises general quality for the next – higher-tech achieved- export push, when it tries to equal the West's capabilities, especially in eco-tech, at comparatively lower prices with a retained US$-peg.

For the present, given its level of US$ holding, and increased trade relations with Asian neighbours, Middle Eastern oil & gas exporters and S. American materials/commodities exporters, it seems the PRC will give Washington little heed to its FX policy lectures, indeed given the ratcheting down of Japan's industrial cost-base (ie achieved via the Toyota, Sony etc problems) there seems real pressure from its Asian peers to devalue once again as China in turn follows the Japanese lead to maintain the necessary Japanese FDI to assist its own industrial ambitions. .

Thus there may well be a re-ratcheting of the whole ASEAN structural cost-base, which will affect China and India so as to maintain corporate margins, FX differentials and so national growth.


Rupee -
India's currency has been rising year on year, much to do with the drop in the US$, drop in Euro and relationship to Dollar-pegged Asian & Arabic currencies. Adding to that pressure has been a strongly performing national stock market so creating a climate of recycled profits onto investment and in certain sectors – such as IT – a level of slowly spiralling wage-push inflation in the more industrially advanced regions.

This highlights that the economy continues to effectively operate as 2 tier 'open & closed' system. The open element being improved banking & financial de-regulation assisting the efficacy of capital markets, attracting FDI and so feeding investment in industry. But in contrast the closed element protecting – for political reasons – the agricultural sector, food retailing sector and specific labour-intensive areas which historically account for a large percentage of the monetary base. Thus India continues to be locked into a catch-22 situation, the innate sociological and cultural base (of tiered co-dependability) denying the necessary state-created social 'safety-nets' and so prohibiting major structural reform across all sectors.

Thus, India's labour policies are little changed – which largely for political reasons – means that employment takes precedence over economic efficiency (eg ship dismantling sector). Cross-country infrastructure is notably poor which essentially maintains the nation as distinct regional economies, each self-serving.

As a notionally self-sustaining food producer - without the need for basic food imports - and the food-corruption riots of 2007 passed, the rise in external Rupee valuation has been of little consequence to most Indians. whilst the comparatively small band of internationally travelled wealthy & middle-class note their improved FX circumstances. But of course it is the corporate exporters are feeling the FX pinch, exporting companies such as Suzuki-Maruti and materials miner/processor Vendanta seeing income margins shrink, though thankfully counter-acted by the improvement in global small car sales (relative to India's small car export policy) and the stabilisation (and expected upturn) in mining and processing sectors.

As a less export driven nation compared to China, Taiwan, S. Korea its innate FX sensitivity is less, and given that India looks to maintain its growth levels where others have slowed, stalled or stagnated, the BoI may well enjoy the rising strength as it it turn is able to buy greater $, Euro., £ & Yen reserve holdings which in turn give greater political clout amongst the 'G8-G20' nations and enable the continued purchase of western companies to assist its own higher-value industrial capability ambitions.

Thus the Rupee could well be on a sustained path of higher valuation, the present export cost-base disadvantage obviated in time at the unit margin level by greater production process efficiencies throughout the value-chain that come with a mix of domestic conglomerate groups and increasing domestic consumer demand - a mixed marriage of cost optimisation and increased scale.

Euro -
The previous collapse of the US financial and banking sector in 2007/8 - with accordant US$ valuation ramifications- and global demand contraction, meant that the Euro's innately high cost-base (even with CEE off-setting) was always bound to become a problem for the EU's Generals. A problem they would have to face pro-actively or re-actively, either en mass or individually.

Untenably high labour costs and diminishing returns on CEE integration have eroded EU competitiveness in all but the highest value sectors in which its players do maintain global advantage.
But the EU economy is obviously not all 'high-end' value creation and the recent years of credit-enables consumption highlighting for many EU members the growing disparity between import and exports most obvious in Balance of Trade figures. Unsurprisingly the credit-retraction shock hit those economies that had enjoyed large paper-based gains over the previous decade (including the UK) but most prevalently damaging to those nations that had experienced rapid rises in living standards based on a nationally thin asset-bases – typically credit driven property, tourism and public sector employment.

[NB investment-auto-motives believed in 2007 that the EU would be the hardest hit, the Southern region most so, given the extent of fundamental economic 'dis-jointing' that occurred between tangibly real and intangible perceived wealth creation].

The current fall of the Euro – something which ideally could have been centrally manages – has instead been precipitated by the capital markets' exposure of the 'PIGS' economies, and demonstrates the lack of individual governmental oversight to create robust economic structures during the boom years. Thus the expected fracturing has occurred, though in a more pronounced manner than expected given the role of invisible off-balance-sheet instruments sold to the likes of Greece that were designed to flatter the credibility of an economy running on empty.

But this is North-South fracture is positive in as much that it highlights the need for economic re-assessment and reform amongst the PIGS, and by virtue of capital markets' discreditation creates necessary downward pressure on the Euro. This, by welcome consequence, allows the more fiscally responsible and pragmatic core EU members of German and France to gain from the single-currency devaluation in terms of their own RoW exports, and importantly acting as 'proactive guides' allows them to take the reigns of EU industrial reform and consolidation in due course.

The stability of the Euro depends upon the stability – and commercial competences - of its members. So the unhappy Greece episode is a wake-up call to 'the PIGS' to set their house in order to both help themselves and stabilise the bloc en mass. Implicit threats of Euro exclusion by Germany & France are probably being aired to enable greater Berlin & Parisian oversight if a EU 'in-house' assistance package is ultimately necessary for Greece via a psuedo EMF - if the bond markets and IMF ultimately prove unsatisfactory solutions on the bases of interest rate costs and domestic rule strictures.

Markets will want to see such a foundational underpinning before the Euro settles at a new meaningful FX floor rate, and that may take some time given the political complexities involved, which means a continued, though slowed, welcome slide for the Euro that aids international competitiveness and so re-energises the bloc-economy.

Importantly, the continued over-pricing of Southern EU property-base (and probably certain CEE regions) must be a core focus for rationalisation, so as to re-set the PIGS' economic models, its deflation – even with a portion of temporary negative equity - allowing the component parts of the national economies to rationally better weave together.


Sterling –
The Pound's demise has obviously come as a result of general economic malais compounded by the perilous state of public finances, quite possibly the worst in the advanced Triad region. Like the US, the supposed momentum for exports has not yet arrived, instead leaving the guardians of the UK economy facing the challenge of creating a new, largely self-sustaining, nationally broader, economic model.

In the near-medium term Sterling itself looks to continue to suffer from this lack of fundamental national economic strength, and it is imagined that the BoE's Monetary Policy Committee will maintain the Weak-Pound stance given a few of the favourable results now emerging. A highly visible result is the inflow of foreign liquidity into the UK's capital markets, the present yield and price/earnings ratios of (respectively) 3% vs 12.2 demonstrably better, on the surface at least, than many others. The Weak Pound also presents opportunities for a continuation of foreign interests in UK companies, as witnessed with the Kraft-Cadbury acquisition, and noted in the Indian Rupee overview.

Given the new mantra to head toward a more high-tech, high-value national economy, future government interventionism to stop this march of progress by defending under-performing 'old-hat' companies from foreign acquisition appears very unlikely, instead the new blue or red government – or indeed possibly green or rose coloured, with a Liberal mix of yellow in the case of a hung parliament – will be looking to re-invent 'old-hat' sectors as re-attuned and 'born-again' (eg Nissan in Sunderland, Ford in S. Wales and Essex).

As for Sterling itself, that subtle showman Jim Rogers looks to be attempting to chip away at its current credibility with the tongue-in-cheek disingenuous quote that he “won't be touching the Pound in my lifetime!”, but saying he'll be interested when he sees further devaluation with the quip “how “cheap is cheap?...under a dollar?”. Given the present state of the UK and US economies, and the historic valuation gap, that may be too much to ask for given the 30%+ Pound devaluation required, but an ongoing slow degradation looks feasible, until either the Conservatives win office with a momentary blip-up in price, but not until a fundamentally strong fiscal policy, backed by a strong national industrial/commercial plan, is tabled.

To conclude, most economies are having to re-orientate to meet the host of new challenges presented after the global economic storm, but none more so than the Triads who are trying to feel their way through under very testing conditions.

Centre stage is the question of national & regional credibility as a 21st century component part of the global economy, and that innate question besets the innate value of their national/regional currency.

In the meantime, that emerged credibility gap presenting a 2-speed world between slow advanced countries and medium pace EM regions will be the source of commercial arbitrage for corporations operating within these distinct zones via M&A and between these zones via geographic expansion.

This very basic observation should to be heeded by all constituents of the Automotive sector, and its cross-border value-chain, as the question of innate value is set against the contextual background of historically re-shaped currencies.

Monday, 15 March 2010

Company Focus – Halfords Group plc – Animal Spirits for Farming the Recession

Economic downturns whilst broadly damaging, do of course play into the hands of those companies well suited to the more austere climate; especially those that re-orientate themselves to match not only periodic recessions, but the general shift of socio-economic and geo-economic trends to maximise their market appeal.

With an attitude of 'animal spirits for farming the recession', Halfords – the retailer of car parts, car accessories, bicycles, mobility products and now garage network owners - could well be starting their Board meetings with an adapted mantra from Orwell's Animal Farm...“2 wheels good, 4 wheels better!”

Since its formal 1902 origins in Halford Street, Leicester, its ironmonger founder Frederick Rushbrooke soon recognised the innate sales growth potential for products that revolved around personal mobility, serving-up bicycle parts and accessories to the Edwardian working classes.

Within 30 years the company had 200 'Halford Cycle Co.' shops nationwide, and in 1945 utilising depressed asset values, undertook vertical consolidation by acquiring its supplier The Birmingham Bicycle Co. Of course since the introduction of Austin 7 in 1922 motoring had become ever more prevalent amongst the expanding middle class, but in a post WW2 era when (petrol) rationing and coupons were still the order of the day, mass mobility in large part meant the bicycle and motorcycle.

Of course with such an expansive network of branches, the subsequent 1950s/60s re-growth of the British motor industry on the back of increasing national wealth witnessed a concomitant reaction from Halfords, balancing bicycle stock with that of car parts. At a still relatively austere time before cars became the commoditised almost disposable items of today, the personalisation of a car for the long-hold original owner or subsequent 2nd,3rd,4th,5th hand owners, servicing, repair and accessory items became the dominant income stream, with by 1968, 300 stores. Such an expansive retail network of course didn't go unnoticed by outside interests with either (vertically) synergistic operations (ie Smiths Industries) or indirect (lateral) complementary activities (ie Burmah Oil).

Burmah Oil acquired Halfords in 1969 whilst it was riding high on buoyant global oil demand, obviously seeing an opportunity to target regions of the UK sell petrol and parts, assisted by its motor-racing sponsorship in the early 1970s, associated with the likes of James Hunt. At a time when most young men were buying their first car, family men were upgrading their cars and executives were enjoying the then status of the company car, Hunt was the 4-wheeled David Beckham of his day and the created tri-lateral connection of him, Burmah Oil and Halfords made for a potent mix right-up to the 1974 oil crisis and Burmah Oil's over-reach and exposure.

Later owners included the Ward-White group, the Boots Group, CVC Capital Partners private equity who then publicly floated the company in 2004.

Since that time, a deeper strategic outlook has emerged seen with:

1. collaboration with Japan's Autobacs Seven Co
2. broader product outlook has evolved with greater segmentation of its retail-lines,
2a.enhanced with organically introduced or acquired branded identities
(eg Bikehut, Apollo & Ripspeed),
3. introduction of new product & service lines (eg electric wheelchairs & electric bicycles)
4. expansion of seasonal retail lines (eg caravanning and camping)
5. expansion of customer-lifestyle retail lines (eg car & home baby products)
6. 446 store network

Thus since the rational adoption of the edge-of-town superstore format some time ago, the company has been seen to stretch its retail scope and coverage. That was undoubtedly a necessary exercise, especially given the volume throughput levels Halford's could leverage when ordering mass volumes of the low-cost items that were made available from Chinese, Taiwanese and other production sites over the last decade.

The emergence of the CEE as a previously strong, now economically flat but stable, entity was also recognised, as a natural correlate opportunity with Poland and the Czech Republic given the trend of relative population migration between these countries and the UK. As a result Halfords seized the opportunity to open 5 stores in the Czech Republic and 1 in Poland.

This growth model whilst powerful may have been viewed as becoming less potent in the medium term, slowing its contribution to the bottom-line in the years ahead as sales volumes of non-essential consumer goods naturally decrease in recessionary times, both in the UK and in the CEE. And so the board rightly looked elsewhere for supplementary revenue that would have a natural fit to Halford's operational space.

Thus it came as little surprise to investment-auto-motives when it was announced on 18th February that the company had bought Nationwide Autocentres network of 224 outlets for £73.2m (7.2 x FY10 EBITDA) from its cash-pile, relative to a Group Net Debt of 1.1x EBITDA. It views the service and repair industry as worth £9bn annually, 56.8% of which is derived from servicing and MOT test certificate issuance – which obviously has a repair correlate.

The driving trends considered were:

A. recognition that car ownership periods were once again extending
B. thereby aging the UK's privately held 'carparc'
C. the public's dissatisfaction with the less than reputable independent garages
(that make up much of the nation's garage trade)
D the average person's inability to understand and repair their car
and
E. the opportunity to access SME & corporate fleet services demand.

Hence the recognition of the opportunity awaiting Halford's, the ability to sell an additional higher-value services to the current Halford's customer (keeping their car longer, out of warranty and into annual MOTs), and to attract new custom from disgruntled ex-patrons of the private trade.

Moreover, the present low-inflation / high-unemployment environment means that bought-in parts are being held at static cost and the required semi-skilled technician labour can be bought at low rates, the hand-over to Halford's also generating the opportunity to renegotiate new terms with present Nationwide employees. Moreover, the combined procurement volumes of standard car-parts via a central purchasing unit means that scale efficiencies can be utilised in driving down bought in unit costs and critically creditor terms, so in due course assisting cash-flow.

Critically since the new MOT regulations were introduced some years ago over-hauling the inspection system. The additional vehicle assessment hardware was duly acquired by MOT practioners to meet new DVLA standards, and critically interface with a DVLA central database. In short, much of the UK's garage trade has had to conform to the enhanced standards. With such a broad, capital intensive exercise already undertaken and in place for the years to come, it means that Halfords' ongoing acquisition path of the additional 200 garages can be done without the level of major capital expenditure to upgrade new sites typically required. Not quite, but largely limited to new corporate signage and internal/external decoration in accordance to the Halfords design standards.

The corporate ambition is to naturally re-brand the garages as Halfords Autocentres and open a further 200 stores offering “dealership quality at lower prices” - obviously in accord with the mood of the age and satisfying the needs of the old and new B2C customer-base (78%), and the newer B2B base (22%).

Autocentre's productivity levels will undoubtedly be an area that sees initial focus. Management has presented comparitive KPI figures for 2005 vs 2009, which were obviously designed to impress, and whilst that 4 year period saw sales growth, per job income rise, the productivity per technician rose only by 1.4 jobs (ie cars) per week – ie 0.35 of a job (car) improvement per year. This must surely be the next area for betterment, with possibly earlier and later opening hours and improved workflow through the garage, where basic engine bay servicing elements and similar can be done 'off-ramp'.

[NB the use of ramps for all vehicle work appears professional but often leads to temporary workshop slow-down, and part-moved cars to 'movement paralysis'. Moreover many less motivated technicians will use the excuse to slow their own workload, especially if on standard wage/salary, thereby seriously slowing volume job throughput].

Given the slow productivity improvement between 2005-09, consideration of work-flow re-organisation will probably be an initial focus of Halfords Autocentre management, possibly instigating additional hardstanding maintenance zones and possibly the idea of technician's piecemeal pay structure, with safeguards to ensure that technician's work standards are maintained and improved where there is a temptation to put job turnaround speed above job quality.

Furthermore, the auto-servicing arena is not completely foreign to Halfords, and presumably there are senior staff that served during its edge-of-town superstore expansionary period when it previously had an agreement to service and warranty repair Deawoo cars sold via the then new and separate GM-Daewoo network. That also presumably means that the typical 'flexi-warehouse' space of a typical superstore which once housed Daewoo service equipment (ramps, special tools etc) was replaced with normal retail shelving when Daewoo UK 'expired' . With a natural contraction of retail space required as a result of reduced consumer demand means that the space could be recaptured for car-servicing with the instillation of suitable partitioning etc.

Moreover still, many Halfords stores sit in close proximity to used car superstores. The sales of used cars has increased in recent years as new car sales slowed, and those fiscally constrained buyers will be seeking an option to the high costs of dealer servicing or the lost confidence of small garages – hence the very type of affordable maintainance Halfords Autocentres offers.

As for the continued roll-out of conventional Halford stores, it seems the most probable path will be the expansion of Poland given the country's bucking of the EU trend by maintained growth momentum, so one of the few growth stars of the present climate. Poland is also a large recipient of grey-market previously German & Czech registered vehicles. The possible slow/stagnation of Czech business for Halfords means that the assets (shop-fittings & products) of one of its lesser performing Czech stores could be easily transported over the border to set-up a second Polish store.

More investment-auto-motives suspects that just as the company Board has set-up shop in these 2 core CEE countries, so it will latterly expand the new Halfords Autocentre venture into these regions, riding the UK-Czech-Polish consumer cross-pollination and the growing trend that motorists will either choose not to self-service or self-repair their cars as their living standards improve, or that rising emissions regulations and advanced auto-technology will prohibit DIYers.

But for the near and medium term beyond the integration of its new garage network, David Wild and his lieutenants will be focused on maximising the per sq metre income from its stores relative to general and seasonal trends, rationalising the new garage network it has bought to improve operating margins and viewing how the 2 may be merged to create a powerful network of branches that offer practical & pleasure goods with a synergistic maintainance and fitment service.

Wild (CEO), Wilkes (COO) & Wharton (FD) will be hoping that Halfords' promotion efforts via BTCC motorsport sponsorship and TV advertising will underpin the promise of cross-selling in these re-orientated stores – where a customer can walk through the aisles, choose upgrade parts and accessories and have them fitted on-site or indeed during a routine service the client is tempted to view the equivalent of a new car dealer's options and accessories list, and so bump-up Halford's servicing margins...ideally an upgraded media system or perhaps a bike rack and maybe 2 bikes to boot! And beyond the family market is Ripspeed's client base of young men and women with few responsibilities and money to spend on performance and cosmetic kits for overtly pandered hot-hatches. Halfords may not have the kudos of say 'West Coast Custom', but just as Ripspeed brought glamour to its London customers in its hey-day, so Halfords could, if better managed, do the same by exploiting Ripspeed's(original) Mini heritage to the masses who currently drive (2000+ 'New') Mini, older models ripe for aftermarket personalisation.

And lastly, given the network expansion of Halfords' property interests, it will undoubtedly review the potential for operating an additional 'PropCo' operating model, so possibly enabling a new division to be created (if not already) that is able to convert any/specific leasehold properties to freehold and so capture the year on year improved valuation, set within the Group's asset-base.

The commercial property sector is indeed sitting in a trough at present, but unlike typical retail premisis on the high-street, in shopping malls or dedicated edge-of-town sites, it is suspected that much of Autocentres' premises will be based on urban light-brown, semi-industrial plots, with far greater (latter-day) change of use opportunities if/when considering plot sale divestment policy or in-house redevelopment such as corporate-assisted social housing.

George Orwell took the road to Wigan Pier to view the social impact of the depression era, and whilst in a very different world 80 years later, Halfords recognises the commercial opportunity by facing today's headwinds full-on, revisiting its past and expanding its future:

“2 wheels good, 4 wheels better!”...the type of animal spirits much needed today when 'farming' the recession.