The seemingly lengthy summer and autumn sell-off across various cyclical sectors - including autos –
was driven by a perfect storm of macro-level (and for some
micro-level) headwinds.
Yet entering Q4, the fear factors have good reason to subside, providing for improving socio-economic contexts and so investor optimism.
Yet entering Q4, the fear factors have good reason to subside, providing for improving socio-economic contexts and so investor optimism.
Q3 Economic Backdrop -
Initial concerns
regards continued Ukrainian political friction, worries were
escalated by the the further additions of slowed Sino-Euro
productivity reports, and the overcast shadow that was the end of
American QE. Hence the associated outlook of expected global
deflation if the USA could not do the global 'heavy lifting', even
this possibility then undermined by rumours of the Federal Reserve's
'hawkish stance' on rates to discourage internal inflation. This in
turn was compounded by mixed North American consumer data at the
everyday retail level of shopping and utilities, coupled with
somewhat slowed big-ticket item sales (inc private cars) and slowed
home mortgage applications.
So general recognition
that whilst the USA would be able to serve its own economic interests
– seen by the boom of domestically produced pick-ups underpinning
blue-chip and SME investment confidence – much of the remaining
world, would experience little immediate corollary.
With this previous
outlook, though Q2 Coupled Ratios analysis did indeed demonstrate its
rational, highlighting general global autos improvement to date and
capturing those worthy companies will mid and long term appeal, the
fact is that markets became very skittish given the lack of near-term
support for seemingly high p/e valuations versus immediate doubt.
Brutal Q3 Market
Reaction -
The summer-long
sell-off of cyclically orientated companies has been somewhat brutal.
Perhaps expectantly so given general sentiment about the previous
current affairs and associated headiness and (vitally) the lack of a
more subdued American market correction which investment-auto-motives
hoped to have witnessed in late 2013. Without the required 5-8%
correction then, the latter fall-out was all the more harsh, and
importantly all the more widespread, impacting worldwide bourses.
Whilst affecting all
auto-producers, the consequential stock-price drops seen – at one
time-point -9% for BMW to -13% for GM and -24% for FIAT SpA (of old)
– resulted from what at times seemed an overtly irrational
perspective by some investors and specifically the pounce behaviour
of short-termist traders; communities within the latter obviously
intent on heavy 'shorting' of those companies which appeared weak
over the mid-term (as exemplified by the targeting of UK supermarket
Sainsbury's).
However, even under
such pressures other actors within markets showed examples of well
gauged rationality. As was the case with GM, wherein its necessary
absorption of heavy cost charges associated with its broad “ignition
switch” recall was countered by the welcome boost of Siverado sales
with better than average per unit margins.
Return to Rationality -
Importantly, that
somewhat short-termist and heavily distopian reaction has presented a
return to greater investment rationality.
The expectation looking
forward now being that with the end of American QE (though still
seemingly dovish on rates) investors – at least in the US, if not
in Japan or probably Europe - will increasingly return to a now more
necessary, traditional approach: that of company “fundamentals”
amid a calmer macro backdrop.
Whilst it appears that
all but US-centric firms continue to suffer during the pan-global
slow-down, from Q2 onwards and across the summer,
investment-auto-motives equally recognised that those foreign firms
that were directly exposed to North America (ie with local production
or high export volumes) would be well placed to gain likewise.
Especially so if also
supported by homeland fiscal and monetary policies; as has been - and
now is again - the case with “Abenomics”, so intentionally
deflating the Yen to boost Japanese auto-makers' and consumer
electronics' own FX gain at the bottom-line; this seen in the 9% rise
in the share price of Toyota, assisted by its very size of volume
sales exposure to the USA.
So quite obviously such
immediately specific investment opportunities have and do appear to
exist per N.America; to quote of one Detroit sales chief via a
Bloomberg report: “the US economy has steadily improved all year.
Now we are poised for stronger expansion backed by an improved jobs
market, higher consumer confidence and lower fuel prices”.
Such words welcome
after such a summer of investor, or rather trader discontent.
They presage the notion
that whilst obviously US-centric – see Jay Leno's car enthusiast
website for the pro-American SME message - the American domestic
economy will also start to draw-in greater import demand; whether in
“visible” goods such as premium German cars, Japanese capital
goods and eco-engineering and via “invisible” services such as
Asian IT and web consulting.
Previously burgeoning
trends regards increased foreign direct investment (FDI) toward the
Triad regions – especially so USA and pan-Europe - set to continue,
as various EM firms across many industrial sectors seek ever greater
market exposure in previously notionally 'post-industrial' countries;
so replaying the yesteryear moves of the likes of Arcelor Mittal in
steel during the 1990s, or Nissan and Toyota during the 1980s.
Furthermore, whilst the
most recent raft of reports for China still appear glum, the previous
geo-specific distress signals of the broader global economy across
Europe, S.E. Asia and portions of S.America, may be reducing. Whilst
seemingly slow given the need to convince often socio-reactionary
politicians, various economic reforms have been tabled and are
setting-out conditions for improvement. They in turn are transforming
what were previously heavily regulated and so restricted sectors
previously state-owned, much unionised or monopolised sectors,
Greece's television sector just one example.
Europe's virtually
stagnant growth rate and SE Asia's better controlled, slowed growth
means that labour costs remain inflation constrained, so offering
reduced headwinds and so improved conditions for local corporations and
SMEs alike.
Critically, cash rich
EM firms continue to seek out local and foreign Merger and Acquistion
opportunities (as seen with the UK's United Biscuits sold to the
Turkey's Yildiz Holdings) so in a timely manner following the likes
of TATA Motors' previous purchase of Jaguar Land Rover.
And critically, the
macro-economic climate brightens: primarily via the witnessed and
expected effects of major QE programmes (previously in the US,
currently with Japan, and expectantly so for Europe), such
opportunistic conditions now enhanced with the notion of 'affordable
oil'.
Here
investment-auto-motives must be underline the fact that OPEC's
actions to intentionally not constrain supply appears an implicit
recognition by global commercial and political leadership that
'affordable oil' must itself acting as a 'prop' for the global
economy; now that US QE ends, Abenomic 2.0 has limited worldwide
effect and before any desperately needed 'Draghi Put' (beyond
QE-lite) takes effect.
Although America's own
'miracle-growth' oil-shale sector is reportedly unable to compete at
below $76 p/b or so, the drop of worldwide barrel prices to the
present $83 (even if presently over-sold and returning to $88 or so)
not only critically reduces and stabilises industrial input costs -
so supporting manufacturers across Europe, MENA, Brazil and Asia -
but China's recent oil bulk buying bodes well for renewed industrial
activity, even if indicator signs are presently weak. Furthermore
such “oil lows” for both pre-refined “Brent Crude” ('Sour')
and post-refined “West Texas Sweet” will undoubtedly serve as a
critical economic bridge for the UK and N.America between what has
been artificial liquidity pumped growth, and a new nascent era of
authentic investment confidence.
Thus with many share
prices across cyclical sectors - and specifically automotive -
“re-rationalised”, combined with the support of “affordable
oil” and still ostensibly doveish central bank sentiment around the
world, Q4 2014 appears to offer a steadier real-world investment
impetus, economic optimism and investor sentiment..
To gauge which
automotive companies are conservatively best placed from the
'bottom-up' / “fundamentals” perspective, investment-auto-motives
presents 'Coupled Ratios Analysis' of Q3 2014 financial results.
Q3
2014 Positioning -
As
is well recognised, 'Coupled Ratios' was formulated to coalesce the
most popularly deployed investment measures across the four primary
investment considerations; these being:
-
Market Valuation Ratios
-
Profitability Ratios
-
Liquidity Ratios
-
Debt Ratios
The
first consists of P/E (price/earnings) vs P/B (price to book value).
The second of Profit Margin vs RoE (return on equity). The third of
Current Ratio vs Operational Cash-flow Ratio. The fourth of Total
Cash vs Total Debt.
Those
companies which appear most frequently within the optimal 'investment
windows' are deemed as more risk averse and so preferable.
[NB
Those that may appear beyond any single 'investment window' may be
undergoing “turnaround” progress, or conversely (temporarily)
over-valued by the market, experiencing mid-term liquidity problems
or burdened with comparatively heavy debt]
Hence,
whilst “Coupled Ratios” condenses usual 'fundamentals analysis',
it obviously excludes 'top-down' macro influences and the details of
internal, company specific actions or strategic directions.
All
must be considered by the practising investor.
Resultant
Outcomes -
See
attached picture for the requisite 4 distinct graphs. Information
gleaned from Q3 2014 company intelligence as presented, external
information agencies and modelled by investment-auto-motives as
necessary to provide estimates of absent information.
Market
Valuation Ratios:
Herein,
almost in an almost 'ad infinitum' manner, Hyundai and Volkswagen
appear most strongly within the 'investment window'. In addition
Honda retains its place, moved only slightly lower to take-up
Volkswagen's previous coordinate position. FCA gains by moving to
just within the 'window', previously hovering on the cusp, whilst
Renault re-enters after previous absence. Daimler gains slightly to
sit upon the boundary-line, thus gaining further credibility, whilst
PSA is shown as overtly high (effectively unmoved) given the lack of
available data. Seen to leave the investment space are Toyota,
becoming rapidly notionally over-valued, and BMW shifting off the
border as its p/b rises. GM sees little re-positioning beyond the
window, at its relatively high p/e driven by American investor
economic confidence, whilst Ford also beyond experiences a slightly
reduced p/e and positive substantial re-rating of its p/b.
Past
successive 'coupled ratios' analysis witnessed VW drift ever more
upwards as per the general pack relative to improving economic
conditions. However as described in the analysis detail in Q2's
observation, with an older model mix, awaiting new launches in late
2014 and beyond, VW was unable to ride the American vehicle market
upturn through Q3. This, plus the previous 'sell-off' sentiment of
cyclically biased big-caps is seen by VW's p/e and p/b marginally
lower re-rating.
Honda's
relative p/e and p/b stability over Q2 and Q3 appears to demonstrate
its management's dedication to managing investor interest and
expectations relative to its far bigger Japanese peer. With internal
recognition that though smaller in production capacity, its broader
commercial activities (cars + motorcycles + power products), whilst
advantageously partially anti-cyclical, must be strategically managed
to avoid top and bottom line volatility at the consolidated group
level, and so provide the operational levers by which to try and
maintain a steady investment story, within the 'window'.
FIAT's
metamorphosis into FCA (Fiat Chrysler Automobiles NV) and its new
NYSE listing, is timely indeed given its re-positioning into the top
of the investment window. Its reduced p/e gained from slowed trading
volumes versus improved P&L and income statement, thanks
unsurprisingly primarily to USA vehicles sales and relative success
in Asia. As expected, aided by investment bank insights, FCA then has
been moulded and timed to befit stock market conditions.
Renault
re-joins the investment space from what were overtly high p/e
valuations created by early-bird investors awaiting both the
possibility of ECB QE and at worst the group's eventual sales and
revenues upturn. Those high p/e's however dragged down by the recent
brutal sell-off. However, (as with PSA) with input costs better
constrained and revenues improving, risk-averse 'heavyweight'
institutional investors will become increasingly drawn, with most
investor types presuming an uptick in share price as a result of
either stronger than guided results or a necessary advent of full
Euro QE.
Hyundai,
having enjoyed unparalleled advantage versus western VM competitors
shortly after 2008/9 and across latter years, experienced a massive
gain in share price. But the rebound of American and European players
has undermined the S.Korean's competitive advantage in western
markets whilst other target EM markets which likewise enjoyed
Hyundai-Kia's previous lower price-point have obviously experienced
slowing local vehicle markets. Together this combination has heavily
impacted Hyundai's fortunes across Q2 and Q3, its record share price
on the Xetra bourse loosing approximately 30% over recent months as
investors perceive Hyundai's worldwide challenges. Nonetheless it
still sits lower-centre within the 'investment window', a function of
its prevailing conglomerate discount, though awaiting a sales and
revenue rebound.
Profitability
Ratios -
Herein,
it is seen that there has been an improvement over Q2 for most
auto-makers, even though many do not yet qualify within the
'investment window'.
Those
that remained strongly within are Hyundai (though profiting slightly
less than Q2), Toyota (much improved over Q2) and BMW (marginally
under Q2 performance). Arriving from the bottom boundary are Daimler
and a re-entering is Volkswagen.
On
the very cusp is Honda (with static QoQ profitability but slightly
improved RoE). Just beyond is Ford (with likewise static QoQ
profitability but substantially decreased RoE), whilst Renault sees a
profitability jump. Further below the 5% profitability boundary are
GM (effectively static) and a lower placed FIAT (slightly improved).
PSA
remains far below, and though viewed as improving as per its scant
'Back in the Race' results material, is still estimated as yet to
reach break-even.
Liquidity
Ratios -
The
majority of auto-makers experienced a major decline in OCF
(operational cash-flow) over Q3. The only three to escape this trend
were BMW (effectively static QoQ) and Toyota ) moderately reduced)
and Daimler. The three pointed star in fact bucked the trend thanks
to its earlier investment efforts and cost absorption, pro-cyclical
exposure to all 'on-road' vehicle segments, and strong newer model
mix, so gaining substantially in OCF.
Remaining
within the 'investment window' are Daimler, BMW, Toyota and (a much
estimated) PSA.
Whilst
experiencing substantial OCF fall-back, Volkswagen and Honda at least
remained in positive OCF territory. Tumbling into negative OCF were –
in ranked order of loss – Renault, Ford, GM, FCA and Hyundai.
[NB
as is the usual calculation Operational Cashflow is simply deduced
from the calculation of OCF = EBIT – (CapEx + Financial
Investments). However given the lack of transparency offered by some
corporations, the FI portion has been omitted so as to provide
simplistic but comparable calculations].
Debt
Ratio -
Relatively
little change for six of the eleven auto-makers. These being: GM and
FCA, respectively well within and upon the border of the 1:2 segment
(of cash to debt), PSA and Renault respectively well within and upon
the border of the 1:3 segment, and Toyota upon the 1:4 border with
BMW statically positioned outside the 'investment window'.
Negative
changes seen with Honda, previously upon the 1:4 boundary but
slipping in cash and debt terms, with Ford likewise slipping at far
higher levels.
Positive
change for Volkswagen, rising from the 1:4 boundary to 1:3 line, and
for Daimler, its cash generation added to its cash cushion along with
slightly added debt, moving from well outside the 'investment window'
to its outer 1:4 border.
Results
-
As
is the norm, investment-auto-motives illustrates the number of
'investment window' appearances for each company.
Four
Appearances:
None
Three
Appearances:
Volkswagen,
Daimler, Hyundai, Toyota
Two
Appearances:
FCA,
BMW, Renault, PSA, Honda,
One Appearance:
GM,
Ford,
Conclusion
-
The
depicted graphs, representative of matched and merged data sets,
highlights the rational investment attractiveness of each of the
global eleven players utilising Q3 (and as necessary Q2) results with recent stock price and
associated data.
Unlike
the quarters of previous 'recession rebound' years which ostensibly
dissected auto-makers into obvious winners and losers – the likes
of VW and Hyundai vs the likes of Renault or FIAT – more recent
quarters have seen the combined effects of both internal auto-sector
structural change and the boost effects of demonstrated and expected
QE.
So
essentially starting to level-out what was once a very one-sided
playing field, and providing those mainstream manufacturers which
have large American and European market exposure respectively sound and improving revenues impetus.
As
a result, the once polarised investment attractiveness toward star
performers of the previously split pack has diminished, with
numerous investment stories of differing size, stature and time-scales
continuing to appear.
Within
this more complex yet wholly positive backdrop, attuned investors
will be seeking out those specific firms which show greatest
contextual promise. The once lack-lustre
Daimler presently a shining example of organisational metamorphosis,
with combined: the divestment of non-core EADS stake, reduced engineering development and production costs, 'back room' efficiency efforts and critically renewed focus on well targeted products across a
broad vehicle spectrum.
Clearly the Stuttgart firm's recent performance provides contemporary
prominence, but each corporation, within its own context, has its own
obviously very specific investment tale. De-constructing the very
fabric of the micro and macro with insightful aplomb is then vital
for investors.