The long, long awaited
and highly anticipated announcement regards the ECB's purchase of EU
sovereign debt has at last arrived. €1.1tr to be dispensed at the
rate of €60bn each moth from March onward will undoubtedly provide
new under-pinnings of confidence to Europe's fixed-income and
equities markets; even if between now and then we possibly see profit
taking in some companies stocks given their dramatic rises on
the QE rumour, with”buy the rumour, sell the fact” outcomes.
Given its national
memories of the 1920s and the Weimar Republic era which
led to massive money-printing and rabid inflation, Germany
understandably remains very cautious of QE in general, hence its
demands for ensured pan-EU structural reforms, to ensure the monies
eventually take good effect. Given the heavy stagnancy of the
continental economy, though the ECB's president's very position and
name might associatively generate thoughts of this good work being eventually undone by fiscal drag, that appears a very remote possibility.
Instead, the liquidity
will inevitably be directed at capital markets, so as to get the
circulation of the money system repaired to healthier levels, with
very probably a more balanced mix of corporate bond buying vs stocks
than seen previously in the US. This then providing further economic
stability, even if at the cost of slower progress. That progress
however should be seen by way of infrastructure spending where
applicable, more probably toward the invisible sewers, pipelines and other networks of old cities, in contrast to the pre-2008 display of
expansive inter-city programmes.
Given years of
real-price stagnancy after the absorption impact of 1989's
Unification, Germany will, whilst likewise seeking EU growth
inflation likewise wish to ensure 'price containment' so that
the spread and effect of QE monies is not simply inflated-away sooner
than expected.
The pre-WW2
hyper-inflation experience, is today still quietly believed behind
closed doors as created by “the jew banker”, the consequences of
which was the terrible suffering of 'Dem Deutschen Volke', so
creating the path to war. So still today, though a willing EU member
to avoid any future continental conflict, with all too real memories
of bad economic outcomes, a very conservative Germany does not wholly
trust the foundations and methods of modern banking.
Ironically, it is this
distrust which should more positively prompt rigorous supervision of
QE outcomes.
Nonetheless, as with
the US and UK, the European QE programme will eventually buoy the
broad economy and Britain itself will eventually gain through exports
even if later than hoped and to a lesser degree given the FX effects
of a devalued Euro. Conversely, the secured raft of cheaper imports,
(most obviously German, French and Italian vehicles) will be welcomed
by UK consumers (and able to compete against similarly placed 'in
situ' products from S.Korean and Japanese manufacturers).
Here in Britain, the
Chancellor of the Exchequer's 'Autumn Statement' of late 2014
presented the fact that rebalancing the books of the country across
the accounting measures of Debt, Deficit and Structural Deficit would
take nigh-on twice the timespan forecast back in 2010; effectively to
2018 and beyond.
This reality then gives
rise to continued consideration of the economic future, what Britain
may do for itself and what positive impact a resurgent Europe brings.
It is generally
believed that an individual's prosperity the theoretical result of
personal education and efforts combined with potency of the nation's
development capability: an visionary economic agenda supported by
strength of public and private finances. However, prosperity only
arrives when an economy is properly functioning; the 20th
and early 21st centuries replete with instances when it
did not, those instances seemingly more frequent as credit was relied
upon to create B2B and B2C demand instead of the power of truly tangible productivity.
The Tsunami Effect of
2008 -
As seen previously, by 2010 the Chancellor of the Exchequer believed that, with US and UK stock
markets roaring through renewed animal spirits, an economic rebound to reset the negative national structural deficit, would be sooner seen than later.
This was the public face of government, but as many - including investment-auto-motives - believed, any full-scale recovery would be problematic given the previous 'tsunami shock' to the global financial system and the effect upon real world commerce, spending power and consumption.
This was the public face of government, but as many - including investment-auto-motives - believed, any full-scale recovery would be problematic given the previous 'tsunami shock' to the global financial system and the effect upon real world commerce, spending power and consumption.
And that a major disjuncture would appear between the fortunes of the West / Triad nations and those many others emerging as part of the New Economic Order.
Magnified by EM
Strength -
As well recognised by
industry, academics, politicians and the much of the public at large,
the preceding four decades had seen broad swathes of the West
incrementally lose traditional competitive industrial advantage to EM
countries. And perhaps rightly so in Adam Smith's manner , as
economies elsewhere reformed, stabilised and promoted FDI and
internal growth. All that was the “BRIC”, “MINTS” and
“CIVETS” success story, especially seen over the last 20 years
and of special significance to western and Triad originated
multinationals (like GM, VW, FIAT, Ford, Toyota, Honda etc).
During this long period
western capital markets bought into the four prime stories:
1. EM B2B and B2C
growth
2. web connectivity
potential
3. the supposedly “safe
as houses” property boom
4. the expansion of the
people based 'service-culture'*
(*from sub-contracting
of utility meter reading to “bundling” of 'media-solutions' to
waged street hawkers for charities)
Britain's Re-Aligned
'Competencies' -
Unlike Germany, Japan,
South Korea and even the USA, countries which has always recognised
the great importance of physical industry to domestic and export
economies, here in the UK whilst various innovation success stories
have been periodically heralded (eg BAE Systems, Rolls-Royce plc and
Dyson) and luxury goods (eg Dunhill, Burberry etc) grew as worldwide
premium spending increased, the fact is that what was termed the
“post-industrial” era had become all too real. Even if for good
reasons at the time, swathes of industry were subsumed to ever deeper
finance and ever broader low/mid-value service sectors to expand the
wealth base of “UK plc”.
Certain lost “heavy”
industrials” such as coal had been economically and environmentally
displaced by nuclear and gas, whilst much “mid” level engineering
(such as mass auto manufacture) shifted to more competent players and
places, with 'light' industrials easily replicated at lower cost
elsewhere.
Yet the fact is that
whilst certain industrial sectors enabled premium pricing to off-set
the heightened national cost-base (eg Rolls, Bentley, Morgan etc)
they were (and arguably still are) too few and far between.
Without the right
research, products, supporting services and brand identities across a
broad swathe of B2B and B2C activity, the UK had inevitably become an
over-costly place to manufacture what were often mid value goods
without global appeal; hence the value-destruction seen during the
1980s and 1990s, and the sale of then touted “national industry”
to more cost competitive foreign industry.
The Travails of UK
Automotive -
In relation to the
automotive industry terms much of the investment focus during the
1980s and 1990s had switched to the retailing arena of premium and
differentiated foreign vehicles; a far more lucrative commercial
position to that of producing increasingly lacklustre British marques
of the period.
British auto-industry
management during these decades stemmed from the BLMC and
Austin-Rover eras, effectively enjoying the guardianship of its
parent BAe plc. As previously seen with Detroit in the 1970s, very
unfortunately silo-mentalities pervaded at the top, resulting from
lack of in-depth commercial comprehension given its subsidised costs
and losses, and the power-struggle conflicts between Engineering (oft
allied to Production), the newer impetus of Marketing and the very
necessary 'bean counters' of Finance. This continued even well after
the 'Associates' culture had been adopted from its industrial partner
Honda. Thus continually self-serving, Midlands-centric and so
increasingly “out of touch” with the realities of the broader
worldwide automotive market-place; its own worldwide NSCs
([inter]-national sales companies) hamstrung, cost-heavy and poorly
structured.
The 1994 BMW takeover
of Rover Group (directly for rebirth of Mini, rebound of Land Rover
and resuscitation of MG and Rover) was less a clash of Anglo-Germanic
cultures and more a clash of very different mindsets, capabilities
and cash-burn. BMW recognised this ostensibly unalterable situation
and wisely exited; leaving Land Rover conjoined with Jaguar under
Ford's PAG empire (itself ironically run by an ex-BMW German).
Conversely, the ability
to resurrect Mini, Rolls-Royce [By BMW] and Bentley [by Volkswagen]
was different story given their then respective organisational sizes
and massive commercial potential.
The continued demise of
mass-volume “British-owned” auto-manufacturing from the mid 1970s
onward then likewise sent fractures through the domestic supply-chain
and inevitably, as society and families experienced the reality of
“economic re-orientation”, into the quality and numbers of new
entrant graduates and apprentices.
Many of these with
short-termist personal goals viewing their posts as simply a
seemingly “steady job” from which to earn and get quickly onto
the housing ladder. A very different attitude to their peer group in
Germany with greater contributional pride and critically the notion
of far longer, progressive and meaningful career horizon.
[NB Ironically, at the
personal level the British contingent were exactly right to have that
property bias during that time, it would prove more steady than their
supposed career in a flailing British and then unwanted British
firm].
Hence, thereafter, the
seemingly all to inevitable “lift and shift” of tooling and
operational assets, with Rover 75 from Cowley/Longbridge to China*,
and TVR sports-cars from Blackpool to Russia.
[NB* the only feasible
business plan presented to the government of the time, with the
shrunken continuation around MG and discontinuing Rover, was
presented by Alchemy Partners private equity firm; John Moulton
seeking to mimic the brand renaissance story. So demonstrating how
the oft berated world of private equity and its often unkind
reputation for asset stripping, sees long term value, whilst
management itself takes short-term advantage. Today MG languishes,
when it could have become a truly valuable 'national asset'].
The Counter-Play for UK
Automotive -
Today nearing 2015 such
stories of a decade ago are themselves in the long distant past, yet
the effects of this dissemination and fragmentation of such
“systems-rich” mass-manufacture and “creativity-rich” niche
manufacture has had a direct effect upon UK plc's own engineering
capabilities; given that its heartland was shrunk and disseminated
elsewhere.
Of course the counter
argument about the UK's 'post-industrialisation' is that this is in
fact a complete misnomer.
The socio-economic role
of the once wholly British-owned companies taken-over by blue-chip
foreign interests by way of their 'transplant' factories (eg. Nissan
in Sunderland, Toyota in Derbyshire and Honda in Wiltshire). And
moreover, associated instances where foreign players recognise the
innate talent of British engineers such as the later development of
Nissan's own development centre “N-TEC” in Bedfordshire (as
similarly proclaimed by badges on certain Sunderland-made models).
And likewise, the
theoretical loss of Rover Group, and resultant sale of its brands to
Germany (Mini) China (Rover-MG) and America and onto India (Jaguar -
Land Rover) [like Rolls and Bentley] is argued as the rebirth of
these 'uniquely' British marques through the availability of
substantial foreign funding. This is indeed hard to refute, given the
expansion plans previously cited and then delivered at Cowley, (tho'
not so at Longbridge), Solihull, Halewood, Castle Bromwich, and onto
Ryton (itself a 'dead' site since Peugeot exited in the 1990s) aswell
as of course new foreign sites in China and Brazil.
Beyond this, like
N-TEC, is the proven FDI investment into important UK engineering
centres such as Gaydon in Warwickshire and Whitely, Coventry.
Warning Signs Ahead -
None of this can be
refuted, and as seen the impact of such FDI has been more than merely
a lifeline for local economies, together with far grander holding
company plans to grow globally the engineering centres are themselves
presently central hubs to the spokes of worldwide manufacturing.
However, as is
inevitably the case, and as seen by the most progressive volume
manufacturers, those critical development hubs of today will need to
be replicated in major export and so new manufacturing regions, as
part of the implicit/explicit promise made by parent companies
regards the broad inter-national EM development agenda.
This then means that in
10-20 years time, these present jewels in the crown of UK engineering
prowess will have been replicated elsewhere. In turn, re-creating the
kind of intra-company competitiveness seen between Dunton and Cologne
vehicle development centres within the Ford empire during the 1960s.
As with competing plants, this necessary internal competition is
believed to assist overall corporate value creation and so
share-holder value and new share-holder interest, and leaves the
losing development centre to re-engineer itself within the firm as a
re-invented internal cost-centre, or possibly as an externally facing
business unit seeking outside revenue, and at worst divested as an
under-performing asset to another ambitious – presumably cost
capable - firm.
Continued Re-Alignment
-
Technology Strategy
Board
As seen, the British
motor industry had indeed been under-going an immense re-structuring
up to the turn of the new 21st century. Home-grown,
home-owned responsibility for mass manufacture had been both
substituted by, and divested to, better positioned, more globally
competitive foreign firms.
However, for all the
talk and impact of the “service economy”, and central role of
financial services specifically, it was also well recognised that
Britain must re-expand and possibly re-invent its high-value
manufacturing and service activities.
Though unstated, so as
to serve itself in a properly hedged manner; both 'inwardly' on the
domestic front (if EM protectionism came to pass) and internationally
'outward' (continuing the historical convention for global trade).
To this end, by the mid
2000s government, industry and investment communities had recognised
the need to identify, corroborate and establish a High Value
Manufacturing vision / manifesto so as to guide policy formation,
which in turn should support investment rationale.
The Technical Strategy
Board was created to undertake this task, ostensibly from 2007
onwards, with the creation of a technical roadmap.
With £400m in its
central budget, plus external funds, it sought to match technical
disciplines in which the UK has capability to markets (sectorial and
geographic) with high growth potential.
The topics it
recognised as prime routes forward are seen below (with focal
regions):
-
Transport Systems (Milton Keynes)
-
High Value Manufacturing (Strathclyde, Wilton, Rotheram, Ansty,
Coventry, Bristol)
-
Satellite Applications (Harwell)
-
Offshore Renewable Energy (Glasgow)
-
Connected Digital Economy (London)
-
Future Cities (London)
-
Bio-Sciences (London)
With
latter addition of:
-
Advanced Materials (tbc)
Critical amongst these
distinct but inter-connected areas is the need to expand physical
research and development bases across various sectors so as to
establish continual, progressive credibility.
The Automotive sector
obviously has a inter-relationships with broad 'Transport Systems'
given its central standing within debate regards private vs public
modes; with 'Satellite Applications' given its position as promoter
and beneficiary of intelligently co-ordinated mass movement; with
'Connected Digital Economy' given the much increased IT content of
vehicles and of course 'Renewable Energy' given the need to combine
fossil and renewables usage.
However, more obvious
is the UK Automotive sector's position within the broad sphere of
“High Value Manufacturing” and “Advanced Materials”. This
very obviously demonstrated to date by the technological progress
made within of a wide spectrum of high-priced vehicle types designed,
developed and produced in the country. Herein there is a mutually
rewarding relationship between sector incumbents whereby the fruits
of research trickles both downward from blue-chip companies into SMEs
(eg powertrain and electronics) and upward from small enterprises
into blue-chip applications (eg carbon-fibre structures). Equally,
important roles undertaken by respective supply chains, distribution
channels, and after-sales support networks.
With an intention to
create greater dynamism amongst small, medium and large firms, so
ultimately leading to commercially credible HVM technology
applications, the Technical Strategy Board's role was and is to
identify the proponents of plausible technical development work.
It has noted that what
it terms a 'Valley of Death' has historically been the downfall of
new technologies. This effectively the scale-up development phase
which follows the initial phase of concept origination / proof /
small scale manufacture, and large-scale manufacturing maturity
offering cost-reduction and quality consistency, and so
attractiveness to blue-chip regional and global firms.
The TSB's primary aim
then is to support identified technologies through this problematic
second development phase.
Achieved through
allocation of what is ostensibly government funding (from Department
for Transport, Business Innovation and Skills and elsewhere)
funnelled through a (seemingly independent) non-departmental public
body (NDPB).
Progress to date by the
Technical Strategy Board – now renamed InnovateUK (innovateuk.org)
– can be viewed on its website. (TSB/InnovateUK is headquartered in
Swindon, renowned for its railway engineering history).
One such 'B' road
vitally inter-connected to the primary 'A' road topics listed above,
is that of the “Low Carbon Vehicle Innovation Platform”; itself
reportedly consisting of 15 competitions, 190 projects, 500
partnerships and additionally funded by the Office for Low Emission
Vehicles (OLEV).
Another 'B' road is the
2015-20 Ultra Low Emission Vehicle programme (ULEV) which seeks to
provide: £100m for broad research, over £200m for a 'plug-in' car
grant (EV/PHEV), £32m for rapid charging schemes, £35m scheme for
flagship cities, £31m for light commercial vehicles, £30m for
buses, £20m for taxis, £4m for heavy good vehicles fuelled by gas
(CNG/LNG).
Amongst the plethora of
content and publications The 2012-15 “HVM” Strategy presentation.
This states how the TSB has chosen to refine its investment choices
by utilising a criteria of 22 manufacturing competencies as defined
by a preceding study viewing the “Manufacturing Landscape”, these
grouped around “5 Key Themes”, and the use of an “HVM Catapult”
scheme so as to “provide the cutting-edge equipment and skills
needed to commercialise world-class technologies”. And various
'Knowledge Networks' created to enable communication and knowledge
transfer. The deployment of “HVM” stretches from the first stages
of Research and Development, all the way through the Value Chain to
the point of a product's ecologically improved disposal and
recycling.
The 5 Key Themes
include:
1. Aligning
technologies against scarcity of energy and commodities
2. Creation of more
effective and efficient manufacturing systems
3. Innovative products
gained via integration of materials, coatings. Electronics with other
technologies
4. Creation of new,
agile, cost-effective manufacturing processes
5. The above deployed
via new business models.
The Opportunities For
Business include:
A) Resource Efficiency:
- Energy generation,
storage, management and security
- Design and
manufacture for sustainability and thru' life
- Design and
manufacture of lightweight vehicles, structures and devices
- Bio-tech, biological
and synthetic biology processing
B) Manufacturing
Systems:
- Process engineering
capability across food, pharmaceuticals and chemicals
- Design and
manufacture for small scale and miniaturisation
- Systems modelling and
integrated design / simulation
- Automation,
mechanisation and human-machine interface
- “Plug and play”
manufacturing
- Novel mechanical
conversion processes for scale, economy and efficiency
- Understanding,
designing and manufacturing formulated products
C) Materials
Integration:
- Smart, hybrid and
multiple materials
- Intelligent systems
and embedded electronics
- Development and
application of advance coatings
D) Manufacturing
Process:
- Flexible, adaptive
manufacture
- Extrapolation of
'Simultaneous Engineering' methods
- Additive manufacture
(layering surfaces and conjoining)
- Net and near net
shape manufacture (elimination of “finishing” steps)
E) Business Models:
- Managing fragmented
value chains to support 'HVM'
- Building new 'HVM'
orientated business models
- Developing and
retaining skills for 'HVM'
- Managing risk and
resilience to support 'HVM'
As stated, but worth
re-stating, the 'Catapult' monies is to be directed to the phase
between “proof of concept” and “commercial demonstration”.
With half the overall
budget allocated to Catapult, the criteria deployed will undoubtedly
provide advancement impetus to those chosen firms which otherwise
would have remained within the 'Death Valley' development conundrum.
Strategic Deployment of
'High Value' Products, IPR and Identity -
Of course the story of
a previously relatively high (even if now slightly declined) UK
cost-base versus mass manufacturing upon the global stage is well
recognised, from textiles to vehicles and far beyond.
Hence the past few
decades have seen greater attention by the likes of the CBI toward
alternative business models. Those of 'intermediate scale' and 'niche
scale' production of higher value items relative to a specific sector
and its relative regional and global TIV (total industry volume).
This so across the
breadth of industry, from yesteryear crafts such as hand-woven and
authenticated Scottish island “Harris Tweed” to the near clinical
build ethos rarefied vehicles such as those offered by Aston Martin
Lagonda of Warwickshire, McLaren Automotive of Surrey, with the likes
of the inimitable Morgan Motors of Worcestershire, with its renewed
'nouvelle-retro' product strategy / brand philosophy, seeking to
entwine the crafted and the precise.
Furthermore, just as
the UK became ever more reliant on its 'creative industries' - such
as initially music, “above” and “below the line” advertising,
television and cinema production, theatre production, information
technology, worldwideweb development and later cyber-associated
products such as video games and smart-phone 'apps' - so firms in
other sectors holding what they consider proprietry origination
strengths, became ever more entranced with the idea of IPR
(intellectual property rights). This mentality the progressive step
from the century-old Victorian patenting process, and prompted in the
1960s onward by Defence and Pharmaceutical sectors, thereafter
applied by those with the financial means.
Of course today, the
end result is that not only is the 'service-product' itself a
saleable entity at home or abroad, but that very rights to the
replication of such “works” (exacting and familiar) would become
saleable in their own manner. Effectively the intellectualised
extension of yesteryear's replicability via product licensing.
Whilst a norm in the
media-sphere, and a natural expansion of the IT business model (by
the likes of ARM Holdings plc), this then has been explored within UK
manufacturing. And deemed successful when Gordon Murray Design in
Surrey sold the IPR rights of its T-series city-car and the
associated i-stream production process to Yamaha.
[NB The Japanese firm
taking on the moniker 'MOTIV.e' to organically extend its own range
beyond motorcycles and continue its interests in 'Mega-city' directed
personal transportation].
Now looking at identity
extrapolation...
As is well recognised
and re-played, highly regarded brands provide for the possibility of
brand extension into both directly symbiotic activities, as well as
possibly more remote areas, much depending upon brand perception and
persona; what is general named 'brand stretch'.
A prime automotive
example that of Aston Martin, with its involvement and offerings
having recently spanned clothing, specific household artefacts,
artwork etc, to varying degrees of success. Similarly, the concept of
mutually rewarding 'cross-branding' grew in commercial appeal for
some companies through the 1990s and 2000s, as demonstrated by the
special edition Range-Rovers furnished by the traditionalist country
pursuits firm Holland and Holland.
Additionally, Britain
continues to progress the idea of (what investment-auto-motives terms
as) 'Veneer Branding'. The idea being that a business nameplate grows
such a level of goodwill that it can be overlaid as marketing veneer
upon the operations of another service provider or manufacturer; with
ideally no loss of 'brand equity'.
This then very much in
the footsteps of once trail-blazing Virgin Group, having through
Virgin Atlantic revolutionised the customer service standards of the
airline industry, thereafter deploying the brand across other
sectors, from re-enhancing its music retail prominence to broader
holiday provision and onto a wide arena including: financial
services, transport, healthcare, food, drink, media and telecoms; now
reported as over 400 individual business interests worldwide. Virgin
Group effectively a venture capital body which seeks out new business
possibilities and partners.
Others have sought to
mimic this ambitious identity driven commercial stance, with
“no-frills” Easy Group best known in seeking to replicate the
model of replication; from initially a very hands-on operational
approach to latterly distinctly hands-off.
The UK's outwardly
visible 21st Industrial-Services Model essentially:
1. 'High Value'
Products
2. 'High Value'
Associated Services
3. IPR Sale and Lease
4. 'High Value' Brand
Extensions and Tie-Ins
5. 'High value' Brand
Identity 'Veneers'.
[NB with as seen the
Technical Strategy Board seeking to broaden the UK's
industrial-service horizon, with new visions for often publicly
invisible Tier 1 and 2 SME firms].
Renaissance Meets
Revolution -
Previous decades have
witnessed both a renaissance of previously declined great British
marques (most high profile thanks to foreign investment), and
realisation that with a loss of competitive advantage to fellow AM
countries and newer EM nations, an effort to effectively
're-engineer' internal core competencies toward innovative solutions;
both in physical production, service provision (the Motorsport arena
especially productive) and increasing recognition of the role IPR can
play.
Yet whilst the
renaissance of grand motoring marques was effectively an expected
strategic course for strong premium foreign firms - to add corporate
kudos, increase per unit margins, buoy and so overall profit levels
and gain the goodwill of boosted local and national economies - it is
the realm of 'revolution' through innovation that is a far harder
formulae to conjure.
Unlike the somewhat
formulaic rebirth of a grande marque, product and service innovation
innovation steps into partly or wholly new realms of the unknown.
Whereas renaissance is a case of “build it and they will come”,
innovation requires far subtler appreciation of often far broader and
opaque influences, from Mega-trends to in-direct / substitutional
competitor reaction.
Re-invented and / or
wholly new product and service concepts with aligned new business
models are far riskier propositions.
On the product front,
this was the experience of Daimler with its original SmartCar. Whilst
on the service front, Peugeot's recognition is that its 'Mu'
multi-vehicle rental system for city dwellers will take years to
snowball and gain critical mass; yet it is willing to support the
venture, from highly publicised French launch to quiet 'tick-over'
during its corporate restructure.
Historically of course
innovation breakthroughs, adaptations and advancements have been
central to the domestic and export economy of the UK. From Newcomen
and Watt steam engines, to Trevithic's marriage of steam and rail for
railway locomotion, to the myriad of trade and consumer items
displayed at the 1851 Great Exhibition, to Marconi's telegraph, to
Whittle's jet engine, to Crick-Watson-Wilkins' discovery of DNA, and
most recently Berners-Lee with the worldwideweb.
Yet it is stated time
and time again whilst exemplary at invention and innovation Britain
fails to commercialise its breakthroughs, whilst its prolific
American cousin seizes and moulds every opportunity.
There are no doubt
frustrated seniors within technical communities who believe that
maintaining much of the present status quo will forever be the real
agenda inside the seemingly pro-active policy-thinking of UK plc.
Innovators invariably believe that the over-riding mindset of the
British Establishment (ie The City at al) is centrally interested in
the financial gained from trading the global and domestic “macro
tides”, from FX rates to commodities to event-driven reactions etc.
[NB One current
probable example being the play on cheap (fossil derived) oil: with
lowly valued well placed oil majors vs potential for biased or
dedicated refiners vs expanded demand elasticity for large pick-up
trucks in the US vs continued EM demand for low-tech domestic HGVs].
Such arguments by
innovators have always been with us. And if viewed by innovators as a
true barrier to the adoption of innovation. Perhaps then better that
'reality' should be either integrated into their strategic thinking,
so circumnavigated by way of a “better mousetrap” (ie
evolutional). Or direct specific innovation toward target countries
which are themselves in need of specific breakthrough technological
innovation.
[NB Herein a useful
case-study is the pan-African adoption of mobile phones and mobile
payment systems (eg M-Pesa) as part of the required micro-financing
initiative to circulate and create African wealth. Ironically, first
recognition of the need and possibilities for such a system came from
the UK's DFID (Department For International Development), thus
highlighting the proven worth of investigating how technology can
overlay evolving cultural norms; and so the critical need for
understanding as to how innovation should be directed to 'flow'
within a cultural context].
The fact is that the UK
very probably needs greater macro-level “joined-up thinking” of
micro-level firms and projects – via much improved technology and
development planning – not simply in the minds of the well
connected City and Whitehall, but in the minds of innovators
themselves.
Looking Forward -
At the national level,
as per the Renaissance and Revolution story itself, the previous
frustrating hiatus enforced upon MG by its Chinese owners, and its
arguably sub-optimal return in hatchback guise - itself undermining
the domestic brand story, previously played-out with RV8 and MG-F in
previous re-births - is at least in partly off-set by the endeavours
of the likes of Gordon Murray and the very strategically, long-term
attuned desire to have the UK play a role as prime originator future
global personal mobility.
Such new era 21st
century UK business models then bode well, at least from surface
inspection, for a world of opportunity as the power of Advanced
Engineering, High Value Manufacturing and High Value Associative
Services meet the might of new product concepts possibly over-laid by
the umbrella of meaningful brands. So as to meet the challenges of
both the New Economic Order, with ambitious BRICs vs rebound West,
and the human needs, wants and desires therein.
The requirement from
2015 onward is to properly underpin more renaissance stories, and
critically improved visioneering to 'join-up the dots' of global
socio-economic challenges, and to mould and re-mould compelling
business stories for end-users.
Only this will draw
investor interests.
And lastly, all the
while creating a more conducive business atmosphere – within the
ideal of “Moral Capitalism” - by which to advance.
To Follow -
Part 3 of this web-log
seeks to simplistically highlight the key aspects behind such a
'renaissance and revolution' story for UK enterprise.
Spotlighting the
virtues of “Business Nounce” and pragmatic “Can-Do Enthusiasm”
tied together with the UK's apparent competitive advantages across
'Multi-Aspect Advanced Engineering' and the deployment of a creative
juxtaposition whereby 3D Precision meets 'Arts + Crafts'.
