The much improved global TIV seen through-out 2009-10 appears to be somewhat undermined in the short-term by the fiscal contraction moves of China. Whilst long-term optimism is undiminished and large CapEx projects adding to (or indeed re-filling) global capacity continue, a planned slowing of Chinese growth has obvious consequences for not only the domestic demand - which had hitherto off-set the previous Western slowdown – but also commodity exporting EM regions own car-markets given that their economies rely so heavily on Beijing's economic decisions.
As such the growth trends of global TIV will slow and auto-companies must re-play (though to a far lesser degree) the corporate re-alignment exercise. An exercise which must re-balance: production capacity, factory & dealer inventory levels, the client-supply rate and residual pricing. The slackening of demand-pull then has a knock-on effect through the supply chain which must be orchestrated in an orderly manner so as to maintain revenue and earnings traction.
Whereas the Western economic rebound allowed manufacturers to 'ride the wave', boosted by the previoulsy heavy round of cost-cutting, the short-term requires greater 'nuance and fettle' both internally and externally; as opposed to the previous need for swathes of change to ensure previous survival and upturn reaction.
Every BoD well recognises that the enlarged pie of the marketplace will consequentially shrink, thus must either try to maintain market-share or seek bold expansion, and consequentially every BoD and their managers will be re-assessing and re-defining the core of their 'competitive spirit'.
Exactly how that translates is dependent upon the company's own cultural personality, highly influenced by that of its senior individuals. Yet the ever raised stakes of corporate success or failure typically sees a stretching of the moral-code of competitive action, this witnessed especially so in the arena of tactical initiatives intended to undermine a competitor large or small, and argued internally as on the 'supporting-fringe' of the overall corporate strategic ambition.
Hence today, with automakers facing still distressed consumers, a buyer's market in the fleet sector and cautiousness in new-car plans amongst company directors, both volume manufacturers, intermediate manufacturers (such as Jaguar and Aston Martin) and niche producers are having to rely ever more so on marketing and PR to do much of the 'heavy-lifting' required to maintain unit sales.
Marketing and PR are essentially about broadcasting messages, and more often than not a very singular message, to external audiences and various stake-holders. These messages cover a broad span of requirement and intent: from the filing of company activity reports to regulatory bodies or stock exchanges as legal obligation, to the construct of ethereal value-systems that underpin the brand, to the sphere of hard-hitting, contentious issue-based messages that seek to engender an emotional reaction.
Such messages rely upon a mix of pertinence and boldness, but can be separated by their ultimate intent: whether to positively bolster one's own company or to negatively undermine that of the prime competition.
The act of 'antagonism' seems to have been part of the conflict psyche since the dawn of time, part of the pre-human condition which in its more sophisticated form has unfortunately become an unfortunate staple of the modern society and so corporate world. This psychological tool honed by some from the school playground all the way through to the environs of middle-management, in a belief that corporate life reflects war-like conditions. The teachings of Sun-Tzu and other war-craft gurus become the prevailing attitude; dramatising the corporate arena that of a Roman arena.
Hence, the use of contrived antagonism should be considered deeply beforehand, since the underlying implicit messages sent to the competitor is that of creative bankruptcy and self-regarded weakness; let alone the less than virtuous moral and ethical stance.
Of course 'antagonism' per se comes in various forms, all of which sit at varying positions along a broad grey-scale spectrum, from the application of the light-hearted message to that of the dark-hearted.
The following provide four examples where antagonism – at varying points of that grey-scale - has been intentionally deployed to varying degrees of ultimate 'success':
- Audi's confrontational poster campaign versus BMW
- Jaguar's 'hostile-bid' launch of the new XF diesel
- Aston Martin's use of the 'JOTA' moniker
- VW Group's stated desire to acquire FIAT's Alfa Romeo
Audi -
In its least extreme guise antagonism is conveyed as light-hearted banter within peer-company advertising, local advertising standards panels the arbiter of advertising standards rules. A well known American example being the poster/ bill-board-battle between Audi and BMW previously located on Santa Monica Boulevard. Audi used a regular sized bill-board for its then new A4 campaign which posited “Your move BMW”.
Recognising the locational importance of the site, prime for stationary rush hour drivers, BMW 'replied' by temporarily installing a neighbouring bill-board five times the size of Audi's, answering with the strap-line “Checkmate”.
In reaction again, Audi stated “Chess? No thanks, I'd Rather be Driving”. A lacklustre and frankly embarrassing response.
The initial antagonistic strike therefor back-fired heavily.
Jaguar -
Since the provision of corporate life-support from TATA Motors in 2008 (with its £2.3bn acquisition of JLR & £1bn injection) Jaguar Cars has been under mounting pressure to demonstrate its mettle, especially so as the smaller sibling to Land-Rover but with larger potential market-share, and even more since the announcement that an annualised average of £1bn of investment will be ploughed-into JLR over the coming 5 years. JLR is touted to have been TATA's bread-winner in 2010, contributing £1.04bn to its FY2010 results. JLR margins were announced as comparable to that of the German trio – even that of Porsche - but of this, the major contributor was very probably Land Rover given its ASEAN sales success and level of amortised cost. Also, investment-auto-motives suspects that this level of turnaround would have been internally supported to boost JLR's net financial figures as a precursor to the notion of a 2012 IPO, as reported by India's 'Economic Times'.
Beyond Jaguar's restricted 3-car product range, which is far smaller than the segmentally broader & deeper German marques, it also faces the challenge of trying to rebuild its innate 'brand equity' to match its historic 'brand profile'. Jaguar then has no alternative but to be seen to fight hard, by both its paymasters TATA, and for realistic survival in very competitive premium car segments.
As part of this demonstration of worthiness is decided to 'press launch' its new face-lifted '2012' XF in BMW's hometown of Munich – a very considered and intentional display of antagonism. The car was driven wearing its 'camouflage coat' of black-and white, so as not to give-away exacting visual cues, which could, but that camouflage on German soil also conveying its 'war paint'. This idea for Jaguar to assert itself in the German 3's backyard will have been agreed by JLR's TATA supremo Carl-Peter Forster and the company's CEO Ralf Speth. Thus goading their previous employers.
Yet whilst an interesting stunt, generating press-coverage and buoying internal sentiment amongst, it is doubtful that BMW's Reithofer, Daimler's Zetsche or VW-Audi's Winterkorn will be distracted nor quaking at Jaguar's provocation.
However, the innate 'message' was primarily directed not toward the German 3, but toward the investment community and German car buyers. This then will provide 'split-returns'. Whilst the former may recognise the late sector-entry into IL4 cylinder diesel technology as advantageous for Jaguar by opening up an important new sub-segment, the latter will no doubt remain resolutely nationalistic in car-buying habits. This espousing a form of 'Germany unity' vis a vis the EU's Grecian crisis – thus presently seen as innately unpatriotic to buy a foreign brand of vehicle.
The provocative 'Munich Munch' then may provide a useful temporary PR story, but such stances of 'showing one's teeth' must be backed-up by the true ability to compete. And that relies upon a powerful, prurient and very visible translation of that £5bn investment plan.
A recent FT article quoted an Indian consultant as stating that Jaguar's “product range [was] designed by Ford”...”concern now would whether TATA could step up to the mark with the next generation of models”. It should be noted that Jaguar has always maintained an in-house design and development capability, it simply previously used FMC available design-hardware, FMC platforms / components and FMC production facilities to reduce cross the board costs. However, as the consultant rightly points out the onus is now on TATA to provide the technical strategy plan backing.
This investment-auto-motives believes will partly be derived from FIAT-Chrysler given Ratan TATA's close links with FIAT and the 'sporting platform' interplay between Jaguar-Maserati-Alfa Romeo, with Chrysler and a possibly re-emergent Daimler able to derive a 'comfort platform'. (See previous blog-posts conveying this vision in 2008-9). Another Italian-tie being the Jaguar b99 concept produced by Bertone.
The obvious question then is “if Jaguar has such faith in itself then why the constant – and seemingly age old – self-comparison to the Germans?” In nature, a Jaguar sits alone at the top of the predatory hierarchy, it knows its station and has no need to postulate.
Aston Martin Racing -
AMR is the factory racing team and special-edition model developer for Aston Martin; itself formed from AML's desire for race-win kudos and technical-supply capabilities of Prodrive. Since 2005 AMR has participated within the four GT classes (1,2,3,4) running coupe cars and the Le Mans Prototype (LMP1) through a Lola JV in 2009 & 2010. With varying successes AMR has become an increasingly high-profile particpant in European and US motorsport.
In 2010 it created an alliance with JOTA Sport, the race-team arm of the JOTA group of companies, itself only recently created from the race interests of its co-owners, one a well-known businessman with 'fast-track' amateur racing status, the other an AMR factory driver.
However, the JOTA name was not borne from a whim, though no doubt unstated, automotive connoisseurs will now that the name 'Jota' originally applied to a race-edition of Lamborghini's 1960s Muira, then latterly applied to a Diablo in 1995 and more recently in 2008 notionally applied as a moniker for the Murcielago replacement or possibly a Ferrari Enzo type halo-car.
Undoubtedly AML and AMR have been watching the impressive progress made at Lamborghini over the last 10 years, and well know that if the VW-owned Italian firm were to formally return to track racing with a factory-backed team, it would in all probability be called 'JOTA' given the pedigree.
Thus, investment-auto-motives believes that JOTA racing (and possibly the JOTA group of companies) was infact intentionally created as part of a preceding plan so as to take perceptional ownership of the 'JOTA' name (on the race track) and place it squarely into AMR's hands. This then helps to hinder both any plan VW-Lamborghini may have for factory-backed entry into 21st century motorsports, and furthermore hopes to reduce the sales potential of the 2012 'Enzo-type' product produced by the Sant' Agata Bolognese company.
An alternative 'take' on this is that JOTA Sport also seek to actually gain business from VW-Lamborghini, by offering an 'off-the-shelf' racing outfit which could manage its tentative racing affairs, effectively outsourcing the work, and thereby for AMR avoiding the potential of facing a VW-factory created race team, which would possibly piggy-back upon the experience of the Audi LMP team and the Porsche GT teams.
In short, AMR's alliance with JOTA is one of both obvious antagonism but also about 'damage limitation' regards its potential for future motorsports success. For JOTA, there is the possibility of a later-day sell-out to VW-Lamborghini if it can prove its performance as an 'outsourced-outfit'; one that AMR today knows very well.
An interesting case where the antagonism created is done so with the hope of a greater strategic pay-off. How this will be received by the Italians & Germans remains to be seen.
As such, investment-auto-motives believes that AML/AMR should have instead developed its own secondary supportive identity, the pre-planning of such perhaps incorporating another great name of the past from the broad stable of race identities which span man and machine. Just as Audi re-emphasises its Auto Union heritage with the Rosemeyer & Nuvolari names on concept cars, could that race team JV been alternatively creatively developed instead of targeting the jugular of Lamborghini. It may now recognise just how big a threat AML/AMR imagined it to be, and steer a new course head on.
[NB If this scenario plays-out positively - highly debatable – the JOTA outsourcing scenario could feasibly open-up a future strategic alliance between AML and VW-Lamborghini in a post 2016 era, this when the now renewed Ford technical agreement ends. This then adds potential for a 3rd party to join in technical offering to AML alongside Ford and a presently tabled alliance with Daimler. Though it should be noted that VW's interest would very probably only be crystalised as that of an active shareholder - to initially affect competition restrictions versus Porsche, Audi & Lamborghini and be part of an intricate plan of long-term synergies. This scenario still yet long-away].
VW Group -
The foundations of Germany's industrial success has typically been laid by generations of family businesses, few more revered than the Porsche and Piech families. Their members have from birth been moulded to undertake their roles and responsibilities to the company and the country itself.
This necessary attitude – depending upon personality type and standing - can however become overtly brusque, blunt and intentionally antagonistic toward competitors
Volkswagen's Chairman Ferdinand Piech holds high regard, and tends to be pragmatic in outlook and frank when communicating expectations.
So was the case when he claimed that FIAT's ultimate long-term survival and stability lay in liquidating the value of Alfa Romeo, these funds deployed to solidly construct FIAT-Chrysler. It is no secret that Piech has eyed Alfa Romeo for years and the statement was an implicit sell recommendation of Alfa Romeo to VW Group. FIAT's Sergio Marchionne's simple reply was that “it is not for sale” recognising the ploy for what it was, preferring to gain funding from the de-coupling of FIAT's Cars and Industrial divisions and the intended 2012 IPO of Chrysler.
Piech & Marchionne know all to well that the future of FIAT-Chrysler would be boosted enormously if Alfa Romeo could add product quality and corporate operational efficiency to its possession of strong styling and emotive brand – elements that Piech knows VW AG can offer. But Marchionne knows that Alfa is key to supporting the brand ladder, volume pyramid and group technical strategy, the crux of the matter is the need for Alfa to provide both consistent unit margins year-in year-out and stable-growth volume levels.
Piech's antagonistic 'press piece' antagonism was wholly intended to explicitly sway public and investor opinion, deride his competitor when under operating pressure and indeed to keep the notion of an Alfa sale on the theoretical table by always 'planting the seed'. It was a cheap shot but with very broad resonance and possible / eventual implications.
Whether such antics are 'part and parcel' of a successful chairman's method is debatable, but in this instance not unusual given Piech's style and ambition. And it was no doubt the case that the content of his words played well with his executive team, VW Group en mass, the national public pysche and politician's desire to further Germany's industrial reach and economic certainty.
Conclusion:
As seen, intentional antagonism appears in various ways, used for various ends. Its use is believed to be part and parcel of the 'corporate game' and seemingly accords to teachings of Sun-Tzu's 'Art of War' philosophy. It is used in connection with desire for either a specific issue conquest or as part of the long-game in supposedly wearing-away a competitor's resolve.
But unlike armies in the theatre of war, corporations exist in far more complex environments which can in-turn dilute the intended effect, create an unwanted reaction or in this age of corporate responsibility induce negative sentiments from the ever-widening stakeholder community; a community aided by IT and the media-sphere in which the once separate perceptions of investors, consumers and competitors are becoming more aligned and more concentric.
As the West needs to desperately re-build its economic foundations the opportunity for seizing the moment is indeed tempting, but a new era of informal, but well defined 'co-opetition' would be better to assist the prevailing fortunes of most companies, and as a consequence deliver greater stability bolstering corporate valuations, so improving the atmosphere for long-term investor commitment and the stable growth of bond and stock markets.
Now on the verge of a possible global slowdown that could put the West into another reverse gear, the leaders of Western companies should simultaneously try and move the economic gear-lever from 'PARK' to 'DRIVE'. Our mixed-market economies are of course at the behest of capital markets and the volatility still endemic and risk-premium demands means that resurgence will not be automatic. But setting the right ethical business tone will help to ensure it doesn't stall quite as easily as could be the case otherwise. At least in the short-term, such a refreshed positively attuned tactical attitude is one Chairman and CEOs could and should adopt.
Post Script:
In stark contrast to such 'antagonism' comes Ford's decision to retract advertising with the News of the World newspaper given its involvement in numerous phone-hacking cases.
Ford has be seen to have 'done the right thing', though it well recognises that its actions will play-out positively in the eyes of its middle-England customers by 'seizing the moral high-ground'.
Whether a case of good CSR, brand and reputational damage limitation or cynical opportunist PR is open to debate, but it does provide - at least on a surface level – an example of positive corporate leadership, and the very antithesis of being an antagonistic.
Furthermore, it also appears that Rupert Murdoch's closure of the NOTW paper should permit NewsCorp to 're-right' its slipped moral standing, ahead of its UK expansion aims. Aswell of course a re-structure of HR & IT resources within its media, print, web & TV channels.
However, at least the topic of commercial ethics is spotlighted.
Showing posts with label Audi. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Audi. Show all posts
Thursday, 7 July 2011
Friday, 12 February 2010
Company Focus – BMW AG – Running Leaner Than Ideal Requires Ongoing Efficient Corporate Dynamics
BMW Stock Price (Frankfurt @ 12.02.2010, 16.25 GMT)
Preferred – Euro 21.61
Ordinary – Euro 28.85
BMW AG was undoubtedly hit hardest by the de-leveraging of western capital & consumer markets. Having enjoyed what could be viewed as the auto-industry's most impressive historic corporate rise through the 1980s, 1990s and much of the 2000s, the newer BMW management have had to alter its normative 'onward marching' modus operandi. Instead developing a combat campaign aimed at minimising consumer ground-loss and speeding structural reform, with what for BMW has been perhaps its most conservative, inward-facing, mentality in 40 years.
That about-face in management style was perhaps best witnessed in the tumble of BMW stock price during the crisis. The market's fear-factor, as ever, perhaps over-played the CapEx losses, but arguably just as equally valid is the over-play of optimism BMW stock has enjoyed during the 2009 equities rally, the company's Q309 report happy to demonstrate BMW's superior performance compared to 'Prime Auto' and the DAX30. From a 30th June 2009 re-base (of 100), by September end, BMW Common Stock enjoyed 133%, BMW Preferred Stock enjoyed 123% versus the DAX30 's 118% and 'Prime Autos' 104.5%. Thus as BMW management were still in the midst of still fighting to rationalise the corporation as a whole, the markets driven seemingly by over-charged sentiment foresaw a less dismal, indeed possibly far brighter, future for BMW AG.
[NB investment-auto-motives suspects that given Germany's need to lead the EU by example, lessen the national impact and in the run-up to its general election, there could feasibly have been leveraged an overt need to support an industrially optimistic self-fulfilling prophecy by the German institutionals, some of which themselves had been greatly assisted by Berlin's advocacy of targeted capital injections into systemically important players. Hence the possible 'belief-in' and support of German industry was a possible implicit expectation by the government, itself seeking re-election].
Prior to this latter-day period BMW management perhaps belated appreciated to forecast the crisis, but once comprehended endeavored to align operations to the very changed conditions seen over the last two and a half years. It recognised, as is the norm in contractionary times, that new BMW branded product identity had to both acquiesce to the less optimistic, anti-experimental western market mentality, aswell as creating a broader attraction within the more 'consumer-sporadic' EM regions. Thus the previous avante-garde brand aesthetic of 'flame-surface' was naturally superseded by less complex yet still deeply sculpted forms, with critically a far more 'Asiatic' influence upon lamp-cluster styling. Thus the central 3-series and 5-series models were reigned-in to once again become the front-runner, vanguard models in terms of core BMW identity and importantly to try and support profit margins. But under such conditions, gross margin, RoS, Net Margin and of course RoE were always destined to be the victims of circumstance.
As part of the build into a new era the BMW brand, ahead of Mercedes & Audi, has gained populist visibility with its ever-increasing Efficient Dynamics eco-initiative, which appears to on purely ecological basis set its cars considerably ahead of German rivals and nearly on-par with hybrid-powertrain Lexus models, using attuned conventional engineering and specific eco-tech solutions such as regenerative braking.
[NB as time progresses, we shall see theoretically all auto-manufacturers gain greater mpg & CO2 g/km figures. Product de-specification will enable reduced costs and accordant weight reduction. A probably low-fluctuation in oil price will enables greater use of larger and quality-improved lightweight plastics - as seen in the 1980s Citroen BX hood/bonnet. Bluff fronts-ends with wide gaping (airflow resistant) grills will be replaced by smoother-profiled noses and greater application of controlled under-body aero-dynamics improvements will respectfully assist Cd & CdA figures. And beyond other such conventional 'fixes' are specific eco-tech introductions ranging from start-stop to parallel and full hybrid technologies, and possibly the practical ideal of road-wheel or prop-shaft electrical generators, by far supplanting today's regenerative braking mechanisms.
However, in practical applicational terms BMW does indeed appear to be leading this transformational change today, just as Ford was in the early 1980s with Sierra, Taurus etc].
Thus BMW is increasingly well positioned as the present-day eco-premium carmaker, given Volvo & SAAB's periodic absence from what should ideologically be their 'eco-thrones'.
But in the meantime, the western demand for BMW branded products has taken a serious knock-back given that it more than other premium carmakers was able to, to a degree, financially engineer its success during the boom years via a mixture of marginal under-supply to maintain inelastic dealer-led pricing, dealer vehicle buy-backs to control used vehicle stock and residual prices and of course the innate power of BMW Financing. It was a self-perpetuating model which over the last 2 years has been partially fractured, and BMW is keen to rebuild.
Management is obviously keen to once again take control of the 3-way 'Productivity-Inventory-Demand' equation, and doing so will be the foundations to regaining industry-leading RoCE margins. Whether that profitability benchmark for a mass-manufacturer is once again achievable is open to question given the very different position BMW sits today, compared to its origins and growth story over the last 25 years. But investors less availed to the true dynamics of the sector will expect to see a return to the same levels of BMW's investor magic in due course – primarily driven by China volumes, if not directly enabled by the split appropriation of BMW-Brilliance profits.
A new 5-series will launch in 2010 so bolstering sales, and possible capture of E-class customers. However, unlike Daimler and E-class, BMW is having to be more tentative, so it follows largely in the 3-series format of styling conservativism. The off-set to that is 5-series Gran Turismo, but as to whether a 7-series derived, high-riding, hatch-back exec car is attractive to SMEs and private buyers is not yet apparent. The 'mixed-bag' various-cross-over formula in this segment has generated very mixed results ie poor R-class / good CLS / questionable X6. And so highlights the importance of getting the formula right for sales success, and not simply as a paper-based exercise driven by budget-hungry chief engineers keen to stretch platform capacities so as to reduce per unit costs which adds hypothetical weight to their board-room negotiating for corporate resources. Thus the X6 and 5-series GT could be said to be a test of BMW's management acumen as it battles to contain costs yet offer meaningful product.
But BMW's real concern is 1-series outside of its home market. It never became the Golf beater envisaged, especially so latterly, as consumers sought 'defensive' auto-purchases and VW grew the sub-brand equity of 'Golf' and its close-proximity variants. Previous mention that BMW seeks an alliance with another EU player (ie PSA or Daimler) must surely be re-visited as an investor-debate topic, the option being that it may develop a volume small car production business model with China Brilliance or indeed explores a JV with Japanese or Korean player (perhaps in tandem with PSA ie Mitsubishi or other). The problem is of course maintaining BMW product quality & driving dynamics standards – something a JV makes all the harder due to product compromise. Thus inevitably BMW will explore the technical option of inter-breeding 1-series and Mini, especially as VW Audi's A1 enters the fray, though given the very different packaging, engineering hardpoints etc, one or the other of BMW vehicles will demonstrably suffer from the compromise.
7-series has become for many an anathema, especially so in contrast to a very progressive S-class, which still essentially 'owns' China's large chauffeured-market and has made in-roads against 7-series elsewhere. Again, whilst holding its ground BMW must re-orientate the car so as to offer something very different yet credible whilst ideally maintaining RR Ghost and 5-series technical synergies.
In short, the BMW brand portfolio is indeed being renewed and the mix theoretically better, but the launch of 3 & 5-series (plus the X6 and 5GT creations) in the midst of the ongoing global economic drag will inevitably hit sales, and the previously devised project business models & IRRs, hard. The introduction of what should be a successful X1 (drawing from X3 and non-BMW) looks to buoy income, but realistically it will be a hard slog as BMW re-aligns to today's 'new norm' in the Triad.
The Mini division has unsurprisingly come under strain in the Triad region, even with the economic stimulus packages that have boosted the sales of smaller cars. As described in previous posts, Mini as a premium-positioned small car has passed its demand peak, the 2nd generation even though effectively all new Mini did not gain the renewed recognition given its visual proximity to the Mk 1 model, and so relied on new variants (eg Clubman & new Countryman). The fact that BMW had to balance a Mk 2 car in the Triad with an all new Mini entry in Asia always meant a law of diminishing returns in western markets. Reithoffer, Robertson and general management are seemingly pinning great hopes on the Countryman's urban-4x4 appeal to bolster the brand.
Industry observers have questioned the level of overlap between Clubman and Countryman,but investment-auto-motives' closer inspection leads us to believe BMW's strategy regards platform-utility maximisation, respective product positioning and divergent product attributes (ie Clubman's space versus Clubman's style) is valid. What is questionable however is volume expectation from these variants. Though not explicitly made public, investment-auto-motives believes that BMW management expectations may be higher than ultimately achieved.
With the intent of creating a modern classic the Mk2 car was visually little changed from its predecessor. The variant models obviously add alternative styles, but if not already tabled, the core 3 door hatchback must be given a long-life design plan which maintaining basic body shape and proportions, provides more impact regards nose and tail treatments. Likewise, a full exploration of 'Mini' (in the round) is once again due to better appreciate its place and future directional possibilities.
The Rolls-Royce division leads into 2010 with the Ghost model, smaller than Phantom, more sporting to combat Bentley, higher in forecast volume and contributing sizable margins borne from far greater BMW (7-series) systems sharing. As Bentley's Continental Flying Spur range ages, and the front-end look of new Mulsanne splits opinion (even if historically derived), the Baby Rolls looks to be the natural beneficiary, probable latter-day coupe and convertible variants selected in preference to Bentley GT and GTC.
Importantly, Ghost's pre-order book will have theoretically drawn-in valuable liquidity to possibly assist the RR division's ideal of self-financing – something we imagine is an implicit demand of BMW and a target of Tom Purves, RR CEO. [NB. As such, as a last resort for future funding, BMW would have a very attractive divestment opportunity, presumably retaining a large stake-hold].
However, negative RR concerns at present relate to defaulted/returned cars and the actual level of Ghost pre-orders – both issues combined possibly creating a heavy headwind. The possibility of higher than forecast payment defaults on 2008/9 sold Phantoms would have obviously decreased cashflow and increased the pre-owned inventory as cars were reconvened. This then puts pressure on independent RR dealers & BMW Finance to either drop residual values in search of sales, or set against short-term assets on the balance sheet at artificially high marked to market value. For those that also maintain classic Edwardian to 1950s RR stock that have enjoyed appreciating auction rates those used car values can be supported 'en mass' by classic counterparts, but for dealers without such classic stock, the value of recent 2007-9 pre-owned Phantoms cannot be 'assisted' within the general inventory dealer arrangement, thus create greater drag for BMW's RR Motors division on new Phantom pricing. The second concern is Ghost pre-orders. BMW's January YoY figures show a sales increase of 135%, which is we regard somewhat lacklustre given the revenue boost new Ghost was expected to provide, but we suspect Ghost has effectively become a for RR Motors revenue stream largely a Phantom substitute, increased sales balanced against reduced margins, Purves himself battling internally with Munich to maintain original contract-pricing for Ghost sub-structures and systems, whilst Reithoffer argues than RR should pay more to assist the BMW group as a whole. If RR is to remain the golden child, in terms of profit margins and the option to divest, Purves will probably stand his ground; but it is a topic more activist BMW investors should investigate more fully.
Ultimately for the BMW group, improving YoY sales data for January of +16% indicates that - unless a double-dip recession tales hold - the group-wide sales trough of 2008/9 has been passed. Yet given economic fragility in the West, and increasingly concerning in the East - if a China contraction effect takes hold – means that BMW still faces severe challenges.
But for the moment the W.Europe January increase of 1.5% (to 38,495 units), the CEE increase of 19% (to 2,237 units), Russia rising by 20% (1,129 units), N. America of 8.7% (16,608 units of which US accounts 15,410), Central America 10% (to 836 units), S. America 99% (1,057 units). In Asia as a whole sales rose by 74.6%, of which Chinese sales improved by 122% (11,919 units) [possibly due to the 'credit-effect' sales rush as highlighted in the previous Daimler posting].
The Motorcycle Division's unit sales increased by 2.2%, which reflects both the increased general demand for 2 wheeled transport in the Triad region, but negatively also BMW's missed opportunity to capture this surge, given its division's CoG in large tourer, sports-tourer, Enduro & super-sports segments. The largely failed commuter C1 project of the late 1990s saw BMW retrench to its core big-bike position, but it recognised the changing dynamics of global commuting (as did peers like Piaggio, Honda et al) hence its acquisition of Husqvana bikes & quadbikes in 2007. It still has not however, re-written the personal transport commuting rule-book, as undoubtedly intended. The MegaCity solo/duo leaning concept car born from BMW R&D's marriage of car and bike technologies looks more like an attention grabber to keep BMW looking advanced, rather than a pragmatic, revenue earning offering.
The Finance Division has obviously come under pressure in recent years, caught between the periodically shut, and still only partially open window for wholesale corporate funding. As a result BMW Finance was tasked in Q309 with seeking regionally-based 'official banking' and 'extended credit' licenses for Germany, France, Italy, US (banking licenses), and for India (extended credit license).As of yet no update has been given. It was also claimed that extra-ordinary EU funding would accessed once amenable, but recent sovereign credit concerns over Greece, Portugal, Spain etc indicates that liquidity will be directed at sustaining national balance sheets, so largely unavailable for wholesale, corporate & consumer access.
To conclude, BMW Group's prime aim has been to re-structure to the new norm. yet maintaining room for future re-growth, this achieved by the “balancing of retail vs residual vs volume”, generic levers for most car companies but historically far more sensitive for BMW. Critically BMW is having to manage its dealerbase, recognising that to hard a squeeze will pressurise their own working capital availability and so long-term survival prospects. BMW undoubtedly wants to see its dealerbase remain as is,string and healthy to help improve future sales volumes so as to break-even the capacity cost and move healthily into the black once more with buoyed FCF.
BMW missed its Q309 results expectations, and whilst better news arrives from across the globe in terms of sales, the battle to recovery is still harsh. FY09 results will be telling as to how well Reithoffer et al in Munich are controlling the situation....but for the moment it is still a case of rational investors holding their breath regards the corporate fundamentals...BMW is still in the fog, and little sign of either a powerfully combined product portfolio or financing flexibility provides a convincing case for immediate progress.
As such the juggling of balls between the Financial Services division and the Autos division looks set to continue, and whilst Q4's optimistic general economic outlook may well have translated into greater numbers of sold cars at the time, once again economic fundamentals and capital markets sentiment has soured somewhat whilst the Q4 purchasing trend by global SMEs that affects the premium-car sector may have been but momentary wind to BMW's sails.
By January end 2010 the outlook (as we predicted) is set to be tougher and BMW will need to - like Daimler - demonstrate its tactical and strategic planning...but unlike Daimler & VW its cash-cushion is far smaller, so far more dependent upon the criticality of recycled, squeezed and retained working capital management far more. That will frazzle supplier and dealer-network relationships, and will test the oft heard mention of the BMW family culture.
Preferred – Euro 21.61
Ordinary – Euro 28.85
BMW AG was undoubtedly hit hardest by the de-leveraging of western capital & consumer markets. Having enjoyed what could be viewed as the auto-industry's most impressive historic corporate rise through the 1980s, 1990s and much of the 2000s, the newer BMW management have had to alter its normative 'onward marching' modus operandi. Instead developing a combat campaign aimed at minimising consumer ground-loss and speeding structural reform, with what for BMW has been perhaps its most conservative, inward-facing, mentality in 40 years.
That about-face in management style was perhaps best witnessed in the tumble of BMW stock price during the crisis. The market's fear-factor, as ever, perhaps over-played the CapEx losses, but arguably just as equally valid is the over-play of optimism BMW stock has enjoyed during the 2009 equities rally, the company's Q309 report happy to demonstrate BMW's superior performance compared to 'Prime Auto' and the DAX30. From a 30th June 2009 re-base (of 100), by September end, BMW Common Stock enjoyed 133%, BMW Preferred Stock enjoyed 123% versus the DAX30 's 118% and 'Prime Autos' 104.5%. Thus as BMW management were still in the midst of still fighting to rationalise the corporation as a whole, the markets driven seemingly by over-charged sentiment foresaw a less dismal, indeed possibly far brighter, future for BMW AG.
[NB investment-auto-motives suspects that given Germany's need to lead the EU by example, lessen the national impact and in the run-up to its general election, there could feasibly have been leveraged an overt need to support an industrially optimistic self-fulfilling prophecy by the German institutionals, some of which themselves had been greatly assisted by Berlin's advocacy of targeted capital injections into systemically important players. Hence the possible 'belief-in' and support of German industry was a possible implicit expectation by the government, itself seeking re-election].
Prior to this latter-day period BMW management perhaps belated appreciated to forecast the crisis, but once comprehended endeavored to align operations to the very changed conditions seen over the last two and a half years. It recognised, as is the norm in contractionary times, that new BMW branded product identity had to both acquiesce to the less optimistic, anti-experimental western market mentality, aswell as creating a broader attraction within the more 'consumer-sporadic' EM regions. Thus the previous avante-garde brand aesthetic of 'flame-surface' was naturally superseded by less complex yet still deeply sculpted forms, with critically a far more 'Asiatic' influence upon lamp-cluster styling. Thus the central 3-series and 5-series models were reigned-in to once again become the front-runner, vanguard models in terms of core BMW identity and importantly to try and support profit margins. But under such conditions, gross margin, RoS, Net Margin and of course RoE were always destined to be the victims of circumstance.
As part of the build into a new era the BMW brand, ahead of Mercedes & Audi, has gained populist visibility with its ever-increasing Efficient Dynamics eco-initiative, which appears to on purely ecological basis set its cars considerably ahead of German rivals and nearly on-par with hybrid-powertrain Lexus models, using attuned conventional engineering and specific eco-tech solutions such as regenerative braking.
[NB as time progresses, we shall see theoretically all auto-manufacturers gain greater mpg & CO2 g/km figures. Product de-specification will enable reduced costs and accordant weight reduction. A probably low-fluctuation in oil price will enables greater use of larger and quality-improved lightweight plastics - as seen in the 1980s Citroen BX hood/bonnet. Bluff fronts-ends with wide gaping (airflow resistant) grills will be replaced by smoother-profiled noses and greater application of controlled under-body aero-dynamics improvements will respectfully assist Cd & CdA figures. And beyond other such conventional 'fixes' are specific eco-tech introductions ranging from start-stop to parallel and full hybrid technologies, and possibly the practical ideal of road-wheel or prop-shaft electrical generators, by far supplanting today's regenerative braking mechanisms.
However, in practical applicational terms BMW does indeed appear to be leading this transformational change today, just as Ford was in the early 1980s with Sierra, Taurus etc].
Thus BMW is increasingly well positioned as the present-day eco-premium carmaker, given Volvo & SAAB's periodic absence from what should ideologically be their 'eco-thrones'.
But in the meantime, the western demand for BMW branded products has taken a serious knock-back given that it more than other premium carmakers was able to, to a degree, financially engineer its success during the boom years via a mixture of marginal under-supply to maintain inelastic dealer-led pricing, dealer vehicle buy-backs to control used vehicle stock and residual prices and of course the innate power of BMW Financing. It was a self-perpetuating model which over the last 2 years has been partially fractured, and BMW is keen to rebuild.
Management is obviously keen to once again take control of the 3-way 'Productivity-Inventory-Demand' equation, and doing so will be the foundations to regaining industry-leading RoCE margins. Whether that profitability benchmark for a mass-manufacturer is once again achievable is open to question given the very different position BMW sits today, compared to its origins and growth story over the last 25 years. But investors less availed to the true dynamics of the sector will expect to see a return to the same levels of BMW's investor magic in due course – primarily driven by China volumes, if not directly enabled by the split appropriation of BMW-Brilliance profits.
A new 5-series will launch in 2010 so bolstering sales, and possible capture of E-class customers. However, unlike Daimler and E-class, BMW is having to be more tentative, so it follows largely in the 3-series format of styling conservativism. The off-set to that is 5-series Gran Turismo, but as to whether a 7-series derived, high-riding, hatch-back exec car is attractive to SMEs and private buyers is not yet apparent. The 'mixed-bag' various-cross-over formula in this segment has generated very mixed results ie poor R-class / good CLS / questionable X6. And so highlights the importance of getting the formula right for sales success, and not simply as a paper-based exercise driven by budget-hungry chief engineers keen to stretch platform capacities so as to reduce per unit costs which adds hypothetical weight to their board-room negotiating for corporate resources. Thus the X6 and 5-series GT could be said to be a test of BMW's management acumen as it battles to contain costs yet offer meaningful product.
But BMW's real concern is 1-series outside of its home market. It never became the Golf beater envisaged, especially so latterly, as consumers sought 'defensive' auto-purchases and VW grew the sub-brand equity of 'Golf' and its close-proximity variants. Previous mention that BMW seeks an alliance with another EU player (ie PSA or Daimler) must surely be re-visited as an investor-debate topic, the option being that it may develop a volume small car production business model with China Brilliance or indeed explores a JV with Japanese or Korean player (perhaps in tandem with PSA ie Mitsubishi or other). The problem is of course maintaining BMW product quality & driving dynamics standards – something a JV makes all the harder due to product compromise. Thus inevitably BMW will explore the technical option of inter-breeding 1-series and Mini, especially as VW Audi's A1 enters the fray, though given the very different packaging, engineering hardpoints etc, one or the other of BMW vehicles will demonstrably suffer from the compromise.
7-series has become for many an anathema, especially so in contrast to a very progressive S-class, which still essentially 'owns' China's large chauffeured-market and has made in-roads against 7-series elsewhere. Again, whilst holding its ground BMW must re-orientate the car so as to offer something very different yet credible whilst ideally maintaining RR Ghost and 5-series technical synergies.
In short, the BMW brand portfolio is indeed being renewed and the mix theoretically better, but the launch of 3 & 5-series (plus the X6 and 5GT creations) in the midst of the ongoing global economic drag will inevitably hit sales, and the previously devised project business models & IRRs, hard. The introduction of what should be a successful X1 (drawing from X3 and non-BMW) looks to buoy income, but realistically it will be a hard slog as BMW re-aligns to today's 'new norm' in the Triad.
The Mini division has unsurprisingly come under strain in the Triad region, even with the economic stimulus packages that have boosted the sales of smaller cars. As described in previous posts, Mini as a premium-positioned small car has passed its demand peak, the 2nd generation even though effectively all new Mini did not gain the renewed recognition given its visual proximity to the Mk 1 model, and so relied on new variants (eg Clubman & new Countryman). The fact that BMW had to balance a Mk 2 car in the Triad with an all new Mini entry in Asia always meant a law of diminishing returns in western markets. Reithoffer, Robertson and general management are seemingly pinning great hopes on the Countryman's urban-4x4 appeal to bolster the brand.
Industry observers have questioned the level of overlap between Clubman and Countryman,but investment-auto-motives' closer inspection leads us to believe BMW's strategy regards platform-utility maximisation, respective product positioning and divergent product attributes (ie Clubman's space versus Clubman's style) is valid. What is questionable however is volume expectation from these variants. Though not explicitly made public, investment-auto-motives believes that BMW management expectations may be higher than ultimately achieved.
With the intent of creating a modern classic the Mk2 car was visually little changed from its predecessor. The variant models obviously add alternative styles, but if not already tabled, the core 3 door hatchback must be given a long-life design plan which maintaining basic body shape and proportions, provides more impact regards nose and tail treatments. Likewise, a full exploration of 'Mini' (in the round) is once again due to better appreciate its place and future directional possibilities.
The Rolls-Royce division leads into 2010 with the Ghost model, smaller than Phantom, more sporting to combat Bentley, higher in forecast volume and contributing sizable margins borne from far greater BMW (7-series) systems sharing. As Bentley's Continental Flying Spur range ages, and the front-end look of new Mulsanne splits opinion (even if historically derived), the Baby Rolls looks to be the natural beneficiary, probable latter-day coupe and convertible variants selected in preference to Bentley GT and GTC.
Importantly, Ghost's pre-order book will have theoretically drawn-in valuable liquidity to possibly assist the RR division's ideal of self-financing – something we imagine is an implicit demand of BMW and a target of Tom Purves, RR CEO. [NB. As such, as a last resort for future funding, BMW would have a very attractive divestment opportunity, presumably retaining a large stake-hold].
However, negative RR concerns at present relate to defaulted/returned cars and the actual level of Ghost pre-orders – both issues combined possibly creating a heavy headwind. The possibility of higher than forecast payment defaults on 2008/9 sold Phantoms would have obviously decreased cashflow and increased the pre-owned inventory as cars were reconvened. This then puts pressure on independent RR dealers & BMW Finance to either drop residual values in search of sales, or set against short-term assets on the balance sheet at artificially high marked to market value. For those that also maintain classic Edwardian to 1950s RR stock that have enjoyed appreciating auction rates those used car values can be supported 'en mass' by classic counterparts, but for dealers without such classic stock, the value of recent 2007-9 pre-owned Phantoms cannot be 'assisted' within the general inventory dealer arrangement, thus create greater drag for BMW's RR Motors division on new Phantom pricing. The second concern is Ghost pre-orders. BMW's January YoY figures show a sales increase of 135%, which is we regard somewhat lacklustre given the revenue boost new Ghost was expected to provide, but we suspect Ghost has effectively become a for RR Motors revenue stream largely a Phantom substitute, increased sales balanced against reduced margins, Purves himself battling internally with Munich to maintain original contract-pricing for Ghost sub-structures and systems, whilst Reithoffer argues than RR should pay more to assist the BMW group as a whole. If RR is to remain the golden child, in terms of profit margins and the option to divest, Purves will probably stand his ground; but it is a topic more activist BMW investors should investigate more fully.
Ultimately for the BMW group, improving YoY sales data for January of +16% indicates that - unless a double-dip recession tales hold - the group-wide sales trough of 2008/9 has been passed. Yet given economic fragility in the West, and increasingly concerning in the East - if a China contraction effect takes hold – means that BMW still faces severe challenges.
But for the moment the W.Europe January increase of 1.5% (to 38,495 units), the CEE increase of 19% (to 2,237 units), Russia rising by 20% (1,129 units), N. America of 8.7% (16,608 units of which US accounts 15,410), Central America 10% (to 836 units), S. America 99% (1,057 units). In Asia as a whole sales rose by 74.6%, of which Chinese sales improved by 122% (11,919 units) [possibly due to the 'credit-effect' sales rush as highlighted in the previous Daimler posting].
The Motorcycle Division's unit sales increased by 2.2%, which reflects both the increased general demand for 2 wheeled transport in the Triad region, but negatively also BMW's missed opportunity to capture this surge, given its division's CoG in large tourer, sports-tourer, Enduro & super-sports segments. The largely failed commuter C1 project of the late 1990s saw BMW retrench to its core big-bike position, but it recognised the changing dynamics of global commuting (as did peers like Piaggio, Honda et al) hence its acquisition of Husqvana bikes & quadbikes in 2007. It still has not however, re-written the personal transport commuting rule-book, as undoubtedly intended. The MegaCity solo/duo leaning concept car born from BMW R&D's marriage of car and bike technologies looks more like an attention grabber to keep BMW looking advanced, rather than a pragmatic, revenue earning offering.
The Finance Division has obviously come under pressure in recent years, caught between the periodically shut, and still only partially open window for wholesale corporate funding. As a result BMW Finance was tasked in Q309 with seeking regionally-based 'official banking' and 'extended credit' licenses for Germany, France, Italy, US (banking licenses), and for India (extended credit license).As of yet no update has been given. It was also claimed that extra-ordinary EU funding would accessed once amenable, but recent sovereign credit concerns over Greece, Portugal, Spain etc indicates that liquidity will be directed at sustaining national balance sheets, so largely unavailable for wholesale, corporate & consumer access.
To conclude, BMW Group's prime aim has been to re-structure to the new norm. yet maintaining room for future re-growth, this achieved by the “balancing of retail vs residual vs volume”, generic levers for most car companies but historically far more sensitive for BMW. Critically BMW is having to manage its dealerbase, recognising that to hard a squeeze will pressurise their own working capital availability and so long-term survival prospects. BMW undoubtedly wants to see its dealerbase remain as is,string and healthy to help improve future sales volumes so as to break-even the capacity cost and move healthily into the black once more with buoyed FCF.
BMW missed its Q309 results expectations, and whilst better news arrives from across the globe in terms of sales, the battle to recovery is still harsh. FY09 results will be telling as to how well Reithoffer et al in Munich are controlling the situation....but for the moment it is still a case of rational investors holding their breath regards the corporate fundamentals...BMW is still in the fog, and little sign of either a powerfully combined product portfolio or financing flexibility provides a convincing case for immediate progress.
As such the juggling of balls between the Financial Services division and the Autos division looks set to continue, and whilst Q4's optimistic general economic outlook may well have translated into greater numbers of sold cars at the time, once again economic fundamentals and capital markets sentiment has soured somewhat whilst the Q4 purchasing trend by global SMEs that affects the premium-car sector may have been but momentary wind to BMW's sails.
By January end 2010 the outlook (as we predicted) is set to be tougher and BMW will need to - like Daimler - demonstrate its tactical and strategic planning...but unlike Daimler & VW its cash-cushion is far smaller, so far more dependent upon the criticality of recycled, squeezed and retained working capital management far more. That will frazzle supplier and dealer-network relationships, and will test the oft heard mention of the BMW family culture.
Labels:
Audi,
BMW,
BMW 2010,
BMW 5 series,
BMW AG,
BMW FY09,
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BMW share price,
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