Friday, 2 September 2011

Macro Level Trends – Iran Autos – Shifting Sands in the New FDI Hub of the Middle East

This month UNCTAD (the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) presented a report which stated that Iran had experienced record FDI figures of over US$3.6bn in 2010, this then the reverse of generally declining FDI activity across the west (as it shudders) and the east as it seeks economic 'cooling' to avoid overt inflation and minimise the value-gap with the west. Moreover, it contrasts with the decline seen in GCC countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait & Qatar.

Iranian FDI grew by approximately 20% in comparison to 2009's $3 bn, this though a comparative 'top-up' relative to the overall 140% growth injection across 2008-2010, from $1.6bn to that $3.6bn. 'On the ground' analysts suspect that a sizeable portion is derived from the Iranian government bringing back its assets from foreign shores as opportunities shrink. In a global FDI arena worth $1,243bn in 2010, that $3.6 appears but a trickle. Yet look more closely and the re-stabalisation of Iraq (itself an obvious FDI attractor) plus new dynamic 'Arab Spring' mood across MENA sets a revised economic template for the whole region, one into which Iran is already well connected and seeks to be ever more so.

[NB In total $11.9bn came from abroad: that $3.6 bn as FDI, plus $7.4 bn in the form of international commercial bank loans, plus approximately $900 million consisting of loans and projects from international development banks].

Given Iran's central geo-political location, historical background, strong national identity, size of its population, the country has always maintained what appears as an independent character. That character has in turn been supported and lambasted by both western super-powers (old and contemporary) and that of its northern 'neighbour' Russia and the defunct USSR.

Thus, from an external perspective, political dealings for those superpowers that had, have or intend (ie China) to regional influence have been complex. Oil of course has been the prime interest of outsiders, and historically no matter which the country's leadership (faithist or administrative), from the early 20th century external interests in the oil fields have created a subtler though arguably more powerful near-east alternative to the far east's 'Great Game'.

In our energy hungry world the west's high hopes of a truly green, minimal carbon foot-print world have been dashed. The 'Fukushima' event created concern over nuclear energy generation, plus the retraction of government subsidies toward 'late break-even' eco-projects, mean that oil (and fossils fuels in general) in reality remain the world's staple energy source. Of course there will continue efforts to 'unhook from oil' for the reasons of national energy security and emissions reduction – and investment-auto-motives philosophically supports those which are indeed truly viable; such as hybrid powertrains - but for most, and the world's motorists in particular (even painting the mass hybrid adoption picture in the west), petroleum will remain as the primary energy source.

For those countries that have generous oil reserves and pumping and refining capacity, the commodity inevitably retains its 'black-gold' status, the prime issues leaders then face is how to simultaneously 'spread the wealth', protect that wealth via SWF's etc, and critically educationally mould populations so that broader associated-oil and non-oil sectors can be developed to grow the economy and thus living standards. And by doing so allowing their country's to 'plug-into' the global economy.

The question of 'indigenous character' and 'external influences' have perhaps had greater impact on Iran than any other country in the Middle East. Unlike its much smaller Emirate counter-parts with greater western influence & allegiance, or indeed those smaller MENA countries with arguably more entrenched Islamic ideologies, because of its position and size Iran has historically been able to both retain its own Persian (vs Arabic) cultural character, whilst also seeking to create its own path forward in a somewhat unique manner. Yet it also recognised after 1979 that it would need to create an alternative future for itself whilst maintaining core beliefs so as to become attractive enough to court FDI, economic know-how and technical transfer from other leading nations, from both the west and the far east.

So whilst it remains represented as a pariah to areas of the west, and has in the past seemingly stood alone within the region, the sands of time have shifted and so too external perceptions of the state; especially so as eastern interests have become more obvious. With this emerging change so medium to large sized commercial opportunities and interests become increasingly available; albeit it by what seems a slow and erratic process given the existence of prevailing cautious and optimistic attitudes.

There is perhaps no better example than the decades long interest by successive leaderships in developing the indigenous automotive industry. Recognising its fundamental power to transform a national economy through both the physical liberation of its populace for both trade and leisure purposes, but as importantly to assist in the technical, scientific and commercial education of its people. The auto sector, as with the oil sector, has been no less than a powerful 'vehicle of change' for Iran.

In recognition of this, in1967 the government created IDRO (the Industrial Development & Renovation Organisation [of Iran]), as the prime state-led arbiter. Today it still holds a powerful sway over much of Iran's primary, secondary and tertiary industries, yet has also well understood the need for sector specific privatisation programmes to attract private and foreign funds to as to modernise and grow industry.

The original auto-sector 'seeds' were Iran Khodro (IKCO) in 1962 and SAIPA (Societe Annonyme Iranienne de Production Automobile) in 1967.

IKCO started with the licensed production of the Rootes Hillman Hunter called the Paykan, essentially the national car' which ran for 40 years, replaced in, 2000 by the all new Iran designed Samand & Soren based on the Peugeot 405 platform. Its successor the 'Dena' is reported for release in 2012, and has close cosmetic overtones to the Mitsubishi Evo.

SAIPA was formed in 1966 and undertook similar licensed production with the Citroen Dyane & Mehari and Renault 5 & 21, adding the Nissan Junior pick-up, various models sourced from Hyundai-KIA and Citroen's Xantia; the latter using 90%+ locally produced components. By 2000 the company had created its own model the Caravan MPV. Also in 2000 SAIPA bought 51% of Pars Khodro to include the Citroen C5, the new C5 and under a JV arrangement (Renault-Pars) the Renault Logan (known as the SAIPA Tondar 90). In 2008 SAIPA released its own 231 'national engine', followed by the self-created 'Tiba' C-segment car intended for 200k units per year production rates.

Pars Khodro was formally established in 1967 having previously build GM products as a contract manufacturer and then licensing America's AMC's Rambler until 1974. It also built the AMC Jeep under licence and formed a JV with GM to produce several GM products under the Chevrolet badge; the 1981 Revolution cutting commercial ties with GM. Thereon the company took on Nissan's Patrol, and in 1997 acquired the Renault 5 rights from SAIPA. 51% of its share-hold was sold to SAIPA in 2000.

Though the notional 'seeds' of the sector, and have indeed created a full-spectrum supplier base, today the combined capacity of Iran Khodro & SAIPA produce approx 95% of all Iranian vehicle capacity. Conversely, private Iranian manufacturing companies have been established in the past but unless of a specific low-level nature, have typically had limited life-cycles due to dependence upon a single licensed vehicle (with its own competitive life time-frame), or in instances have been brought into the government controlled fold.

Between the major-scale government linked companies and the small-scale privates are the Iranian-Foreign joint ventures.

Like other protective and arguably insular states it has sought to be the prime player in the drafting of FDI trade conditions and general commercial agreements. As such – as with any emergent country with economic agents drawn from the power-base – the framework for market access has been that of Joint Venture deals. Those foundations and learning then allowed Iran to nurture its own 'sovereign standing' as national manufacturers were created using a mix of directly purchased foreign parts, licensed manufactured parts and internally developed skills and manufacturing.

Aspects of this learning (often enforced via trade sanctions) promoted the creation of 'hybridised' or 'Frankenstein' products: creations stemming from either a need or opportunity to engineer vehicles from 'mix and match' systems, typically the mating of separately designed and sourced bodies & powertrains. For example, the P.K. was a car made by Pars Khodro P.K. (2000 - 05) used a Renault 5 body and KIA Pride engine, whilst the Iran Khodro Peugeot ROA used a 405 body placed upon on the chassis/engine of an older Paykan.

Even with internalised learning, it was recognised that the quality of domestically made components and whole vehicles was falling behind the quality standards being set by international companies. To aid further learning about world class standards Iran relaxed the importation duties on both foreign made parts, and indeed whole vehicle imports. In 2003 a 10-year ban on vehicle imports was lifted with importation duties reduced from 147% to 90%. In FY2007 US$ 2,058,016,004 worth of all types of motor vehicles has been imported to Iran, with a 270% growth of imported passenger cars between 2005 to 2008.

It is hoped that the learning absorbed will further domestic design, engineering and testing capability to ultimately export vehicles further across the region than has been the case thus far and with ambitions further afield relative to EM countries. In this mould the idea of the 'world car' project grew, using well proven mechanicals from originally French licensed sources (PSA-Renault) to create or rather re-engineer a model suited to the demanding suburban and rural roads of EM countries. However this project was effectively overtaken by Renault's own efforts to recreate Dacia using its own cost-absorbed second-generation platforms, the success of Sandero etc models plain to see – even so inside Iran.

Today there are over 25 indigenous and foreign JV automotive vehicle manufacturing concerns, excluding the broad supply chain that grew up to serve the assembly plants and the periodic emergence of niche car producers targeting the small but growing leisure car market

The major entities whilst typically unknown to those outside Iran are cornerstones of the economy and as such whilst have undergone privatisation programmes of their own, the government with its typically 25% holding stakes still exerts a great deal of influence over the activities and destinies of those listed companies.

[NB non-comprehensive by nonetheless lengthy listing of automotive-sector companies is provided as a Post-Script addition].

The liberalisation of Iranian capital markets through the slow but locally powerful development of the 1967 TSE (Tehran Stock Exchange) [aswell as other initiatives], has been a critical driving force in the industrial and commercial development of the country. Today the TSE comprises of over 350 companies, its full market capitalisation in the region of US$ 106bn and a p/e of 7.3, up measurably from the 5.5 in 2009, or indeed 4.1 the preceding year. Unsurprisingly in direct relation the average yield given has dropped from the highs of 14.5% in 2007 and 15.8% in 2009.

Unlike many other MENA exchanges the TSE is open to foreign purchasers, and the recent inflows of cash would explain the softening of the notional 'profit spread' between p/e and yields.

The stock market itself saw bullish rises over the beginning of the year, in excess of 22%, however, Iran Investment Monthly (published by Turquoise Partners) highlighted the drop-off in market confidence in May as a result of political unease connected to Iran's ongoing nuclear ambitions. June saw a continuation of constrained and cautious activity with a month end 4% drop before pulling back 2%. July experienced a 2.5% gain on the back of sustained oil & commodity price confidence. Trading was also muted in the run-up companies presented their (Iranian calendar) Q1 earnings results.

But more importantly for domestic and foreign automotive investors that general May downturn appears to have been exacerbated by the recent pseudo-political interventions in the automotive industry.

Parliament has formed an investigation group to scrutinise the type and level of company ownership transfers within auto-industry over the past year. Reports suggest that approximately 40% of the ownership has changed as a result of the trades by the major shareholders of Iran Khodro Co. and Saipa Co. Parliament suspects that the companies had engaged in a share repurchasing practice via some of their subsidiaries. Such moves then, if proven (and if indeed the case – and not simply rumour-mongering to depress share prices, which itself is unethical) vehemently oppose the liberalisation of Iran's industrial sectors through ongoing privatisation plans aimed at reducing state ownership. Parliament also repealed a 5% block transaction of Iran Khodro Co. during May which provided additional uncertainty for auto-sector investors.

Market observers will be seeking a demonstration of political will which - if proven – admonishes and punishes those managers and executives were involved. Moreover, from a regulatory perspective there looks to be a need to close any administrative loop-holes that allowed the cited stock-repurchase to occur.

The industry was also impacted by the governments decision to de-value the Rial by 10% or so in June. Whilst good news for commodity exporters, seeing a growth in demand, the sizeable quantities of foreign sourced components then created a very real headwind regards input prices.

For the near-term a cloud has indeed appeared on the vehicle sector's investment near-horizon.

However, this apparent expose also should allows for re-focus on the Iranian auto sector by investment professionals around the Middle East and perhaps further afield, equities investors and private equity companies alike themselves de-constructing the sector to identity 'value' or 'growth' auto companies, aswell as mapping-out the sector to identity matched synergies for M&A.

Looking to the mid and long-term and the Iranian picture looks increasingly improved year on year.

Though the government has export plans for its motor vehicles, the domestic market should see steady growth as long as the recent unpalatable inflationary environment can be contained. From the societal perspective of the macro PESTEL order, 2 high profile events have and are taking place which will provide a medium term and long-term boost to general consumerism and personal transport needs and demands.

The first has been the completion of a $830m shopping mall project in Shiraz (build by the UEA group Royalstar). The Fars Shopping Complex houses 2.500 individual shops (the world's greatest concentration) over mall in terms of the number of shops over 420,000 sq m of retail space (the world's 4th biggest). The project also includes a luxury 5* hotel, an amusement park and convention and exhibition centres.

This landmark complex sets a new. higher bar for Iranian consumerism and commercialism, the social ramifications will be to draw more people into the realms of aspirational lifestyles and enhanced shopping and mixed-venue experiences. Importantly it will add additional 'upscale colour' to the fabric of Shiraz's and regional society, the raised expectations of which will perpetuate a 'keeping up with the Sharifi's' mentality. The aspirant shopping mall car park in turn acts as catalyst for attitudinal outlook and expectations regards car ownership: its status-seeking and replacement cycle.

This then is a commercial enterprise giving a basis for regional-influence.
On a far bigger national basis is a state sponsored home-building ambition.

The ambitious Mehr Housing Plan seeks to build around one million affordable homes per year that could have real impact on the domestic car market. The government has budgeted for a vast amount of resource (liquidity and man-power) to this plan and construction has begun at a rapid pace. It is expected that the effect on the car market is three-fold:

1. It is 'shovel-ready' work for a broad span of the workforce, labourers to managers, all of which enjoy the psychological comfort of stable income, thus able to either trade-up in used car market or indeed buy new.
2. The plan has shifted the norms of housing supply curve, the additional capacity already having a draw-down affect on house prices; which in turn provides greater disposable income for singles, couples and families which can be used for new vehicle purchase.
3. the built houses will encourage those new house buyers to change their lifestyle by incorporating either their first car, a trade up or new car purchase. New homes tend to psychologically propagate replacement of personal vehicles aswell.

[NB it should be recognised however that the naturally more cautious, conservative and debt-averse peoples of Iran and the Middle-East are not as easily influenced by the notion of aspiration, so the 'lifestyle' changes in car ownership prompted by shopping habits and new homes should not be directly compared to that of historic western patterns. There is an effect, but undertaken with greater consideration and less urgency. Moreover the present high inflation rate will deter any near term debt-enabled private automotive purchases, the May CPI rate being 21% YoY].

Even with this innate caution, the EUI forecasts that new car registrations will reach 1.8m units in FY2011 and nearly 2.0m units in FY2012. (Having risen from 1.3m in 2007, 1.45m in 2008, 1.56m in 2009, 1.67m in 2010.

These social factors then provide the basis of demand, but currency stability issues still need to be addressed to provide the foundational confidence to enjoy Iran's new era.

To this end, the Central Bank of Iran has presented plans for currency reform so that a new denomination replacing the Rial (and its plethora of zeros) may instil more confidence both internally aswell as on the global stage, seemingly in a bid to provide greater cross-border currency flows than has been the historical case, though it comes with a risk of short-term inflation, as seen with the introduction of the Euro and amended Turkish Lira. The change-over to a more Arabic name will need to be paralleled by monetary and fiscal initiatives to create a sound platform, with the seeming ambition to create a currency parity between the New Rial and US$, less so to influence cross-Atlantic trade than to present an equivalent basis from which to improve commerce across MENA.

[NB It should be noted though that previously the necessary cross-border currency FX transactions represented a sizeable slice of the Iranian financial sector, given the amount of public and commercial inflows/outflows, and so any reduction in this activity must be off-set with growth in new financial service provisions].

If achieved real progress will have been made in instilling domestic and indeed regional export confidence.

One governmental element however may cause political and so policy and policy execution stability. That is the apparent philosophical gap that has appeared between Iran's Supreme Leader the Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, reports suggesting that the former is dismayed by the level of power being wielded by the President and political associates. With one year until the country's President elections the kudos accrued by the President for his home-building plans and staunch defense of Iran on the global stage have indeed made him a nation favourite – indeed Middle Eastern favourite – but a political disruption could occur (with possible social consequences) if it is felt by national elders that the role of Ayatollah has become diminished, which itself appears to go against the realms of Iranian Islamism.

For now however, the political waters looks relatively calm with greater focus recognised and demanded on social and economic issues, including presumably the future size, shape and role of the Iranian auto-industry

In 2009 the researchers Javad Abedini and Nicolas Peridy released an economics-orientated report titled “The Emergence of Iran in the World Car Industry: An Estimation of its Export Potential”.

The well researched report highlighted that over the previous 10 years Iran had indeed emerged as a major car producer, but due to delays in economic reforms, domestic vehicle exports have not increased as much as local production and consumption. The research used various academic modelling and calculation techniques such as: data sets of exporting and importing countries, sectoral variables (production, tariffs etc), original variables (expectations, hysteresis), a decade time-scale and 4 vehicle type production groups, “ new theoretical developments of the gravity equation”, Hausman-Taylor modelling and “dynamic estimators”...all to create an assumed empirical bilateral trade model from which ultimate export potential is calculated. An undoubted academic achievement demonstrating the power of broad-reach multiple inputs to arrive at an apparently credible output result.

To quote: “The results show that Iranian the then current car exports are about 100 times less than their fitted values. This indicates that there is a significant export potential for Iran, especially toward India, China, Russia, as well as smaller neighbours: Turkey, Pakistan, Central Asian countries). As a result, Iran could become the major auto supplier in the Middle East. However, this requires the completion and success of ongoing economic reforms.

Given the nature of this very general weekly essay, investment-auto-motives has not viewed the intricate detail of the modelling process, and indeed praises the authors for its thoroughness in data capture, modelling procedure and recommendations for Iranian industrial and specifically automotive sector reform.

Infact, investment-auto-motives also agrees that Iran could become a far greater major player in vehicle manufacturing for export across MENA, Sub-Sahara Africa, CIS states and possibly EM Latin America, since these regions large in both geographical area, political progress, economic development 'toward the western model' and demographic potential.

However, opposing the reports conclusion's, investment-auto-motives sincerely believes that Iran will not be able to ultimately export vehicles in large quantities to India or China.

Both have already become respective EM champions within small car production and medium car production,and their state and conglomerate owned truck, bus and van companies are continuing to forge commercial direct links with more advanced western producers. Their market growth of cars, x-overs, SUVs, van, truck and HGV demand has emphasised parallel JV collaboration across the supply and value chains. Whilst similarly expectations of retailing and after-market 'leap-frog' improvement will arrive, especially so in India, since China has already modelled itself on western consumer influence and retail environment methods.

The Abedini-Peridy results concluded that “Iranian current car exports are about 100 times less than their fitted values”, these seemingly heavily swayed by the 'apparent academic potential' of India & China.

Unfortunately the world's truly powerful forces, political, social and economic, cannot be easily captured, transformed into data sets and run through computer models, they are instead very real immutable influences which have already set the ground rules and boundaries of realistic Iranian export potential. To be accidentally misled or be irrationally optimistic about operating at only 1% of export potential is not just demonstrating naïveté about sector developments elsewhere, but to be, blind to the dynamics of historical, contemporary and future forces.

However, China may well present an opportunity, albeit on a smaller income scale than apparent by China's huge population. Iran does indeed offer the pre-text of 'Muslim-esque' vehicles, and these may be of interest to those Muslim Chinese who wish to emphasis their personal identity. They tend to live in the north-west of the country, along the Central Asia border (Xingjiang, Ningxiam Gansu & Quinghai) ascribed as 'the Quran Belt'. Yet furthest from the wealthier Eastern sea-board and of heavy agricultural leaning, whilst pockets of primary industry are present the regional income levels are far lower than urbanised counterparts. Thus any market development Iran wishes to capture may take longer than anticipated and indeed may eventually be undermined by the strength of large Chinese VMs and Russian entrant brands. Exploration of the strategic Sino-Muslim opportunity then must be viewed as a long-term commitment expecting initial and on-going 'sunken costs' and late-phase break-even.

Thus Iran undoubtedly has a favourable future if it can implement on-going broad-brush reforms across economic policy and industry restructuring so as to to un-tap its full potential. Yet those efforts, whilst not dis-counting export possibilities, must be primarily directed internally so as to continue to transform the quality of life for its inhabitants and equally aid to the never-ending need for the constant updating of industrial knowledge and processes.

However, those external efforts to raise Iran's public profile across the world – vehicle exports being a major lever – should continue to be directed at the proven and plausible geographic target areas of MENA, Sub-Sahara Africa, the CIS countries and 'second-tier' Latin American countries.

For the very sake of national and brand credibility, Iran Khodro, SAIPA, Pars Khodro et al must plot their international path very carefully so as to ensure international respect. That is best served via building a strong an resilient automotive force via what is perhaps the most critical judge and enabler of its capabilities – the capital markets.

Iran of course seeks to replay the historical automotive journeys of the Germans, Japanese and S.Koreans; each took their own steady path, through what was then a less complicated and less fiercely competitive landscape.

This is indeed a time of 'shifting sands' for the Iranian auto-sector, domestically and internationally, but with insightful planning and efficient delivery that path of self-enabling progress can very probably be extended, but relies upon an expansion of the broad national automotive capability and the ability to constantly navigate its way.

Post Script:

A non-comprehensive list of Iranian automotive companies follows:

IDRO Affiliated:

Vehicle Manufacturers:
Iran Khodro Group – inc Iran Khodro Co. (IKCO)(cars) & Iran Khodro Diesel Co.(trucks, buses), SAIPA Group – inc Pars Khodro Co. (cars), SAPIA Diesel Co. (trucks, buses), Zamyad Co.

Parts Suppliers:
Govah Co, Iran Auto Parts Mfg Co (IPACO), Supplying Auto Parts Co (SAPCO), Khawar Parts Prod Co. (KPP Co), Mehvarsazan Co., Mehrcam Pars Co., Top Service Co., Vehicle Axle Mfg Co. (VAM), Iran Khodro Spare Parts & After Sales Services Co. (ISACO), Desco, Iran Heavy Diesel Engine Mfg Co. (DESA), Sane Co., Indamin-SAIPA mfg Co., Kaveh Khodro SAIPA Co., Mega Motor Co., Plasco Kar SAIPA Co., Sazeh Gostar SAIPA Co., SAIPA Anzin Co., Iran Radiator Co., Charkheshgar Co., SAIPA Piston Co., SAIPA Malleable Co., IKD Engineering & Procuremnet Co., Iranian Diesel Eng Mfg Co. (IDEM), Mashhad Wheel Mfg Co.(MWM),

Capital Goods Machine Tools Suppliers
Technology in Auto Ind Advanced Mfg Co.(TAM), SAIPA Heavy Diesel-Iran Heavy Diesel Mfg Co., Press Iran Co., Abzaran Co., SAIPA Engineering Mfg, Iran Heavy Dies Mfg Co.(IHDM),

After Sales Service:
Rena Tech Services Co., Spare Parts Production & Dev Services of Pars Khodro Co., SAIPA Yadak Trading Co,

Joint Venture Affliated:
Renault Iran – Iran Khodro & Pars Khodro
(Renault)Dacia Iran – Pars Khodro
(Renault) Nissan Iran – Pars Khodro
Peugeot SA Iran – Iran Khodro
Citroen Iran - SAIPA
Mercedes Benz – Iran Khodro
Deawoo Iran – Kerman Auto Industries (Cielo & Matiz models)
Qirui/Chery (QQ) Iran – Keman Auto Industries (QQ model)
Proton Iran - Zagross Khodro Industrie Co (Wira, Gen2, Impian models)
Volkswagen Iran - BAMCO / Kerman Auto Industries (Gol, Bora, Eurovan models)
BMW Iran - Persia Khodro
Hyundai Iran – Kerman Auto Industries (Verna model) / Rain Khodrosazan
Mazda Iran - Bahman Group [since 1952] (3-wheelers, pick-ups, 323 models)
Mitsubishi (Pajero) Iran - Bahman Group (1997 model)
Nissan (Patrol) Iran – Zamyad Group (production ended 1998)
Toyota (LandCruiser 70) Iran – FATH Industrial (production ended)
Land Rover (Series 2/Defender) Iran – Morrotab Group (1962 to date)
Ssangyong (Musso) Iran – Morrotab Group
Great Wall Iran – DIAR Industries (SUV models)
Magirus-Deutz/MAN Iran – Zarin Khodro Ind. (various truck & 4x4 models)
Kamaz Iran - Rakhsh Khodro Diesel
JAC Iran - Rakhsh Khodro Diesel

[NB FIAT's involvement, signing agreement with Pars Group but not yet commencing production, has been reported over the years. Its Chrysler links and US government funding have generated protests by a small anti-Iranian / pro-Israel group. Presumably with the government funds re-paid FIAT will have a freer hand to join its competitors in the Iranian market. Not to do so not only prohibits a national income stream but could possibly generate a boycott of FIAT vehicles across the MENA].

Niche Vehicle Production:
Renus Corporation – 2+2 personal car (Anna model cabrio & hard-top)
Farassa Simili S1 – sports car (Lotus Seven / Westfield / Caterham model)
JMC company (UK) – leisure vehicles (R40 model)
Shahbazzadeh Co. - Retro roadster (Faria model) 5-seat convertible (Elana model)
Talash Motive Powers Ind Co.- motorcycles & 3-wheelers

After-market Performance Tuning and Body Accessories:
Demik Tuning Co - Iran Khodro, Saipa, Peugeot, Pars Khodro.

Privately Affiliated:
Kish Khodro (cars) founded 1998 (40% Iranian State Bank, 9% BMS Co (UK), 51% private capital.
Shahab Khodro (buses, coaches) founded 1962
Khodro Kaveer (cars)
Khodro kaveer is an automobile company based in Yazd, Iran . Established in 2002, it makes BMC and Cumitas cars.